

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM

VOLUME 1B

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM

VOLUME IB
THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS
SINCE 1918

EDITED BY
P. M. HOLT
Professor of Arab History in the University of London
ANN K. S. LAMBTON
Professor of Persian in the University of London
BERNARD LEWIS
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211 USA
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia

© Cambridge University Press 1970

Library of Congress catalogue card number: 73-77291

Hardback edition

ISBN 0 521 07567 x Volume 1

ISBN 0 521 07601 3 Volume 2

Paperback edition

ISBN 0 521 29135 6 Volume 1A

ISBN 0 521 29136 4 Volume 1B

ISBN 0 521 29137 2 Volume 2A

ISBN 0 521 29138 0 Volume 2B

First published in two volumes 1970

First paperback edition (four volumes) 1977

Reprinted 1992, 1995, 1997

Transferred to digital printing 2004

CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	page vi
<i>Introduction</i>	vii
PART IV THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS IN RECENT TIMES	
1 MODERN TURKEY	527
<i>by KEMAL H. KARPAT, University of Wisconsin</i>	
2 THE ARAB LANDS	566
<i>by Z. N. ZEINE, American University of Beirut</i>	
3 MODERN PERSIA	595
<i>by R. M. SAVORY, University of Toronto</i>	
4 ISLAM IN THE SOVIET UNION	627
<i>by AKDES NIMET KURAT, University of Ankara</i>	
5 COMMUNISM IN THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS	644
<i>by A. BENNIGSEN, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris and C. LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris</i>	
6 THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE WEST	673
<i>by DANKWART A. RUSTOW, Columbia University, New York</i>	
7 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE	698
<i>by MORROE BERGER, Princeton University</i>	
<i>Dynastic Lists</i>	731
<i>Bibliography</i>	737
<i>Glossary</i>	751
<i>Index</i>	755

PREFACE

The aim of these volumes is to present the history of Islam as a cultural whole. It is hoped that in a single concise work the reader will be able to follow all the main threads: political, theological, philosophical, economic, scientific, military, artistic. But *The Cambridge history of Islam* is not a repository of facts, names and dates; it is not intended primarily for reference, but as a book for continuous reading. The editors believe that, while it will not be despised by the expert orientalist, it will be useful to students in other fields of history, and particularly to university students of oriental subjects, and will also appeal to those who read history for intellectual pleasure.

A standardized system of translation has been employed for proper names and technical terms in the three principal Islamic languages—Arabic, Persian and Turkish. Some anomalies have, however, been inevitable, and place-names which have a widely accepted conventional spelling have been given in that form. Dates before the nineteenth century have normally been given according to both the Islamic (*Hijrī*) and Christian eras. Footnotes have been used sparingly; principally to give references for quotations or authority for conclusions in the text. The bibliographies are not intended as an exhaustive documentation of the subjects to which they refer, but as a guide to further reading. For this reason, and to avoid extensive repetition of titles, many of the bibliographies have been consolidated to cover two or more related contributions.

The Editors are responsible for the planning and organization of the work as a whole. They have tried to avoid gaps and overlaps, and have given general guidance to contributors, designed to secure some consistency of form and presentation. The individual authors are, of course, responsible for their own opinions and interpretations.

The Editors wish to express their thanks to all who have assisted in the preparation of this work. They are particularly grateful to those who undertook the translation of contributions or gave advice and sub-editorial assistance, especially Mr J. G. Burton-Page, Professor C. D. Cowan, Dr J. F. P. Hopkins, Dr A. I. Sabra, Professor H. R. Tinker, Col. Geoffrey Wheeler and Dr D. T. Whiteside. They would also like to thank members of the staff of the Cambridge University Press for their invariable patience and helpfulness.

THE EDITORS

INTRODUCTION

P. M. HOLT¹

A reader taking up a work entitled *The Cambridge history of Islam* may reasonably ask, 'What is Islam? In what sense is Islam an appropriate field for historical enquiry?' Primarily, of course, Islam is, like Christianity, a religion, the antecedents, origin and development of which may, without prejudice to its transcendental aspects, be a legitimate concern of historians. Religious history in the narrow sense is not, however, the only, or even the main, concern of the contributors to these volumes. For the faith of Islam has, again like Christianity, been a great synthesizing agent. From its earliest days it displayed features of kinship with the earlier monotheisms of Judaism and Christianity. Implanted in the former provinces of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires, it was compelled to maintain and define its autonomy against older and more developed faiths. Like Judaism and Christianity before it, it met the challenge of Greek philosophy, and adopted the conceptual and logical tools of this opponent to expand, to deepen, and to render articulate its self-consciousness. In this connexion, the first three centuries of Islam, like the first three centuries of Christianity, were critical for establishing the norms of belief and practice, and for embodying them in a tradition which was, or which purported to be, historical.

The Islamic synthesis did not stop at this stage. The external frontier of Islam has continued to move until our own day. For the most part, this movement has been one of expansion—into Central Asia, into the Indian sub-continent and south-east Asia, and into trans-Saharan Africa—but there have also been phases of retreat and withdrawal, notably in Spain, and in central and south-eastern Europe. But besides this external frontier, which has largely been the creation of conquering armies, (although with important exceptions in Central and south-east Asia and Africa) there has also been throughout Islamic history an internal frontier—the invisible line of division between Muslim and non-Muslim. Here also over the centuries there has been an expansion of Islam, so that, for example, in the former Byzantine and Sasanian lands the Christian and Zoroastrian communities were reduced to numerical insignificance, and became minority-groups like the Jews. This twofold

¹ I should like to thank my co-editors, Professors Lambton and Lewis, for reading and commenting on this Introduction in draft.

INTRODUCTION

expansion has brought new elements into the Islamic synthesis, some permanent and widely accepted, others more transient or local in their effects.

The process of synthesization has not gone forward in a political vacuum. Unlike the early Christian Church, the Islamic *Umma*, or community of believers, achieved political power from the outset, and was organized for mutual support in the maintenance of the faith. This concern of the community for the faith survived the break-up of the caliphate and the emergence of new and often transitory régimes. It has taken various forms. Two of the principal institutions of Islam, *Shari'a* and *Jihād*, the Holy Law and the Holy War, are expressions of the concern in its conservative and militant aspects respectively—aspects moreover which are not wholly distinct, since the Holy War is fought in defence of the Holy Law against its external and internal enemies. In political matters as in others, Islam adopted and incorporated contributions from many sources. The successors of the Prophet as heads of his community drew on the customs of Arab tribal leadership, as well as the usages of the Meccan trading oligarchy. They inherited the legacy of Byzantine administration, as well as the traditions of the Sasanian monarchy. Later rulers were influenced by other political concepts: those brought into the medieval Islamic world by Turkish and Mongol immigrants from the steppes, and in the latest age the constitutional and legal doctrines of liberal Europe, followed by the seductive panaceas of totalitarianism.

Islam, then, as it will be examined in the following chapters, is a complex cultural synthesis, centred in a distinctive religious faith, and necessarily set in the framework of a continuing political life. The religion, the culture, and the political structures alike present many features which seem familiar to an observer whose own background is that of Christian Europe. It could hardly be otherwise, since elements derived from Judaism and Hellenism are common to both the Islamic and the Christian syntheses; since, furthermore, the histories of the Islamic community and of Christendom have touched so often and at so many points. But consciousness of the similarities must always be balanced by an awareness of the characteristic and substantial differences. Like Christianity, Islam is a monotheism with an historical founder and a sacred book; although its theology in regard to both differs essentially from Christian theology. There is also a perceptible difference in the criteria of membership of the community. Whereas in Christianity acceptance of the catholic creeds has been the basic criterion, in Islam credal theology has been of less relative importance; adherence

INTRODUCTION

to the Holy Law is the characteristic manifestation of faith, and hence orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy has been the usual token of membership. Another difference is that Islam has no equivalent to the Christian sacraments (although certain practices, notably the Fast of Ramaḍān and the Pilgrimage, appear to have an unacknowledged quasi-sacramental character), and no priesthood, although the '*ulamā*' (the religious scholars) and the leaders of the Ṣūfī orders (two groups at some times and in some places closely interconnected) have often played a part in Muslim societies analogous to that of the clergy amongst Christians. The absence of a sacerdotal hierarchy, or of any conciliar system, to define the faith, linked with the primacy ascribed to orthopraxy, has made Islam more tolerant of variations of belief than Christianity. It is in general true to say that heresy (to use a term not quite appropriate in Islam) has been repressed only when it has been manifested as political subversion: it is also true to say that, since Islam is both a religious and a political community, the distinction between religious and political dissent is not clearcut.

Another question which the reader of this work may ask is, 'What are the sources on which knowledge of the history of Islam is based?' The Islamic civilization of the first three centuries (in this as in other respects the seminal period) evolved two characteristic types of historical writing. The first of these was the chronicle, of which the outstanding example is that composed by al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923). But behind the chronicle lay diverse historiographical elements—the sagas and genealogies of the pre-Islamic Arab tribes, the semi-legendary narratives of the Persian kings, and, serving as the central theme to which all others were subservient, the career of the Prophet and the vicissitudes of the *Umma* which he founded. The early historians were primarily religious scholars: the traditions which they recorded were in part Traditions in the technical Islamic sense, i.e. *Ḥadīth*, the memorials of the alleged acts and sayings of the Prophet, as transmitted by a chain of informants. There was no formal distinction between the historical *Ḥadīth* and the main body of Traditions which formed a principal element in the elaboration of the Holy Law; indeed, it is clear that many items ostensibly of an historical nature had in fact legal and social purposes. There is also a fundamental problem of criticism; namely, the difficulty of establishing how much of this copious *Ḥadīth* material is a veritable record of Muḥammad's activities, and how much is of subsequent and extraneous origin, assimilated in this form into Islam. The

INTRODUCTION

early Muslim scholars were keenly aware of the problem, although the criteria they adopted for discriminating between the authentic and the feigned Traditions seem artificial and insufficiently rigorous by modern standards of historical investigation. The whole subject is highly controversial at the present day, with, on the whole, non-Muslim scholars adopting a more radical, and Muslim scholars a more conservative attitude in *Hadith* criticism.

Thus the motive which led to the development of Islamic historiography was primarily religious. In nothing does Islam so clearly demonstrate its kinship with Judaism and Christianity as in its sense of, and attitude towards, history; its consciousness of the existence of the world under a divine dispensation, and its emphasis on the significance of human lives and acts. Muḥammad saw himself as the last in a sequence of prophets who were God's apostles to mankind. The Qur'ān abounds in references to sacred history. Hence Islamic historiography assumes as axiomatic the pattern already evolved in Judaeo-Christian thought: a succession of events in time, opening with the creation, culminating in a point of supreme divine revelation (when, in effect, there is a new creation of a holy community), and looking prospectively to a Last Day and the end of history. In this connexion, it is significant that, in spite of the contacts between Islamic and late Hellenistic civilization, and of the Muslim reception of much of the Graeco-Roman cultural heritage, the Islamic historians were almost totally uninterested in their Classical predecessors, whether as sources of information, or as models of historiography. The Roman Empire played no part in the *praeparatio evangelica* for Islam as it did for Christianity.

This conception of Islamic history as sacred history was a factor in the development of the second characteristic type of historical writing, a type original in Islam—the biographical dictionary. The earliest of these to survive is a collection of lives of Companions of the Prophet, and, in the words of Sir Hamilton Gibb:

it is clear that the conception that underlies the oldest biographical dictionaries is that the history of the Islamic Community is essentially the contribution of individual men and women to the building up and transmission of its specific culture; that it is these persons (rather than the political governors) who represent or reflect the active forces in Muslim society in their respective spheres; and that their individual contributions are worthy of being recorded for future generations.¹

¹ H. A. R. Gibb, 'Islamic biographical literature', in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (London, 1962), p. 54.

INTRODUCTION

Although both the chronicle and the biographical dictionary changed and developed as, after the third Islamic century, historical writing ceased to be the special field of the religious scholars, as the caliphate was fragmented, and as new states and dynasties arose, the two persisted as the standard forms of historical writing until recent times. From Arabic they were carried over into the Persian and Turkish literatures, and from the heartlands of the Middle East to the fringes of Islam. Only during the last century, and partly at least in consequence of the reception of Western historical objectives and techniques by Muslim scholars, have they become moribund.

One important class of source-material, familiar to the student of Western history, is almost completely lacking for the history of Islam—namely, archives. Certain documents are to be found transcribed in chronicles, as well as in collections of model letters and the encyclopaedic handbooks written for the guidance of government officials, but these are at least at one remove from their originals, and as isolated pieces are of diminished evidential value. Climatic conditions in Egypt, and chancery practice in Europe, have preserved some documents, more or less at random, but only with the records of the Ottoman Empire does a rich and systematically maintained government archive become available. With the nineteenth century, archival material increases. As in other fields of historical study, important contributions have been made by the auxiliary sciences of archaeology, epigraphy, palaeography, diplomatic and numismatics.

The modern study of Islamic history goes back to developments in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Throughout the previous millennium, the peoples in the lands of Western Christendom and Islam had remained in almost total ignorance of each others' history; but whereas the Muslims almost without exception chose to ignore events which seemed to them extraneous and irrelevant, the Christian writers elaborated what has rightly been called a 'deformed image' of Islam and its founder.¹ In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this came to be challenged. The contacts of trade and diplomacy were increasing between Muslim and Christian states. The study of Arabic was established in European universities for a variety of reasons, not least that it was seen to be the key to the writings of the Muslim philosophers and scientists, hitherto known only in imperfect medieval Latin translations. A knowledge of Arabic was also important in the

¹ See N. Daniel, *Islam and the West: the making of an image* (Edinburgh, 1960).

INTRODUCTION

study of the Hebrew Bible—a study which flourished in the age of the Renaissance and the Reformation. During the same period in Western Europe, the foundations of critical historical enquiry were being laid: ancient texts were being published, old documents were being brought out of neglected archives. The motive behind much of this activity was ardently polemic; nevertheless, controversialists both in Britain and on the Continent were fashioning the instruments and devising the methods of modern research.

A new approach to the study of Islam was one aspect of this ‘historical revolution’, as it has been called.¹ It was demonstrated in two principal respects. The first of these was the publication of texts. Here the initiative was taken by Dutch scholars, Erpenius and Golius, in the first half of the seventeenth century, to be followed shortly by the Englishman, Edward Pococke (1604–91). The greatness of Pococke, however, lies mainly in a second respect. He had for his time an unrivalled knowledge of Muslim history and Arab antiquities, of which he gave an exposition in a short but very influential work, *Specimen historiae Arabum* (1650). The book remained authoritative for a century and a half, during which time it served as a quarry for a succession of writers. Resting on an encyclopaedic range of Arabic sources, the *Specimen*, implicitly by its scholarship, as well as by the occasional explicit comment, prepared the way for a more accurate and dispassionate view of Islam than the ‘deformed image’, which was still commonly accepted—and indeed lingered for two centuries. A later generation of orientalist extended the new understanding of Islam, and, by writing in modern languages, conveyed it to a less academic readership. Three highly important works in this connexion were the *Bibliothèque orientale* (1697) of Bartholomé d’Herbelot, *The history of the Saracens* (1708, 1718) of Simon Ockley, and George Sale’s Preliminary Discourse to his translation of the Qur’ān (1734). Besides the information thus made available on the Islamic (and especially the Arab) past, there was in the same period a growing body of literature on the contemporary Muslim powers, especially the Ottomans and the Safavids. Through such publications, as well as others which were works of controversy rather than of scholarship, Islamic history became more familiar to educated Europeans, and was established beside ancient and modern history as an accepted field of study. This expansion of the world-view of European historians is

¹ See F. S. Fussner, *The historical revolution: English historical writing and thought, 1580–1640* (London, 1962).

INTRODUCTION

demonstrated by Edward Gibbon, who, in his *Decline and fall of the Roman Empire* (1776–88) devoted nine out of seventy-one chapters to Islamic history, ranging from Arabia in the time of the Prophet to the Mongol and Ottoman conquests, and viewed its course with the same ironical detachment as he did the establishment of Christianity and the barbarian invasions of the West.

In the space of nearly two hundred years that have elapsed since Gibbon wrote, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment have themselves passed into history, and new forces have emerged in the development of European society. Political, social and economic change, the new ideologies of liberalism, nationalism and Marxism, have contributed to form the outlook and to define the preoccupations of historians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At the same time, the methods of historical study have continued to evolve. The source-materials available for research have immensely increased, and the range of techniques at the historian's disposal has been extended. The aims of the historian have changed in response to both of these factors. Where the pioneers in the field sought primarily to construct, from the best sources they could find, the essential framework of political history, and to chronicle as accurately as possible the acts of rulers, historians today are more conscious of the need to evaluate their materials—a critique all the more important in Islamic history since the control supplied by archives is so largely deficient. They seek to penetrate the dynastic screen, to trace the real sites and shifts of power in the capitals and the camps, and to identify, not merely the leaders and figure-heads, but the ethnic, religious, social or economic groups of anonymous individuals who supported constituted authority or promoted subversion. It is no longer possible, therefore, to segregate the political history of Islam from its social and economic history—although in the latter field especially materials are notably sparse over wide regions and long periods. As the study of Islamic history is now developing, many of the apparent certainties of the older Western historiography (often reflecting the assertions and interpretations of the Muslim traditional historians) have dissolved, and it is only gradually through detailed research that a truer understanding of the past may be attained. At the same time, the range of investigation has been extended from its older foci, the heyday of classical Islam, the great dynastic empires, and the areas of confrontation with Christendom, to other periods and regions, which as recently as ten or twenty years ago aroused little interest among serious historians.

INTRODUCTION

The Cambridge history of Islam cannot therefore pretend to supply a definitive conspectus of its field: it seeks rather to offer an authoritative guide to the state of knowledge at the present day, and to provide a sound foundation on which to build. The majority of its chapters are devoted to political history—this is inevitable in view of the relative abundance of source-material, and of the comparatively large amount of work that has been done here. Similar reasons explain the generous proportion of space allotted to the Muslim lands of the Middle East—which were, moreover, the region in which the classical Islamic synthesis evolved. Yet the picture which the work as a whole seeks to present is of the great and diversified community of Islam, evolving and expanding throughout thirteen centuries, creating its characteristic religious, political and social institutions, and making through its philosophy, literature and art a notable contribution to civilizations outside its own household of faith.

CHAPTER I

MODERN TURKEY

(A) POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS: 1918-50

The War of Liberation and the downfall of the old régime

The Mudros armistice signed on 30 October 1918, by the government of Ahmed 'Izzet Pasha appointed by the sultan for this task, marked the defeat of the Ottoman empire in the First World War. The war was fought valiantly on several fronts, but many officers and intellectuals with a new outlook on life and government realized that the war had proved the bankruptcy of Ottoman political and military philosophy, and threatened the independent existence of the Turks.

Defeat appeared inevitable as early as 1917, and compelled many officers and intellectuals to reckon with its consequences. The multinational Ottoman state could not be revived, whereas the unifying idea of a Turkish national state was barely emerging. The Allies had already agreed to divide the empire. On 13 November 1918, Allied troops landed in Istanbul and established a military administration. In the spring of 1919, the French advanced into the regions of 'Aynṭāb (later Gaziantep), Mar'ash and Adana, the Italians landed in Antalya, and the British in Samsun and the Dardanelles. The sultan in Istanbul, Mehmed VI Vahīd al-Dīn, acquiesced in the occupation.

Soon he was busy persecuting the remaining Union and Progress leaders, after the main ones, Ṭal'at, Enver and Jemāl Pashas, had fled abroad. The sultan's governments, headed alternatively by Tefvīq and Damad Ferid Pashas, gradually became preoccupied mainly with defending the sultanate. The leading groups associated with the court and the Istanbul press appeared to have reconciled themselves with the idea of occupation. A series of political parties established in Istanbul after the armistice was concerned mainly with the policy to be followed towards the Allies.

Many Turks had looked at the beginning upon the Allied occupation as a temporary measure necessitated by the armistice. The fallacy of this soon became evident, when on 15 May 1919, the Greeks landed in Izmir under the protection of Allied warships, and began to advance into the interior with the clear intention of annexing western Anatolia

to a greater Greece. The indignation was unanimous even among those who had settled for Allied occupation in the hope that at least their life, faith and property would be respected.

Muṣṭafā Kemāl landed in Samsun in northern Anatolia on 19 May 1919, amid these circumstances. His official duty as army inspector was to supervise the disarming of troops as demanded by the armistice. But Kemāl's actual goal was to organize national resistance to occupation as decided in Istanbul after months of fruitless efforts, and to stir the sultan's government into action. Shortly after arriving in Anatolia, Muṣṭafā Kemāl established contacts with military commanders and eventually with the associations for the defence of rights.

These associations began to be established as resistance groups by local leaders in Thrace and Anatolia towards the end of 1918. They were middle-class organizations. The town notables, '*ulemā*', landlords and merchants established the associations as means of self-defence and independence, and also for the preservation of the traditional way of life. In many instances members of the Union and Progress party, dissolved in 1918, were instrumental in providing leadership. Ṭal'at Pasha, among other unionist leaders, is supposed to have urged his followers to organize passive resistance in Thrace. With the signing of the armistice a good many reserve officers, former teachers in towns or petty officials, returned home, and eventually assumed leading positions in the associations along with traditionally minded leaders. The former decided to publish newspapers, to establish branches in smaller localities and to contact army units. However, some associations remained conservative in character, local and regional in scope, as revealed later by their opposition to Muṣṭafā Kemāl's national goals.

The activities of Muṣṭafā Kemāl in Anatolia created suspicion in Istanbul and consequently his appointment was terminated. He then resigned from the army in July 1919. His success as a civilian depended on his ability to mobilize support for the movement without antagonizing further the Istanbul government. The sultan-caliph as the legitimate head of the state and community still commanded profound loyalty among the population, and even among Kemāl's close supporters.

The resistance movement began to acquire momentum with the congresses of defence associations held in Erzurum, from 23 July to 7 August 1919, and Sivas, from 4 to 11 September 1919, which formulated the *Millî Mişâq*, or National Pact. The Pact expressed the decision

to maintain national independence and integrity, eventually through a government elected by a National Congress, if the Istanbul government failed to fulfil its duties. Loyalty to the sultan-caliph was, however, stressed, while the blame for his actions was placed on his ministers. The two congresses appeared in fact as popular assemblies, whereas the Pact, although couched in traditional language, seemed an expression of national will.

Thus, the movement of national liberation, although initially directed only against the foreign invader, began to shape itself also as a revolution against the established authority at home. Muṣṭafā Kemāl's point of departure, that is to say the idea of national sovereignty, was modern in essence, and could not be reconciled with the sultanate's traditions or interests. Unavoidably the difference between the two came into the open.

The sultan, still formally assured of the loyalty of his subjects and commanders, decided on the insistence of nationalists in Anatolia to hold elections in the autumn of 1919, and eventually convened a parliament in Istanbul on 20 January 1920. The deputies represented chiefly the nationalist viewpoint, and helped to strengthen Muṣṭafā Kemāl's position in Istanbul. The British in Istanbul, faced with growingly aggressive deputies and popular unrest, finally arrested the nationalists and sent them to Malta, causing the legislature to prorogue itself indefinitely on 18 March 1920. Next day, Muṣṭafā Kemāl called for the election of an assembly with extraordinary powers to meet in Ankara. This town of about 20,000 people was already the seat of Kemāl's Representative Committee.

The Grand National Assembly was opened by Muṣṭafā Kemāl on 23 April 1920, two days after he had solemnly prayed for the well-being of the sultan-caliph and issued a circular to this effect to province administrators. The same day the United States recognized the Armenian government formed in eastern Anatolia. The Grand National Assembly stressed the need for a government, and defined itself as the paramount representative of the national will. The break with Istanbul was complete, despite the nationalists' vows of loyalty to the sultan-caliph.

The latter had already issued early in April a *fatvā* from the *shaykh al-Islām*, authorizing the killing of nationalists as a religious duty. He eventually organized special units for this purpose, and condemned to death *in absentia* Muṣṭafā Kemāl and other leaders. The nationalists

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

countered this by securing *fatvās* from Anatolian *muftīs*, by declaring null all treaties, agreements and conventions signed by Istanbul after 16 March 1920, and by defining disloyalty to the National Assembly as treason. A few days later the Assembly passed the Law against Treason and established the 'Independence Courts', which were repeatedly reactivated, and finally abolished in 1949. These efforts seemed to have had limited response since a series of anti-nationalist local revolts broke out. Some of these were put down by troops under the command of nationalist commanders and others by the irregulars of the Circassian Ethem, whose support of the nationalists was followed by his desertion to the Greeks.

The sultan-caliph had used his religious powers to stamp out the nationalist movement, and thus sanctioned indirectly the foreign occupation of Turkey in violation of his basic religious obligation to defend the community against outside invaders. The sultan's position was clarified and further weakened by the treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10 August 1920. This treaty reduced the Ottoman empire to the Istanbul area and northern Anatolia, and gave the remaining territories to the Allies. The Sèvres treaty caused the final break with Istanbul, the loss of hopes of agreement with the West, and led to a search for support from anywhere, including the Soviet Union. Buoyed by the rising nationalist sentiment in Anatolia, the Grand National Assembly began to levy troops and supplies. The first major military victory was won against the Armenians who evacuated Kars and then signed the treaty of Gümrü on 3 December 1920. The eastern front had been strengthened politically by friendly relations with the Soviets, which began in the summer of 1920, and eventually led to the treaty of Moscow on 16 March 1921. The nationalists began to be recognized abroad as a force to reckon with, especially after the heavy defeat inflicted upon the Greeks in August 1921. The victory, coming after continuous Greek advances freed Ankara from the danger of occupation and earned Muṣṭafā Kemāl the title of *Ghāzī*, a fighter in a religious war.

On the south-eastern front the French advance was checked in 1920. Finally, a treaty signed in 1921 established the southern border. The Italians also left Anatolia. The greatest battle in the interior took place within the Grand National Assembly, which assumed control of government, and gradually extended its authority in the countryside. The study of the social structure of various groups in the Assembly and of their ideologies ranging from Islam to socialism are essential for under-

standing the nature of modern Turkey. Landlords, conservative religious leaders, nationalist *mufitis*, patriotic notables, modern-minded officers and intellectuals were represented in the Assembly.¹ These formed the middle classes in the Ottoman empire, and although separated by differences of philosophy and attitudes, they united against the foreign occupation, and through it against the upper order represented by the throne and the high bureaucracy.

The war had started for defence and unavoidably became a social front. It turned out to be also a populist movement, particularly since the idea of national sovereignty at its base was broad enough to lend itself to diverse interpretations. The intellectual group advocated economic and social measures beneficial to the population, as well as a legislature based on a kind of professional representation. The government programme of 13 September 1920 paid lip-service to the caliph, but in the second article described the sole purpose of the Turkish Grand National Assembly as being the delivery of people from the oppression of capitalism and imperialism. It promised to 'eradicate the misery of the people and accept as basic principle the achievement of happiness and welfare' through adequate measures in matters of land, education, justice, finance and all other social fields as rendered necessary by the modern age and the people's true needs. The government vowed to draw its political and social principles from the nation's heart, and enforce them according to its needs and tendencies. The socialist group in the Assembly, a series of newspapers and organizations with Marxist leanings, and the Islamic communists formed the extreme wing of the populists. The bitter animosity towards the West caused by the Sèvres treaty directed all the hopes to the East which became 'a ray of hope... to produce welfare and independence for the country'. The representatives of rural groups had a different concept of populism. They attacked primarily the ruling groups in the administration and described them as the cause of all evil, despite their vain efforts to reform the country by imitating Europe. Some of the proponents of social ideas—always respectful to religion—were encouraged by the growing friendship with the Soviets, but chiefly by the backwardness at home. Muştafâ Kemâl, although leaning towards the social-minded group of intellectuals, and often using their terminology, did not commit himself totally to them,

¹ For information on the social background of nationalist officers, see Dankwart A. Rustow, 'The Army and the founding of the Turkish Republic', in *World Politics* (July 1959), 513-52.

and least of all to communism, as is implied at times. He was preoccupied primarily with the form and the functions of government institutions and envisaged populism in terms of power, authority, sovereignty and administration. He wanted to establish first a modern political structure, and used the existing ideologies to the extent they suited this purpose.

The struggle between conservatives and modernists concerning the political régime eventually forced the social problems into a secondary position. The Constitutional Act passed by the Assembly on 20 January 1921 did not reflect the social issues. It recognized the principle of national sovereignty and assembled all powers, including the execution of the *Shari'a*, in the National Assembly. Thus the Assembly with its conception of unity of powers became *de facto* absolute ruler of Turkey.

The ideological struggle reshaping itself as modernism versus traditionalism within the Assembly was brought to a conclusion by the final defeat of the Greeks in 1922. The armistice of Mudanya signed on 11 October 1922, recognized in the main the territories demanded by the nationalists, and put an end to the foreign occupation. The forthcoming negotiations for a peace treaty precipitated a final clash between Ankara and Istanbul. Both were invited to send delegates to Lausanne. The sultan was offered therefore a unique opportunity to regain his power and prestige, to the eventual detriment of the nationalist modernists who were in power in Ankara. The National Assembly, prodded by Muṣṭafā Kemāl, deprived him of this chance by abolishing the sultanate on 1 November 1922, and by declaring, significantly enough, that the sultan's authority had ended on 16 March 1920. The separation of the offices of sultan and caliph was, according to Muṣṭafā Kemāl, closer to the spirit of early Islam, when the caliph had authority over lay *amirs*. He described the sons of 'Oṣmān as having seized the sovereignty and sultanate of the Turkish nation, who had now taken the sovereignty into their own hands. The Lausanne treaty, concluded on 24 July 1923 after prolonged sessions, accepted the basic claim of Turkey, offered the Greeks a generous settlement and opened a new era of friendlier relations with the West. Henceforth Muṣṭafā Kemāl and the National Assembly were the masters of Turkey's destiny.

The establishment of the republic and the reforms

The second major phase of modern Turkish history began after the national elections of 1923. The elections, in addition to unseating the deputies opposed to Muṣṭafā Kemāl, and to his modernist goals, now

easily discernible, sanctioned also the transformation of the defence associations into a political party. The People's party, later the People's Republican party, established in 1923, became Muṣṭafā Kemāl's instrument for power and reform and also the ladder through which new groups from the lower bureaucratic-intellectual order ascended to power and fortune.

The new Assembly opened on 11 August 1923, ratified the Lausanne treaty, and later in October, made Ankara the capital of Turkey. On 29 October the Assembly accepted an amendment to the Constitutional Act of 1921 to make Turkey a republic. Muṣṭafā Kemāl was elected president and 'İsmet Pasha (İsmet İnönü) became the first republican prime minister. The establishment of a republican régime was the logical consequence of the idea of national sovereignty and national statehood. It marked at the same time the beginning of a new ideological orientation. The nationalism dominant in the War of Liberation was the outgrowth of populist ideas and religious loyalties, and in this form it was instrumental in defining the territorial limits of Turkey. The nationalism emerging after the establishment of the republic aimed at reshaping the state and its institutions according to a secular modern model inspired by the West. The names 'Turks' and 'Turkey' mentioned frequently by leaders appear henceforth in a national context, whereas in the past they had chiefly a religious connotation. Consequently the universalist idea of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanism, both of which had played such important roles in the Union and Progress era, were rejected.

But a modern national state and a Turkish nation could not be established as long as the traditional theocratic foundations remained intact and their symbol, the caliph, maintained his position. The latter, still supported by a large group of loyal followers, could have easily regained his traditional powers and rendered meaningless the idea of a modern republic. The issue, therefore, appeared in need of speedy solution, if the progress achieved so far was to be preserved. Consequently, after a preliminary preparation, the caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924, and the incumbent 'Abd ül-Mejid sent into exile. Knowingly, Turkey renounced a position of influence in the Muslim world, despite insistent demands from Islamic leaders for the preservation of the caliphate. The abolition of the caliphate was followed by the closure of the Ministry of *Shari'at* and of the religious courts, and by the unification of the educational system. The judicial functions were

reserved to independent courts, and education placed under the sole responsibility of the Ministry of Education. The traditional institutions which had governed society and government for centuries were liquidated, and the way was open to a new mode of life.

The caliphate, in addition to its political position, was also the culminating point of the social hierarchy which had controlled the masses for centuries. The economic and social changes occurring in the past had created new forces and forms of economic and social relations which, contained within the framework of religion, could not follow the natural course dictated by causes at their birth. The abolition of the caliphate, therefore, threatened to liberate these forces, to challenge the authority of the religious leaders and undermine their social and economic status. Already many of the old '*ulemā*' families had become landowners, merchants or craftsmen combining conviction with interest, and thus preserving their position in society.

The Constitution of 20 April 1924 had legalized the new order, but still preserved Islam as the state religion. The National Assembly was defined as the legal repository of all powers. This unicameral legislature elected the president, who in turn nominated the prime minister. The cabinet was responsible to the Assembly, which alone could decide its own dissolution. The entire organization, however, was controlled by the Republican party headed by Muṣṭafā Kemāl. The government structure reflected its revolutionary background, and left no doubt as to where authority stood.

The reaction to reform and the power group emerging in the Republican party came out in 1924, in the form of a Progressive Republican party established by former associates of Kemāl. The party's outward intention was to oppose authoritarianism and promote democracy and liberalism, whereas loyalty to the caliphate was its inner cause. A few months later in 1925, Shaykh Sa'īd launched his revolt to restore the caliphate and establish an independent Kurdistān. The government responded swiftly by bringing back 'Iṣmet Pasha as premier—he had been replaced by Fethī Bey (Fethi Okyar)—and by passing a Law for the Maintenance of Order. The revolt was quelled, and the Progressive party abolished. The law marked the beginning of a series of new reforms to liquidate the vestiges of the old régime. It also sealed the Republican party's full ascendancy to power.

Secularism so far was implemented in the government, whereas society at large preserved its traditional way of life and customs, rooted

directly in Islam. It seemed that a total modern change could be achieved only by reshaping the institutions, manners and attitudes which perpetuated the hold of traditionalism over the masses. The suppression of the dervish orders and convents, dress reform (the abolition of the fez and the discouragement of the veil), the introduction of the solar calendar, and the emancipation of women between 1925 and 1935, were part of the attempt at cultural modernization. The adoption of the Civil Code of Switzerland in 1926, and of penal and commercial codes from other European countries, though connected with secularism, were also prompted by the need for a more systematic economic life and proper protection for the new régime of private property and middle classes, which had sought legal protection since the nineteenth century. The abolition of social titles, the introduction of the Roman alphabet and the prohibition of the Arabic script (1928), the recital of the call to prayer in Turkish, and the establishment of history and language institutes, were reforms with cultural, but mostly nationalistic purposes.

The surname law of 1935, after which Muştafâ Kemâl took the name of Atatürk (father—Turk), ended the confusion created by the use of first names. It unwittingly gave at the same time legal recognition to the family names of the surviving old aristocracy of Anatolia, as well as to the new rising middle classes. The surnames were to become distinguishing social marks. The reforms did not hinder the practice of Islam although the ecclesiastical schools and other religious activities lost official support. In 1928 the reference to Islam in the Constitution was dropped. Nevertheless, on occasions the press and the public showed great reaction to any apostasy from Islam. It seemed that Turkey had a secular government set to rule a society fully dedicated to Islam.

The reforms, although more profound in their symbolic meaning and orientation towards the future than usually credited nowadays, dealt largely with the form of society and were enforced through state authority. The nationalist and secular aspects of modernization gained in importance to the detriment of truly social issues. Moreover, prompted by changes of social structure, nationalism became the ideology of the new power-groups, and deprived populism of its social democratic content. Society, according to the new official view, was composed not of classes but of individuals divided into occupational groups. The state was the only institution entitled to total allegiance, thus differing little in this aspect from its Ottoman predecessor.

While achieving some of the political objectives sought by the intelligentsia since the turn of the century politically and ideologically Turkey had reached an impasse by 1930. The revolutionary régime had injected society with a few revitalizing reforms, and hoped that it could move forward by self-generated dynamism. The Liberal party experiment of 1930 came out of this search for return to 'normalcy'. It was in part prompted by Muṣṭafā Kemāl's desire to check the increasing power and relative stagnation in the Republican party through an opposition, and also bring in a measure of self-rule. The atmosphere seemed suitable, since the Law for the Maintenance of Order was abolished, and a small Kurdish revolt easily put down. The Liberal party was established by Fethi Okyar at Kemāl's own suggestion. It received unexpected popular support. It was dissolved in November 1930, largely on the insistence of the Republican party hierarchy, who eventually convinced Muṣṭafā Kemāl to give up his neutral position with exaggerated reports of impending religious reaction. It is highly significant that government officials, often acting under the orders of local Republican party leaders, often created difficulties for Fethi. In the end Muṣṭafā Kemāl personally had to intervene, and assure him freedom of movement. The dissatisfaction in the countryside, as discovered later by Muṣṭafā Kemāl during a three months' trip, was caused by economic stagnation and the usurpation of lucrative positions by party members. The first effort to establish democracy produced no visible results, except for giving a chance to the opposition in the countryside to organize itself and wait for another propitious moment, which finally came in 1946.

Foreign relations, economic policy, social and ideological development

The failure of the democratic experiment, the world economic crisis of 1929, which affected Turkey's agricultural exports, coupled with the rise of totalitarian systems in the West, produced its effects in Turkey. Theoretically the entire movement of reform and modernization since 1839 appeared directed against autocracy, and came to idealize the Western democratic, parliamentary order as the ultimate goal. Practical considerations, on the other hand, pleaded in favour of strong measures and quick results, and incidentally appealed to long traditions of authority. Turkey more than any country, owing to its geographical position, social structure and political traditions, has often oscillated between East and West in the course of modernization. This became

more evident after the revolution of 1917 in Russia, and the emergence there of a modern socialist régime. The influence of the Soviet Union was strong during political alienation from the West, or during the failure of the Western system and institutions to provide satisfaction or results. As long as the West maintained its vitality, the influence of measures inspired by the Soviets—and these are numerous—remained local. Thus, the new *rapprochement* with the Soviets which began in 1929 (despite previous Russian propaganda against Kemāl who had been described as a fascist) was caused partly by fear of Italy's expansionist aims (notwithstanding a treaty of mutual neutrality signed with Mussolini in 1928) but mostly by the economic crisis in the West. The exchange of visits between the statesmen of the two countries and the intensification of trade led to a loan agreement for the development of the textile industry.

A new authoritarian trend was evident in ideology and government organization. The ideology of the republic, already defined in the Republican party convention of 1927, was expanded and clarified in 1931, and incorporated in the party programme, and then in the Constitution in 1937. The six principles (republicanism, populism, nationalism, etatism, secularism and reformism), represented by six arrows on party publications, thus aimed at encompassing all Turkey's problems. Of these principles, etatism was to receive considerable attention in the next decade, and even to force nationalism and secularism to follow its authoritarian and partly materialistic philosophy.

The Republican party increased its influence in the government and by 1935, it became identified with the state and nation. The corporative ideas of the Italian system, owing to their convenient rejection of class differences and idealization of the state were borrowed along with the Soviet methods of party organization; Recep Peker became the party's secretary-general. He was an ultra-conservative in social matters, a nationalist and a bitter enemy of the Ottoman dynasty. His philosophy, which was widespread in the party, was expressed in his university courses. The Republican party claimed that the republic was a *party* state, and that people were to address party organizations to have their needs met. Populism and national sovereignty had all but lost their initial meaning. The people were not forgotten though. The forceful reforms, according to the memoirs of one member, were to continue, for 'the motto that reforms are for people despite the people was an unchanged law... Those who achieve social and political changes in the

social structure are the leaders who do it for the people by opposing the people.¹

These internal political developments were accompanied by an active foreign policy under the resourceful minister, Rüşti Aras, from 1925 to 1938. The basic principle was expressed by Atatürk as 'peace at home and abroad'. It was a policy marked by flexibility and freedom of initiative, facilitated in part by lack of international political blocs which might have forced Turkey to commit herself to one side. Moreover, as the first Muslim country to modernize and victoriously to oppose the West, she enjoyed prestige and popularity both in the Orient and the Occident.

Relations with the West improved after the treaty of Lausanne, but the award of Mosul to Iraq was followed by a treaty of friendship with the Soviets in 1925. The settlement of oil-rights with Britain for a pittance straightened the balance in favour of the West. Relations with Greece improved greatly after the signing of a treaty of neutrality, arbitration and conciliation in 1930, and enabled the two countries to adopt a common policy in the Balkans. The conferences which began in 1930 led to the Balkan Pact of 1934 with Greece, Roumania and Yugoslavia, and assured Turkey both peace and trade with these former Ottoman territories. Italy's renewed threat of expansion in the early 1930s brought Turkey closer to France and Britain, and caused a partial deterioration of the relations with the Soviets, already marred by the latter's support of communist activities in Turkey. The Montreux convention signed in 1937, which permitted Turkey to militarize the Straits, while preserving freedom of passage, was made possible by the fears caused by German and Italian dreams of expansion.

The Sa'dābād Pact of 1937 with Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, although of limited consequence, guaranteed peace in the East and maintained Turkish influence in the region. Thus by 1937 Turkey had established friendly relations with all her neighbours, and this enabled her to carry out her own internal policy. However, the annexation of Hatay (Alexandretta) in 1939, after a series of diplomatic moves and agreements with France, the mandatory power, opened a still unhealed rift with the Syrians.

The Turkish leaders, who all came from the lower echelons of the ruling class and were heirs to Ottoman elitist views, had a keen understanding of the art of ruling. But the brilliancy shown in military and

¹ Avni Doğan, *Kurtuluş, kuruluş ve sonrası* (Istanbul, 1964), 222.

administrative fields was not matched in economic matters. In the first they had a philosophy and a tradition, in the second neither. Hence they adopted a pragmatic approach to economic policy, which, deprived of sound theoretical foundations, often fluctuated according to the personal views of its enforcers.

The importance of economics as the foundation of a modern state, already recognized by the Union and Progress party in 1911, was fully endorsed in the republic as indicated by the Economic Congress of Izmir held in February 1923. The subsequent economic policy developed without the support of a native middle class and against the sad memories of the capitulations, abolished in the Lausanne treaty. The Turkish leaders did not reject the idea of private enterprise, although at no time, except between 1950 and 1952, was there a policy geared to its requirements. Economic liberalism as well as etatism were judged primarily in terms of authority, state interests, historical and political traditions, rather than as questions of production and distribution, involving people and interests. The goal at the beginning was to stimulate economic activity by providing capital for local industries, and opening up, and eventually taking over, some foreign enterprises in mining and transportation. The Work, Industry and Mining Banks became the cornerstone of Turkish economic policy, but without achieving spectacular results.

The place of the Greeks (most of whom departed in the exchange of population in 1924) and Armenians, who controlled the manufacturing and commercial enterprises in towns, could not be taken overnight by the incoming Balkan Turks, mostly from rural areas. The resulting economic stagnation was made worse by the world economic crisis of 1929, and was a new blow to private enterprise. At this time Turkey received a Soviet loan of eight million dollars for industrial development, to be followed later by similar loans from the Western states.

The five-year plans of 1934 and of 1939, partly shaped according to the Russian model, were limited in scope, and had few of the organizational features of modern planning projects. Nevertheless, they promoted state investment. But the outbreak of war in 1939 resulted in an increase of defence expenditure, and forced a drastic reduction of economic investment. Some basic industries for consumer goods, such as textiles, paper, glass, ceramics, chemicals and a steel mill, were already established. The national income in 1938, according to rather unreliable figures (the first statistics were compiled in 1927), was one-third above

the figure for 1927.¹ Nowadays those who consider the material results of etatism tend to hail it, whereas those who look at the production costs and poor management are inclined to play down its achievements. Agriculture, the backbone of the economy, was neglected and often exploited, ending eventually in lowering the peasantry's living standards.

Students of the Turkish economy, misled by leaders' statements and changing policies, claim that the country had no clearly defined economic ideology. Actually, etatism was the basic ideology, if etatism is to be taken out of its economic context and considered in the broader spectrum of tradition, history, political authority and *élite* rule. The government wanted to modernize the economy of Turkey by solving the problems of production and industrialization within the framework of state authority. It wanted to use free enterprise as a lever at its own discretion to spur Turkey's economic vitality. There was no question of transferring political power, or sharing it with the representatives of productive forces: capitalists or workers. Hence etatism became necessary. It is, therefore, understandable that pure capitalism and socialism were equally condemned.

There was a notable attempt at framing an economic-political ideology, which represented chiefly the viewpoint of the state and the groups in it. The review *Kadro*, published originally with government support, tried to combine and use socialist and corporative ideas to create a modern apparatus of production, free of exploitation and controlled by a nationalist state which would impart justice to all. There was no question of growth from below, or even interest in cultivating the creative forces of the masses. The latter were to be used in attaining the goals established by the *élite* cadre of the state.

The Turkish rulers faced the fundamental problem encountered by all emerging modern systems, namely the establishment of a new pattern of relations between state and individual. But, without a basic constitutional foundation such as that provided in the past by Islam, the state, still immersed in its own ruling habits, was searching for new arguments to justify, legitimize and perpetuate its traditional supremacy.

The idea of preserving the existing traditional social structure as distinct from the power-structure, although irreconcilable with modernistic aims, appeared essential for maintaining the primacy of the state. The rejection of social classes, political parties, the class-struggle, and trade unions resulted partly from the need to foster unity, but mostly

¹ *First five year development plan 1963-1967* (Ankara, 1963), 8.

from the logical necessity of the etatist ideology and its conservative social philosophy. Consequently the trade union movement was banned and labour relations strictly regulated through a Labour Law of 1936, modelled on the Italian counterpart. The supporting socio-political basis of the etatism was nationalism, which, in line with internal developments, changed from a humanist philosophy into an arch-conservative rightist ideology.

A series of measures intended to spread the nationalist republican secularism of the new régime to the masses unavoidably reflected the conservative ideas of this etatism. The People's Houses, established in 1931–2, aimed at providing a general education for the masses in the Western spirit, but also at indoctrinating them politically. By 1950, 478 People's Houses and 4,322 People's Rooms (founded in villages after 1940) had been established. The activities of the Houses included language and literature, fine arts, drama, sports, social assistance, adult education, library and publications, village welfare, museums and cultural exhibitions. In the end their political role, as the cultural outlets of the Republican party, prevailed, and undermined their efficiency. There were other consequences of this etatist elitist ideology. The peasants, hailed earlier as the true masters of the country, were soon forgotten and left to lead their traditional life attached to family and kin. It is no exaggeration to say that after a good beginning in 1925 little changed in the villagers' life, except for the worse treatment received from the tax-collector and the village police. There was, however, in 1938 a renewed interest in agriculture as expressed by Atatürk to 'make the fifteenth anniversary of the Republic the beginning of a systematic and planned agriculture and village development'. But the first Village and Agricultural Development Congress did not produce much.

A new power-group was at the helm, working through the Republican party. The ruling circles consisted of men with a military, bureaucratic background, who had been associated with the establishment of the republic and its reforms. The populist and religious-minded groups in the first National Assembly had long been left out. The lower ranks of the constantly expanding bureaucracy were made up of graduates of *lycées* and universities with a smattering of general culture and limited professional training, but holding tight to a diploma which was considered sufficient to assure them a career. The offspring of the former Ottoman families, if not totally compromised by association with the sultanate, easily acquired high positions in the administrative apparatus,

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

notably in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by virtue of their education, refinement and knowledge of foreign languages, as well as family connexions.

In the countryside, the notables, the old *a'yān* and *'ulemā* families, after a brief period of hesitation came to terms with the new régime, once their social status and property rights appeared assured. Next to this group there rose the craftsmen, small merchants and local intellectuals who had provided the leadership in the War of Liberation. These became the new middle class, some based on inherited properties or those acquired from the departing minorities (a special law granted to these people the right to purchase property at very low prices), or through association with the state enterprises. They often acted as the distributors of state products, the representatives of monopolies and of commercial enterprises in buying the peasant's products and selling him manufactured items. Thus, there emerged new political and economic groups, who, out of interest if not conviction, supported the new régime, the national state and its modernistic aims, and, unwittingly perhaps, shaped their own lives accordingly.

The educational process was determined in good measure by the social development and its political undertones. The rate of illiteracy in 1927-8 was ninety per cent, and in 1935-6, it fell to eighty per cent, and has remained about sixty per cent since 1950. The *lycées*, as might be expected, expanded forty-one times between 1927 and 1960. University enrolment grew at about the same rate. But as late as 1960, the total number of village children in elementary schools was 1,455,254 out of a total of 2,372,778 village children of school age, as against 823,947 from a total of 945,624 town children. The relatively slow development of education was caused by a variety of physical difficulties; the small size of villages, the cost of schools and training. A more important cause, however, was the lack of a sound educational philosophy, which in turn resulted from a failure to develop an adequate populist social philosophy. Education at upper levels became a yardstick of social status, and consequently some conservatives expressed doubts about the wisdom of spreading primary education. Some even proposed to train an aristocratic *élite* of technicians and administrators in the West, and entrust the modernization of Turkey to them. Education placed emphasis on instruction, theoretical knowledge and far less on doing, creating and participating. The schools did not visualize the intellectual refinement of the human being as the ultimate goal but contented them-

selves merely with preparing good citizens for the state. The only major and genuinely Turkish experiment in mass education, the Village Institute programme, was altered just when it began to produce results.

The relative stagnation which seized Turkey in the mid-1930s could be considered as the symptoms which accompany the closing of one period and herald the beginning of another. The generation which won the War of Liberation and created the first reforms had reached the end of its creativity. Their ideals and philosophy were inspired by the political and intellectual objectives of the Young Turk era: to create a national Turkish state and give to it a modern political form. Despite their limited background, the early reformers' achievement is monumental indeed. They started to modernize a society shaped by political and social traditions rooted in Islam, and amidst most adverse internal and external circumstances. They created a new state, and through it undermined permanently—often without desiring it—the belief in the permanence of social organization, and the sanctity of customs, *mores* and authority. The leaders' greatest achievement was the establishment of a modern political structure, the national state, supported by an institutional basis easily adaptable to modern functions. These were results obtained through a policy of appraising the phenomenon of power without the religious bias.

The man behind this achievement, Atatürk, died on 10 November 1938. He was a strong man, a ruler by the virtue of his training, but not a dictator. He detested the title and continuously stressed his allegiance to national sovereignty. Atatürk was a soldier-ruler and as such had a keen understanding of the virtues and defects of his people. Unlike the Ottoman ruling class, he used his insight for the people's own good. In so doing, he did not beg for popularity, but ordered, punished and rewarded with the habit of a soldier used to obedience. But beneath the determined appearance there was a man, the orphan who was raised in the healthy, human atmosphere of the village, and then the small Balkan town of Salonica. He preserved a freshness and spontaneity towards life even after he became the most powerful man in Turkey. Some of the reforms, particularly the cultural ones, are in fact a direct expression of his own view of life.

Atatürk's coffin was deposited in 1953 in his monumental tomb overlooking Ankara, now a city of about 700,000 people. Every year on the anniversary of his death, the officials deliver their speeches, the youth swear eternal observance of his reforms. In the afternoon throngs of

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

common men travel miles by foot from the city and surrounding villages to pay their respects to the man who opened the way to their happiness. Theirs is a simple and moving testimony to a popular love which permanently guarantees the existence of Atatürk's modern Turkey.

Turkey during the Second World War

After Atatürk's death, İsmet İnönü (b. 1884) became president. He had been replaced by Celâl Bayar (b. 1883) as premier in 1937, in circumstances that still remain obscure. A few months later in 1939, Celâl Bayar's place was taken by Refik Saydam. A military man by training and highly respected by the army, İnönü's basic philosophy differed from Bayar's. İnönü was the opposite of Atatürk. A man devoted to his family, cautious and a skilful politician, he idealized law and order, the primacy of government authority, and the stability of the established régime. Bayar was a banker and economist with a rather authoritarian nature, with many friends among civilians and business groups, but only a limited following among the military and the intelligentsia.

The Republican party convention of 1938 made İnönü permanent chairman. A second convention assembled the following year created an Independent Group to simulate an opposition in the Assembly, and, while tightening centralization, decided to release the party leaders from administrative positions. It also declared that many party members did not know much about Kemalist ideology and stressed the need to formulate and disseminate it. The administration was eventually filled by men of lesser stature, who represented the new groups emerging in the 1930s; these were firmly dedicated to the republic but had a limited cultural and social horizon.

Foreign relations rather than internal policies became the dominant theme of this period. The first major question concerned the future of Hatay (Alexandretta). The treaty with the French in 1921, confirmed by the Lausanne treaty of 1923, recognized the special status of the Turks in Hatay. Eventually, in 1936, the League of Nations proposed autonomy for Hatay, but France supported by Great Britain accepted a joint Franco-Turkish administration in order to secure a military alliance with Turkey. The Hatay assembly, chosen by elections which gave a slight majority to the Turks, applied for incorporation, and by July 1939, the territory became part of Turkey. On 19 October 1939, Turkey signed a treaty of alliance and mutual defence with France and Great Britain, largely to insure herself against possible Soviet designs as evidenced by

the latter's demands for a revision of the Montreux convention. The Soviets had indeed signed a secret agreement with Nazi Germany and secured the promise of bases on the Straits, territory and a sphere of influence in the north. The collapse of France in 1940, the German conquest of the Balkans and advance deep into Soviet territory in 1941, created repercussions in Turkey. The mistrust of Russia manifested itself in the form of growing pro-German feeling among some intellectuals and military groups. Nationalist thought began to acquire racist undertones, and a few extremist circles encouraged by German agents spread Nazi and fascist ideas.

Germany began to exercise pressure on Turkey to join the Axis powers, or at least to permit the passage of troops to support the pro-Nazi Iraqi rebels who had taken control of government. Turkey resisted threats and promises, and gave time to Great Britain to re-establish control in Iraq. The Germans, however, secured a treaty of friendship and trade in 1941, but without neutralizing the Turkish-French-British alliance. In 1943 it was the turn of the British to press Turkey to enter the war against Germany, but without success, since the Allies could not meet Turkey's demand for arms. Eventually Turkey suspended the shipment of goods to Germany, and then broke off diplomatic relations on 2 August 1944. Finally on 23 February 1945 Turkey declared war on the Axis powers and thus qualified to attend the San Francisco conference. Thus Turkish policy during the war remained consistent with the basic idea of peaceful coexistence, preservation of independence and refusal of territorial aggrandizement—even later, when Greece acquired the strategic Dodecanese islands from Italy at the peace conference.

The war did not cost Turkey loss of men or territory but did impose heavy economic hardships. The National Defence Law, which gave the government absolute powers to control the economy, paralysed the market. The requirements of troops, mobilized at the beginning of the war and kept in readiness until the late 1940s, created a shortage of basic consumer goods. The shortage was aggravated by the sale abroad of raw materials and agricultural products. The peasants were forced through the Land Products Office to deliver pre-established quotas of wheat at a price fixed by the government below that of the free market. In many instances the delivery was secured by force, and villagers often sold their belongings to meet the quota. The black market which flourished from the beginning of the war permitted profiteers to accumulate fortunes

overnight. Imported goods, and even home-produced items, such as flour and bread, came on the black market. The substantial amount of foreign currency accumulated from exports was spent after 1946 on a variety of imports and household goods purchased mainly by urban groups with the money hoarded during the war.

The wartime inflation and shortages caused hardship among the lower urban classes, but less among the salaried groups, which were assisted with food and clothing. Faced with growing economic difficulties and defence expenditure, the government finally rammed through the Assembly in 1942 the *varlık vergisi*, a sort of capital tax. The premier, Şükrü Saracoğlu, presented it as a measure of social justice and national self survival aimed at those enriched by the war, but as it turned out, chiefly at the minority groups. The law was enforced drastically at the beginning, causing the bankruptcy of small artisans and businesses. It was abolished in 1944, after having damaged the prestige of Turkey abroad, shaken profoundly the confidence of the business community, harmed the economy by causing a flight of capital, and added to the speculative fever on the market.

The increase in the volume of demand, the shortage of imports and the rapid accumulation of capital in private hands during the war combined to stimulate the growth of an entrepreneurial class, composed predominantly of commercial and manufacturing groups, as well as of contractors who supplied the army and the market with food and a variety of home-made items to replace foreign imports. The number of industrial workers in private enterprises grew during the war to about 300,000 people. Thus the war produced the conditions for a new type of social and economic balance by forcing the growth of the private sector to match and eventually surpass in size the state sector. This rise of private enterprise which afforded possibilities for quick profits created in turn a materialistic social and economic outlook.

The war also provided a convenient excuse to intensify the restrictions on freedom of assembly, press and thought through the Law of Associations passed in 1938. The reforms were also enforced thoroughly wherever possible, although there was more emphasis on their formal observance than on their spirit. The implementation of secularism became dogmatic, as did the language reform. Religious practices, never forbidden by law or by the government, continued, but without a supporting theological basis, intellectual speculation and thought. There was a deterioration of spiritual values, which, cut off from Islam,

could not be connected with a new secular, philosophical source. Nevertheless, for lack of other sufficiently strong cohesive social force, religion still continued to be the criterion for determining Turkishness. Intrinsically Islam as a faith regressed, as shown by the growth of various religious orders and superstitious beliefs among villagers. The peasant had regarded his religion as a normative moral order, in fact the only major force which regulated relations in the village and formed the basis of his ethical code. For all practical purposes the republic offered him laws, regulations, authority, but nothing to nurture his inner life. The intellectual had books, libraries, universities and a variety of other sources to meet his spiritual and moral needs, and to replace in part his dependence on religion. He had also a positivist view to explain the universal order. The peasant had none of these. He remained opposed to secular reforms, lest his life end in chaos.

The middle classes too began to look upon Islam as a moral force which could be used to regulate the new economic relations, and contain the materialistic urges of the masses. The problem as usual appeared as a moral crisis. Where the intellectual wanted to use state power to preserve social morality (later expressed as socialism), the middle class sought salvation in religion, partly because of tradition (the craftsmen and small businessmen remained deeply attached to Islam), and partly because of mistrust of the state. The family, already a cherished institution, became further idealized, for the intellectual and the new middle-class groups alike found in its customs and philosophy the habitual climate of Islam, which many had rejected formally but sought subconsciously for the sake of their own psychological security.

The establishment of democracy

The end of the Second World War found Turkey exhausted physically and morally at the hands of a rightist bureaucratic order closely resembling a dictatorship. The president was the National Leader and the Republican party his instrument of power. But the war had discredited the one-party systems, the rightist dictatorships, and naturally weakened Turkey's moral position, which seemed to be aggravated by her failure to join actively the Allies in the war. Internal tensions at home and conditions abroad necessitated a profound change. The signs of change were evident in 1944, when the racialists and pan-Turanists were tried for subversive activities. The San Francisco conference, attended by a large Turkish delegation, pointed towards a democratic world-order.

President İnönü's declaration of 19 May 1945, promising a democratic régime at home, raised further hopes of an imminent change.

The government appeared prepared to tolerate some kind of opposition when a land reform bill was submitted to the Assembly on 14 May 1945. The reform, the first of its kind, was opposed from the start by a group of landowning deputies and representatives of some commercial groups in the countryside. These, headed by Adnan Menderes, the spokesman for the Agricultural Committee, criticized the expropriation clauses as threatening to destroy middle-sized farms. The debates in the Assembly eventually touched upon a wide range of political issues in an effort to demonstrate that the one-party system and the ever-expanding government authority violated the Constitution and democracy in general. The government reaction to criticism was relatively mild.

The Land Law was passed after creating a profound social and political rift in the Republican party, and encouraging the formation of opposition groups in the countryside. In fact, through its widespread social and economic implications and political effects, it could be rightly considered the turning-point in Turkey's internal life. The Land Law, incidentally, was hardly enforced, and eventually amended in 1950, to render it meaningless. By 1954, a total of 1,551,206 hectares of land, mostly owned by the state, had been distributed to about 100,000 families, leaving at least ten times more peasants in need of land. The main difficulty arose of course from the fact that Turkey had not sufficient cultivable land for all, even if landholdings were brought down to the minimum size.

The political régime began to be liberalized in the summer of 1945, when the first opposition party, the National Resurgence party, with a programme of moral rejuvenation, was established by a rich contractor, Nuri Demirağ. Turkey was about to give a unique example of conversion from a semi-dictatorial system to a democracy. This decision, if considered in the light of the élitist, authoritarian background of Turkish governments appears as a true revolution. The people were free to cast off the rule of a selected few, and to learn to govern themselves by establishing through voluntary action and agreement a government representative of society.

The main opposition party was formed on 7 January 1946, after the press, through its leftist and liberal journals *Tan* and *Vatan*, had prepared the ground by subjecting the Republican party to bitter censure. The

founders of the Democratic party were Celâl Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü, all of whom had belonged formerly to the Republican party, and supported its policies. The ruling Republicans encouraged, and, according to unverified reports, even supported the establishment of the Democratic party, presumably in the hope of using it as a democratic façade. After a short period of indecision, the people began to join the Democratic party, and swelled its membership to one million within six months. Peasants, workers, the lower middle classes and other dissatisfied groups supported the party, and in fact forced its leaders to take seriously their opposition to the government.

Meanwhile, the government liberalized the press and the Law of Association, and introduced the system of direct voting. The president's title of National Leader was dropped. The first national elections were held in 1946, in an atmosphere rendered tense by the Republicans' tampering with the election results. The Democratic Party, nevertheless, elected sixty-four deputies who found in the Assembly the most effective propaganda rostrum. The Republicans, faced by increasingly hostile crowds angered by the election frauds, brought Recep Peker to the premiership.

This internal development started from the hope that Turkey might be able to preserve a balanced position between all the war-time Allies. Consequently political liberalization was extended also to the leftists, who responded by issuing publications, and establishing their own organizations. The Soviets, however, forced Turkey out of this would-be neutral position. In March 1945 they denounced the 1925 treaty of friendship, and, on the basis of the Potsdam agreements, demanded on 8 August 1946 the revision of the Montreux convention to limit control of the Straits to the Black Sea countries. They asked for bases on the Straits, and even territory in the north. Turkey rejected all demands and remained on the military alert until 12 March 1947, when President Truman issued his promise of aid (the 'Truman Doctrine') to countries threatened by communism.

Thus, menaced from the north, Turkey was forced to consolidate her internal front by suspending in 1946 several leftist publications, trade unions, and two political parties. The right-wing elements in both the Republican and Democratic parties, encouraged by the fears caused by the Soviet Union, eventually attacked the Village Institutes, the People's Houses, as well as several university intellectuals as being leftist in character. The reaction which started in Turkey in 1947, contrary to the

generally held opinion, was not religious but social and political, and was triggered by the turn of events in foreign policy. The religious reaction started initially as a corollary to the reaction against communism.

Meanwhile, the struggle between the Republican and Democratic parties reached breaking point. The impasse was solved by İnönü's declaration of 12 July 1947, which accepted the opposition on an equal basis with the governing party, offered it legal protection, and assured the country that the government would change according to the people's wish. The declaration of 12 July is the basic document recognizing the multi-party system in Turkey.

The Republican party in turn attempted to adapt itself to the requirements of democratic life by amending its by-laws and programme in a convention assembled late in 1947. For the first time the convention paid close attention to the opinion of its rural representatives, whose close knowledge of people at large was considered essential in achieving victory at the polls. The convention recommended a series of liberalizing measures in education, secularism and land reform, the main purpose of which was to counteract the Democrats' similar promises and secure votes. The liberal policy followed by the Republican government after 1948, which included the introduction of religious education in 1949, and the acceptance of an election law in 1950, are to be found in the recommendations of this convention.

Meanwhile a small group, representing the liberal, individualistic, and also the unruly elements in the Democratic party, broke away in 1948, and formed the National party. Marshal Fevzi Çakmak joined the party after becoming disillusioned with the Democrats, but even his prestige did not win it popularity. This indicated that Turkish politics are bound not only to personalities but also issues. The party has remained a small regional organization. The two major parties did not differ drastically in programmes and leadership, but did present striking dissimilarities in organization and mentality. The Democratic party had at the beginning a very broad popular basis. It was dominated by the lower-level organizations, unlike the Republicans whose power was concentrated at the top. The Democrats represented the lower classes and some business groups. The Republicans were supported by intellectual bureaucratic groups and the richer upper circles of the etatist enterprises. The first defended liberalism and the latter etatism; although the terms had little in common with their Western meanings.

MODERN TURKEY

They represented essentially currents of thought born from historical conditions specific to Turkey and the Islamic world in general—the struggle of the popular masses against the ruling order at the top. But underneath the traditional influences there was also a crucial modern issue. The Democratic party promised to be an aggregate of interests with potentialities of broad representation, whereas the Republican party remained committed to an ideology with narrowing effects which alienated many groups. This was the most important facet of the Democrats' liberalism.

The multi-party struggle after 1946 might not have changed the rulers' mentality, but it did provide a unique type of social and political education for the peasants, workers and lower groups of businessmen. Truly voluntary associations, freedom of discussion and thought, criticism of government and other types of activities encountered in a democratic society, notwithstanding the abuses coming from novelty and inexperience, appeared after 1946. The individual gradually emerged and began to demand his share in electing the government that would rule him. For the first time in the entire history of Islam, the individual's political role and his secular rights against the government were accepted, and permitted to take institutional forms. The elections held on 14 May 1950, brought the Democratic party to power. Celâl Bayar became president and Adnan Menderes prime minister.

(B) TURKISH NATIONALISM

General remarks

The history of nationalism in Turkey is intimately associated with the evolution of state ideology from Islamic universalism to multi-national Ottomanism, and finally to one-nation Turkism and patriotism. Nationalism in the Ottoman empire did not start as a movement of liberation but was adopted by the state as a means to rally the population around a common concept and thus maintain its territorial integrity. The ideas of nation, language and fatherland did not follow one uniform line of development but varied constantly according to changing internal and external conditions. Islamic traditional influences supplied the emotional stamina of Turkish nationalism, long provided for some sense of unity, and only recently began to be replaced by objective local influences.

Turkish nationalism appears as a series of successive movements, differing in their ideological foundations and goals, and often conflicting with each other. For instance, the pan-Islamic universalist concepts developed under 'Abd ül-Ḥamīd (1876–1909) were adjusted to the pan-Turanian ideas of the Young Turks (1908–18) and finally discarded in the War of Liberation (1919–22) and the Republic (from 1923) for a limited concept of Turkish nationalism.

Islamic universalism, which was a special kind of nationalism, if nationalism is to be taken as loyalty to a set of ideas, is only implicitly touched upon in this article. The main attention is devoted to Ottoman and Turkish nationalism. These two movements were genetically related to each other, and appeared as an integral whole. But their differences were greater than their similarities, chiefly because the political framework, namely the type of state in which each developed, had a different structure and different goals. The aim of both movements was to create a nation. But the Ottoman state could hardly hope to give the community of its people the feeling that they belonged together, shared a common heritage and had a common destiny. This state could create a nationality, as it did in fact, but not a nation in the modern sense of the word. The existence of the Ottoman state was inherently dependent on maintaining its multi-national polyglot population under the supremacy of a ruling *élite*, whose political thought derived from universalist Islamic concepts of state and government.

Turkish nationalism proper developed primarily within the framework of a national state. It was a secular movement, which aimed at creating a nation with an identity of its own, based on the specific cultural characteristics of the Turks. Territorially, it was confined to the well-defined areas in which Turks were an overwhelming majority. Socially, it represented the populist democratic aspiration of the lower middle classes. Politically, it was based on the idea of national sovereignty.

Taking the narrow view, one may well say that nationalism in its modern sense can develop only in a national state. Modern nationalism entails emphasis on local and national characteristics, and, therefore, conflicts with Islamic universal concepts of social and political organization. Although Islam survived several challenges of localism and nationalism in the past, it seems that now the odds are in favour of nationalism.

Nationalism in the Ottoman empire

Ottoman nationalism was born in the nineteenth century as a reaction to the struggles of Christian minorities, who strove to establish independent national states according to the liberal ideas of the French Revolution. The Ottomans were also inspired by Western nationalism, primarily as it affected the internal administration of the state. But they purposely ignored its ideological content, for its acceptance would have amounted to a recognition of the minorities' viewpoint, as well as of a secularist, particularist philosophy of government. The terms 'nation' (*millet*) and 'fatherland' (*vatan*) used by Ottoman nationalists did not coincide. 'Fatherland' was the territory under Ottoman rule, whereas the *millet* encompassed in essence only the Muslim subjects.

The Christian groups were treated as different *millets*. The legal equality and common Ottoman citizenship, given to all subjects after 1839 and 1856, aimed at creating some bases for national unity. These attempts were unsuccessful, primarily because they were not supported by cultural or linguistic bases for a real unity and nationhood. The idea of a 'fatherland', as framed by Ottoman nationalists, could appeal emotionally to Muslim, but not to Christian, subjects. The Ottoman nationalists sought to identify the territory with Islam, and impose its defence on the citizen as a religious duty. This approach was something new indeed. The Muslim Turk certainly had a natural attachment to his village and his town. He would defend his village, but would not show the same readiness to die for far-flung territories without relating his sacrifice to something deeper in him. The zeal to preserve the integrity of these territories could be aroused only by appealing to those feelings, images and symbols associated with their original acquisition. It is in this sense that Ottoman nationalism had to identify the defence of territory with the defence of Islam. This was relatively easy among the unsophisticated Turks, who for centuries had fought for Islam, and had become so identified with it as to forget their own national identity.¹ Mizānî Murād Bey could write towards the end of the nineteenth century that the government and the peasant came to agree that war with the

¹ It is true that the nomads and villagers spoke vernacular Turkish, and quite often they knew, as their folklore reveals, that they were not Arabs or Kurds. However, no political significance was attached to these differences. Nevertheless the Turkish nomads and villagers, even though identified with the state's Islamic goals (the state was actually thought to be the sultan) seem to have developed also a sense of hostility towards the administration, as revealed by references in the folklore of the nineteenth century.

West was a matter of life and death, that it would continue without mercy and truce, and that all this was the consequences of the Crusades, which had taken now a modern form.

The intelligentsia, however, closely concerned with the fate of the state, needed a more sophisticated interpretation of nation and nationalism to tie their own emotional and traditional attachments with their modern yearnings.

Nâmiq Kemâl's play *Vaṭan yahut Silistre* (1873) is indeed the fundamental work which defined the fatherland and the Ottomans' duties towards it. It has exercised a continuous and powerful influence on all nationalists until our own days. The setting of the play, significantly enough, is Silistria, a frontier fortress on the Danube. The hero is an ex-officer, Islâm Bey, and the entire theme exalts sacrifice for the fatherland.¹ The *vaṭan* (fatherland) for Nâmiq Kemâl was 'a celestial body . . . leaning with the head on one continent, the body on the other and the legs stretched on the third'. The nation (*millet*) was a notion inspired by his mystical mentor, the poet Leskofchalî Ghâlib, who had no dealings with contemporary political problems but used it in a religious context. The greatest 'virtue was to sacrifice one's body made of the fatherland's earth for the fatherland's glory'. No Ottoman should hesitate to die for his fatherland, established through courage and sacrifice, for there was no reason to be born without being ready to die for the fatherland. There is in this play a song sung by volunteers going to war. It epitomizes Nâmiq Kemâl's idea of loyalty to the fatherland:

'Our purpose and thought is the fatherland's future. . . .
 We are Ottomans, the bloody shroud is our dowry.
 We seek martyrdom (*shahâdet*) in battle.
 We are Ottomans, we give life and receive glory.
 The greatness of our ancestors is world renown.
 Don't think that one's nature changes,
 This is just the same blood.
 Let the cannon boom and spread flames.
 Let the Heavens open the door to dead brothers.
 What did we find in this world to avoid death?'

Nâmiq Kemâl's romantic interpretation of history, his mystical exaltation of heroism and Islamic idealism, had profound influence in

¹ In Turkish, *anavatan* (motherland) is commonly used for fatherland. It implies a more intimate association with the territory than *vaṭan*.

defining the approach to history writing, as is clearly evident in the textbooks written for secondary schools in the second half of the nineteenth century.¹ Important to note is the fact that the political meaning attached to Islam was something new and modern. This was one of the first developments to pave the way for the eventual rise of a true power state, a national state, utterly incompatible with the Islamic concept of a moral universal state. Nāmıq Kemāl occasionally used the word Turk as being synonymous with Muslim, as clearly indicated by his introduction to his novel *Jeşmi*, or *Evrâq-ı perîşân*, written as answer to Michaud's *Histoire des Croisades*.

The rise of Ottoman nationalism was accompanied by a linguistic movement, which has been often described as the real beginning of Turkish nationalism. Indeed, the Young Ottomans, İbrâhîm Şînâsî, Ziyâ Pasha, Nāmıq Kemāl and 'Alî Su'âvî, wrote of the need to simplify the official language by eliminating some of the cumbersome expressions, as well as Arabic and Persian words for which there was a Turkish equivalent. These were journalists and writers seeking for means to reach a greater number of people. A simplified Turkish language could facilitate communication with larger audiences and help generalize the new political ideas developed by the intelligentsia.² They were aware of the need for a new literature, new symbols and topics, and needed a language to express them. It is in this context that they sought to make the Turkish language a more efficient means of communication, without giving to it a definitely nationalist meaning.

There is, however, some evidence to indicate that the discussion on language differences (court language versus that of lower urban groups) expressed also a sort of resentment against the growing elitist bureaucracy. 'Alî Su'âvî, who referred clearly to Turks and their own language, implied that the Ottoman rulers were separated from their subjects, and that the Turks were one, but the most important, of the many national groups under Ottoman rule. Ahmed Midhat Efendi also could write in the first issue of his review *Dagharjık* (1871) that 'our nation has lost its mother tongue, the Turkish, [elsewhere he says the language brought from Turkistân] and had to learn in its place a language which we cannot call other than Ottoman. . . . This language is not Arabic nor Persian nor

¹ On historical writing in this period, see Ercüment Kuran, 'Ottoman historiography of the Tanzimat Period', in Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East* (London, 1962), 422-9.

² See Kemal H. Karpat article in Robert Ward and D. A. Rustow (eds.), *Political modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, 1964).

Turkish, but had become the language of a minority... who subjected the majority and left it without a language.¹

The scholarly evidence to support the claim for an independent Turkish language, as well as a history of the Turks apart from Islam, came from some Western writers such as Léon Cahun, Arminius Vambéry, Arthur Lumley Davids, and converts like Muṣṭafā Jelāl al-Dīn Pasha. These works provided the inspiration for Fu'ād and Jevdet Pashas to write their grammar, *Qavā'id-i 'Osmāniye*, in 1851. These were followed later by other grammars and dictionaries. It is through these historical-linguistic writings that the intelligentsia discovered the rich pre-Islamic history of Turkic peoples in Central Asia. Now they began to think of a Turkish existence outside Islam, although the 'Turks' association with Islam was so intimate and so strong as to create insurmountable difficulties in accepting emotionally any other existence.²

The linguistic awakening, as well as Ottoman nationalism as a whole, was affected by nationalist thought among the Tatars and Turks of the Crimea, the Caucasus and Kazan. Their leaders published a series of newspapers and reviews in the second half of the nineteenth century with the purpose of educating their people and imbuing in them a sense of nationality as defence against the tsarist government's pan-Slavic drive. Some of these publications entered the Ottoman empire, but awakened little interest at the beginning. The emphasis of folk-culture, language, and local character held little appeal for the Ottoman leaders raised in the universalism of Islam. But when the outside Turkish nationalism adopted some broader aspirations, such as pan-Turanism, the bulk of Ottoman intellectuals became interested in it. Yūsuf Akchuraoghlu, in his essay *Üç tarz-i siyāset* ('Three kinds of policy') dismissed Ottomanism and Islamism, and suggested Turkism—a national policy based on the Turkish race—as the basis for the state. Akchuraoghlu's view on race came from German sources, and was rather alien to the Turks' own cultural understanding of race. But it had a touch of universalism, and in the following decade racialism acquired power as a basis for both pan-Turanism and later pan-Turkism in Russia and the Ottoman empire.

¹ Ahmed Midhat (1844–1912) was an Islamist, but more in the moral than the political sense. A man of modest origin, he disagreed with Nâmiq Kemāl, who expressed basically the views of the bureaucratic intelligentsia.

² Yet these efforts to give life to the Turkish language were partially offset by a return to an obscure language laden with Arabic and Persian constructions, in the literary school known as *Edebiyat-i jedide* (New Literature) at the end of the nineteenth century.

In tsarist Russia, nationalism stemmed from the Turkic minority's desire for survival, and operated in a natural environment conducive to national consciousness. But in the Ottoman empire it was the Muslims (Turks) who held government power and were accused of oppressing the Christian minorities. Pan-Turanism here became predominantly a principle of foreign policy, and a welcome substitute for the fading dream of pan-Islamism. Eventually pan-Turanism lost its vigour in Russia, whereas in the Ottoman empire it gained additional momentum and was instrumental in the decision of the Committee of Union and Progress government in 1914 to enter the war on the side of Germany, in the hope of gaining territories in the Balkans and Russia.

The early Ottoman nationalists were not concerned with the positive objective elements which made up a nation, but searched for an ideology capable of assuring the state's survival. This attitude was preserved in the understanding of pan-Turanism since scant attention was paid to the actual life, culture or welfare of the individuals living in the 'country of Tūrān'. What mattered was the state, not the individual.

Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī's stay in Istanbul at the end of the nineteenth century, and his Islamic propaganda, particularly his ideas that 'the unity between men is dependent on unity of language and religion', seem to have impressed some intellectuals. It is in this sense that language and religion together gradually began to be regarded by intellectuals as forming the basis of nationalism, and relegated the earlier idea of common nationality (Ottomanism) to a secondary role. And since the language was Turkish it is obvious that this was to give the Turks a dominant ruling position in the state. Meḥmed Emīn Yurdakul (1869–1944) in his *Türkçe şî'rler* ('Turkish Poems', 1897), written in simple Turkish (he said, at the urging of al-Afghānī), declared for the first time his pride in being a Turk and extolled the greatness of his faith and race. Thus language, faith, and race for him were indeed the necessary foundations to form a nation. Meḥmed Emīn's nationalism was humanist and democratic in essence, for it was born from a direct observation of his social and human environment. Yet, its Islamic content could hardly appeal to Christian minorities, or in fact to the Ottoman government, which could not accept openly Turkism without undermining its hold over other national groups.

Nationalism in the Young Turk era

Until the advent of the Young Turks to power in 1908, nationalism had developed as a movement with three interconnected ideologies:

Islamism supported by conservatives, Ottomanism by the bureaucracy and Turkism by the younger generation. All three ideologies attached varying importance to Islam. The conservatives and Ottomanists backed by ‘Abd ül-Ḥamīd, viewed it as the basic principle of state, whereas the Turkists regarded it as an element to go into the making of a nation. But none had fully clarified the vital relation between the nation and the state. The Ottoman state, still a multinational structure, was deeply entrenched in its own traditional philosophy of government whereas the nation proper did not yet exist. The situation persisted after 1908. The Young Turks while out of power could afford to promise liberal measures to any dissatisfied group. But once in power they became identified with the state and its political philosophy. Tal‘at Pasha, the premier, stated in his memoirs that to meet the demands of Christian minorities for independence would have resulted in the liquidation of the six-hundred-year-old Ottoman empire, built by ancestors through endless sacrifice.

The government of the Young Turks tried to maintain intact the territory of the empire while engaging in an active policy of turcification of Muslim groups, such as Albanians and Arabs. But this policy, which was utterly unsuccessful, was in fact the effort of the ruling group to identify the government with a national group, even before developing some concept of national culture, or nation in the modern sense of the word. In the economic field, the Young Turks made massive efforts to give Turks a place in the economy, particularly in trade and industry, where Armenians and Greeks were in almost absolute control.

The government’s view of nationalism was not necessarily accepted by all the nationalists and Turkists. The difference in approach between the government and intellectuals is well dramatized by the fact that Enver Pasha, one of the ruling trio, refused to accept Mehmed Emin as an Istanbul representative to the Union and Progress convention, since Emin defended Turkish nationalism, whereas the government was committed to Ottoman nationalism under the guise of Turkism. This was an expansionist nationalism which soon, as mentioned before, became identified with pan-Turanism.

Yet the Young Turk period witnessed the rise of the first organized nationalist movements among the intellectuals. The *Türk Derneği* (‘Turkish Society’) was established in 1908, by leading nationalists such as Mehmed Emin and Yūsuf Akchuraoghlu, as well as Ottoman non-Muslims, with the purpose of studying the past and present achieve-

ments of Turks in all fields of endeavour. It was a sort of scholarly organization at the beginning, and published a review *Türk Demeği* which later became *Türk Yurdu* ('Turkish Homeland'). The latter has appeared intermittently up to the present and has usually expressed conservative nationalist views. The *Türk Ojakları* ('Turkish Hearths') established in 1912, aimed at popularizing the ideas of nationalism, and at raising the cultural level through education, lectures, practical courses on language, literature and drama, as well as welfare activities. The review *Genç Kalemler* ('Young Pens') published in Salonica in 1911, used simple Turkish, and chose its topics from the country's life, to give to literature a national and more natural orientation.

Turkish nationalism since 1908 was profoundly affected by Ziyā Gökalp (1875–1924). Differing from other nationalists who were trying to develop new concepts, Gökalp relied on accepted cultural and social values, and organizational understanding, and used them to shape a traditionalist conservative brand of nationalism. He defined the nation (*millet*) as the last stage of organization of human society. *Kavim* (Arabic *qawm*, kinship group) and *ümmet* (Arabic *umma*, community) were the first two. He developed a theory of internal cohesion in the nation by combining the family attachments prevailing in the kinship groups and the feeling of brotherhood in the Muslim community.

Gökalp spoke of the language, political form and culture of the nation as being Turkish, but he failed to indicate how these outward modern forms would change the Islamic conservative traditionalist content which, he thought, constituted the essence of the nation. Gökalp looked upon the nation as a collectivity, a term borrowed from Durkheim, and assigned to it absolute supremacy over the individual who could not have a life or identity outside his community.

These were the characteristics of the traditional Muslim *umma*, which Gökalp redefined by using modern terminology and ended by producing the blue-print for a Turkish *umma* as a modern nation. For Gökalp, political and cultural goals had the same power, and in fact appeared as identified with moral and ethical issues, and formed the essence of nationalist feelings. Consequently, his nationalism was all-embracing, had a mystical touch, offered emotional nourishment, and could easily serve as a substitute for religion, as in fact it did. Moreover, Gökalp, owing to his own background, had a mystical view of human problems, a tendency towards exaltation and myths, as symbolized by his ideal of *Türān* and *Kızııl Elma* ('Red Apple'). *Türān*, the country to include all the

territories in which Turks lived, was a myth which became the ideal of pan-Turanism. *Kızıl Elma*, a term appearing frequently in nationalist literature, was a legendary mythical country towards which the Turks converged.

Gökalp was not fond of the Ottoman ruling group, primarily because he regarded them as an alien group who had perverted the basic Islamic foundations of the empire. Eventually he sided with the Union and Progress party, and worked diligently to unite around one common concept of nationalism all the feuding nationalist groups of his time, the Islamists, Westernists, and Turkists. But instead of fusing their ideas into a new concept, Gökalp put them side by side: Islam supplied the essence of the nation, Westernism its outward appearance and Turkism its name and ideals. Later, when the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire appeared inevitable, Gökalp placed emphasis on Turkism and secularism without altering fundamentally his communal view of the nation.¹

In conclusion it may be said that the ideas about nation and state between 1908 and 1918 stemmed from political and cultural sources which did not coincide with each other. The state was disintegrating, while the nation was about to emerge. The intellectuals seemed to agree that the Turkish nation was to have its own language, its own culture (primarily based on Islamic values) and its own history. Some stressed the Central Asian heritage, others the Seljuk and Ottoman history, that is to say the Islamic period.² No definite agreement on territory was reached.

Nationalism in the republic

The fate of nationalism in Turkey was determined by actual events more than theory. The Balkan War of 1913, and then the First World War, resulted in the liquidation of Ottoman territories in the Balkans and the Middle East. This development destroyed the sustaining foundations of Ottomanism. Pan-Islamism was affected too. The loss of the Arab territories after 1916 seemed to have left among Turks no lasting wounds or haunting memories similar to those resulting from the

¹ As recently as 1963, a nationalist director of a high school in Kayseri claimed that he belonged to the Turkish nation, Islamic *Ümmet* and contemporary civilization.

² Some Islamists in the Young Turk era went so far as to say that the Ottoman empire, and in fact the contemporary Turks and their state, could not have survived without Islam, and that religion was so much part of them that neither the nation nor the state could afford to eliminate them.

liquidation of the Rumelian territories. The first were mere transfers from one Islamic rule to another, the second formed the essence, the political *raison d'être* of the Ottoman empire. But the fact that the Arab irregulars attacked and murdered the Ottoman soldiers, who in their innocence thought they were defending the abode of Islam against infidels, destroyed not only the pan-Islamic ideal, but the very idea of the brotherhood of Islam.

One may cite various incidents to prove that the Arabs were discriminated against and maltreated by the Ottoman government, although probably no more than other Islamic groups. But this hardly detracts from the fact that the Ottoman state and the Turkish population were fully identified with Islam, and had exhausted their human and national resources in maintaining the territorial integrity of lands under Islamic rule. If one reads the poems of the Islamic poet Mehmed 'Akif glorifying the deeds of Turkish soldiers in the First World War, and then vehemently rejecting the idea of Turkish nationalism, one can better appreciate how recent and strong was the Turks' identification with Islam.¹ The *shahīd* (martyr) fallen in the battle with the infidel was, according to popular beliefs, to be rewarded with a place in heaven, but where would the martyr go who found death at the hands of another Muslim? The real daybreak for Turkish nationalism began indeed somewhere in the sandy dunes of Arabia, where the idea of a universal Islamic empire was born, and where finally it was proved false. The war destroyed also the pan-Turanian dreams of expanding into the Turkic lands of Russia, first because this was militarily impracticable; and secondly, because the new Soviet régime was the first to recognize and develop friendly relations with the nationalist government of Muṣṭafā Kemāl.

Thus, by the end of the First World War in 1918, the universalist influences which nourished Ottoman nationalism had lost their bases. The only remaining thing was a piece of territory in the arid Anatolian hinterland inhabited primarily by Turks, whereas the rich coastal lands were occupied by the enemy. The sultan was in Istanbul, a virtual

¹ Mehmed 'Akif wrote the Turkish national anthem. After the First World War he went to live in Egypt, and finally returned and died in Turkey. In his poem 'Unknown Soldier', he wrote:

'Martyr son of a martyr
Do not ask me for a tomb;
With arms open for you
Is waiting the Prophet.'

Compare this with Nâmiq Kemāl's play to see a continuity of thought. Today both men are still venerated as true nationalists.

prisoner of the Allies, and unable to exercise a direct influence on the movement of independence in Anatolia.

The War of Liberation, which began in 1919 under the leadership of Muṣṭafā Kemāl (later Atatürk), had genuine modern nationalist characteristics from the very beginning. It was the Turks' own war to save a piece of territory and create a fatherland. (The first proclamations urging the population to join the war spoke cautiously mainly about saving the caliph and Islam.) The National Pact, defining the purposes of the movement appealed to Ottoman Muslims united in religion, race and aim, but no longer addressed them as a group charged with a universal mission, but as a nation called to defend its own territory. Furthermore, terms such as 'national will', 'national sovereignty', frequently used by nationalists, stemmed from a modern understanding of state and nation as indicated by Muṣṭafā Kemāl's speech of 1 March 1922. 'The people of Turkey' he declared 'form a social body united in race, religion and culture, bound to each other by mutual respect and feeling of sacrifice, common interest and destiny.'¹ In the same speech he described the peasants as the country's true masters. Later, in another speech justifying the abolition of the sultanate (1922), Muṣṭafā Kemāl declared that the Turkish nation, after having founded the states of Chingiz, the Seljuks and the Ottomans, 'had decided this time to create a state directly under its own name and in accordance with his own attributes'.² Eventually he rejected pan-Turanism and pan-Islamism. The above passages indicate that much of the essence of nationalist ideas prevailing during the Young Turk period had been absorbed by republican leaders. But these ideas were interpreted and adapted to the requirements of a nation living in a well-defined territory.

It must be stated also that the occupation of Turkey by foreign powers, and the subsequent strong anti-imperialist ideas, developed during the War of Liberation, added a new political dimension and dynamism to Turkish nationalism. In the past nationalism had appeared as a device adopted to save the empire. It was passive and lacked driving motivations. In the War of Liberation, it turned into a dynamic ideal with a definite goal; the creation of a state and nation for Turks alone, and eventually it led to the adoption of a republican régime and national statehood (1923). Thus, the state emerged before the nation. The young officers, intellectuals, and, to a lesser extent, the civil servants, took the main part in creating the national state. The same groups also

¹ *Atatürk'ün söylev ve demeçleri* (Istanbul, 1945), 215.

² *Ibid.*, 269–70.

undertook the difficult task of creating a nation by following at the beginning, for lack of anything better, Gökalp's blue-prints.¹ But there were individuals associated directly with the state, and ultimately it was the state philosophy that prevailed and was forced on the nation.

The immediate problem was to find common bonds to provide internal unity and cohesion. The departure of minorities (the last group being the Greeks, exchanged in 1924 for the Turkish population living in Greece), had left the Turks in an overwhelming majority. They were somewhat aware of the new political form of the state, but not quite sure yet as to what constituted their cultural identity. The Turkish language, even though described officially as a distinctive national characteristic, struck little emotional response. It was still Islam which commanded loyalty, and created internal unity. Of necessity, the state made full use of it, despite the secularism, which meanwhile had become a state principle. The practical criterion for Turkishness was not language or nationality, but religion, as indicated by the hesitation to encourage the immigration of Turkish-speaking Christian Gagavuz of Bessarabia (then part of Rumania), or to oppose the departure of Turkish-speaking Christian Karamanlis. The same is seen in the readiness to accept Greek-speaking Muslim Cretans, or the Slavic-speaking Muslim Bosnians and Pomaks of the Balkans. Much of this affinity towards the Balkan Muslims was engendered by past common allegiance to the Ottoman empire. In government posts, marriage, and everyday relations, the line of demarcation was still religion. It would have been inconceivable at this early stage for Turkish nationalism like Arab nationalism to have Christian spokesmen. It must be pointed out, however, that Islam was no longer a goal, but merely a convenient force to be used for building a national state.

The existing concepts of state and nation did not quite coincide until the early thirties. The *Türk Ojakları*, echoing their old pan-Turanian ideas, still defended the view that the nation was based on culture and race. The idea of finding objective elements for nationhood in the very territory of Turkey and the life of Turkish people emerged in 1931–2, in the People's Houses. These establishments replacing the *Ojakları* were charged with the development of a national Turkish culture, i.e. they were to give a new cultural identity to Turks, by studying the folklore, people, and towns; and by creating a new literature built around the love

¹ Ziya Gökalp's views on *ümme*t was the basic reason for his temporary eclipse during the heyday of secularism (1928–45).

of country, people and life. The Houses were to disseminate also the nationalist, and secularist ideals of the Republic.

Just about this time, Muṣṭafā Kemāl launched the theory that Central Asia, the original home of the Turks, was the cradle of civilization, that Turkish was the mother of all languages, and that Turks had carried them to the world, including today's Turkey. The purpose of those theories was to give to Turks a sense of national pride, lessen their inhibition towards the Western world, and cut off their attachments to Islamic and Ottoman traditions. Subsequent archaeological and anthropological studies tried to prove that Anatolia was part of Western civilization, and that it had been the homeland of Turks for millennia. However, the idea of a Turkish civilization in Central Asia, besides adding new arguments to pan-Turanism, created also a romantic yearning for some remote lands and nostalgia for the past, and pushed aside the preoccupation with present conditions. All the conquerors from Central Asia became national heroes. Their deeds were cited as national achievements. Race once more proved to be a convenient link to tie together the Turks of Central Asia and Anatolia. Books, plays and articles, written on the subject, were so subjective in approach as to overshadow, and in fact pervert, the objective view of culture adopted in the People's Houses. The Ministry of Education became, and to a large extent remains, the centre of this kind of nationalism.

Meanwhile, the history of the Ottoman empire was ignored. The remains of Turkish civilization in the Balkans were utterly neglected, even when the local governments, Greek, Bulgarian, Yugoslav, Rumanian, destroyed mosques, bridges, baths and entire Turkish towns and villages. As usual, the West was untroubled by such sacrilege, since Muslim Turks were the victims. History was rewritten and reinterpreted with a view to glorifying the Turkish pre-Islamic past, in the same manner, often with the same arguments and words, as the Arabs glorify their own past now. Meanwhile, nationalism, which had been defined as one of the principles of Turkish revolution in the Republican party programme, was incorporated into the Constitution in 1937, and became one of the six principles of the Turkish state.

In the late thirties, the search for national culture had deviated from its objective goals. A new nationalist intelligentsia, mostly sons of notables from arch-conservative Anatolian towns and small bureaucrats, came into existence. Many teaching positions and government posts, as well as the leadership of student organizations, fell into their hands.

Their nationalism was akin to chauvinism—fanaticism and opposition to any kind of social thought and inquiry. This is also the period when secularism was harshly implemented and religious practices were even frowned upon. Nationalism became indeed a type of religious passion, and the nation a political myth.

In due time, between 1939 and 1944, nationalism deviated towards racialism, as pan-Turanic hopes were awakened by the German advance into the Soviet Union. Reviews such as *Gökbörü*, *Çınaraltı*, *Orhun*, to name just a few, are good samples of the nationalist trend of the time. The strengthening of one-party rule, the identification of the state with the nation, the rise of totalitarian régimes and the war in Europe, were some of the outside causes for this extremist course taken by nationalism. In reality this extremist nationalism was a social and psychological crisis caused by the breakdown of ancient concepts of organization and loyalty. Indeed a series of reforms in language, the legal system and the economy, undertaken by the state, had undermined the old system and caused a crisis of identity. Peyami Safa's confused nationalist writings of the period clearly indicate the extent of this crisis, as well as the attempts to fit old loyalties and concepts into a new fold. On the other hand, influential publications, such as *Varlık*, under the direction of Yaşar Nabi, found enough courage to withstand the lure of extremism and defend the initial objective, patriotic goals of Turkish nationalism.

It must be pointed out, however, that the influx of a variety of religious and conservative ideas into Turkish nationalism between 1933 and 1945, helped to identify various groups in the countryside with the nation and state. The population began to think of itself as being Turkish, and although it was still loyal to Islam as a faith, its thoughts and aspirations were confined to the territorial boundaries of Turkey. Islamists, racialists, socialists and pan-Turanists, although still dedicated to universal goals, were in reality thinking as nationals of the Turkish state.

Physically there was now a Turkish national state and one nation (culturally it still needed definition) and this was the major achievement of nationalism. Probably the greatest differences between the Turks and the Arabs in their present struggle for political modernization lies in the success of the first and the failure of the second to achieve stable national statehood.

CHAPTER 2

THE ARAB LANDS

(A) POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS: 1918–48

The Arab lands of the Near East which were part of the Ottoman empire for nearly four hundred years, fell under Allied military occupation by the end of 1918. Great Britain and France had in their hands the destiny of the twin historic capitals of the once mighty Muslim empire: Damascus of Umayyad fame, and Baghdād of ‘Abbasid grandeur. And, for the first time since the Crusades, Jerusalem and, indeed, the whole of Palestine were occupied by a Christian power. The Arab nationalist leaders’ joy at the liberation of their lands from what they called the Turkish yoke, soon turned to disillusionment, righteous anger and even hostility when the truth became widely known, i.e. the existence of certain agreements and correspondence, whereby the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire—Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine—were to be divided between the British and French governments. Iraq and Palestine (with Transjordan) were to be under direct British military rule. France was to be installed in Syria and Lebanon. An Arab government was, however, established in Damascus early in October 1918. The story of this government, the establishment of which was due to unexpected circumstances, and the special case of Lebanon which clung to its own independence—special because of its religious and social background and because of its cultural and economic ties with the West—deserve to be related briefly. On 1 October 1918, the Arab forces of Fayṣal entered Damascus. On 5 October, Fayṣal announced the establishment in Syria of an Arab constitutional government fully and absolutely independent, in the name of ‘our lord, Sultan Husayn’. The British government was prepared to recognize an Arab administration under Fayṣal as representative of his father, King Ḥusayn, in territory east of the Jordan river, from ‘Aqaba to Ma‘ān and Damascus inclusive. However, he would have to get in touch with the British and French governments regarding the affairs of the Arab administration through two liaison officers, one British and the other French. He had also to remember that the territory under his administration—until a short time ago part of the Ottoman empire—was now only

'occupied enemy territory' in the absence of a peace settlement with Turkey. Meanwhile Fayṣal's government would receive a financial subsidy of £150,000 a month.

It may be of interest to note that Lawrence's romantic association with the Arab revolt came to an end in Syria at the end of the first meeting which took place between *Amir* Fayṣal, General Allenby and Lawrence himself on 3 October at the Victoria Hotel in Damascus. Lawrence told Allenby that he would not be able to work with a French liaison officer, and asked for leave. Leave was granted, and he left Damascus for Cairo the next day.

Lebanon was occupied by British and French forces on 8 October after having lived for a week under an 'Arab Hashemite Government' established 'illegally' by a small Arab force which had been sent by Fayṣal from Damascus to hoist the Arab flag in the name of the king of the Ḥijāz. A few days later, the French military governor of Lebanon, Colonel de Piépape, in a warm and friendly speech, announced that he was now reinstating in office the Lebanese Administrative Council, and restoring the independence of Lebanon under the protection of the French Republic. Thus, when the armistice with Turkey was signed on 30 October 1918, either the Union Jack or the Tricolour was flying in all the Arab towns and cities which became later the capitals of the independent Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent. It is true that the Arabs were jubilant because their countries had been liberated from the horrors of war, but they could not help being filled with misgivings and suspicion about the future of their lands. On the one hand, there were the war-time pledges and commitments of the Allies and the Principles of President Wilson: 'government by the consent of the governed... and for the benefit of the populations concerned', and 'self-determination... an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril...'¹ On the other hand, they were face to face with a military and political West which occupied their lands. Hence, what guarantee was there that they were going to achieve their hopes and aspirations for political independence and national sovereignty? Meanwhile, another element of anxiety had been added to the Arab leaders' fears for the future, although its real significance and incalculable results could not, at the time, be fully grasped or envisaged. This was the Balfour Declaration made in a letter to Lord Rothschild on 2 November

¹ From President Wilson's addresses to the Senate on 22 January 1917 and to Congress on 11 February 1918.

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

1917, and stating that the British government viewed with favour 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. . . ' Doubt of the sincerity and suspicion of the intentions of the Allies became unavoidable.

The *Amir* Fayṣal was at the time the only recognized Arab leader with whom the Allies were dealing. His engaging personality, his dignified demeanour, his reasonableness and understanding of Western diplomacy, gained for him the respect and admiration of those who came to know him. He stood firmly for the Arab nationalist aims of political independence and the ideal of uniting the Arabs eventually into one nation. In a memorandum which he submitted to the Peace Conference in Paris on 1 January 1919, he wrote, 'I came to Europe on behalf of my father and the Arabs of Asia. . . They expect the Powers to think of them as one potential people, jealous of their language and liberty, and ask that no steps be taken inconsistent with the prospect of an eventual union of these areas under one sovereign government.'¹ On 29 January, he submitted another memorandum to the Peace Conference in which he wrote:

As representative of my father who, by request of Britain and France, led the Arab rebellion against the Turks, I have come to ask that the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia, from the line Alexandretta–Diarbekr southward to the Indian Ocean, be recognized as independent sovereign peoples under the guarantee of the League of Nations. . . I base my request on the principles enunciated by President Wilson (attached), and am confident that the Powers will attach more importance to the bodies and souls of the Arabic-speaking peoples than to their own material interest.²

1919 was a year of long and bitter controversies between Great Britain and France over the Syrian Question, particularly over the Arab government of Fayṣal in Damascus. Clemenceau maintained firmly that the setting up of this government by the British was untenable, and inconsistent with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Lloyd George appeared to give his full support to Fayṣal and to an independent Arab government in Syria. But he had to give way, finally, to Clemenceau's uncompromising attitude, and the year ended with Fayṣal in Paris trying to reach some understanding with the French government.

In January 1920, when Fayṣal returned to Damascus from Paris, after a stay of nearly four months, he was a tired and worried man. He was

¹ D. H. Miller, *My diary at the Conference of Paris, 1918–1919* (New York, 1924), IV, 297–9.

² Miller, *My diary*, IV, 300.

suspected by his own people, warned by his father not to compromise the independence of Syria, and harassed by deputation after deputation who came to see him and urge immediate action. The Iraqi leaders had their grievances against Great Britain who had occupied Iraq; the Syrians were against the French and also the British, whom they blamed for having abandoned them to France; the Palestinians, after the Balfour Declaration, accused Britain of having 'sold' Palestine to the Zionists, and some Lebanese were distressed by France's direct and full intervention in all their affairs. In view of the deteriorating situation in Syria and the failure of Fayṣal's policy of moderation, the General Syrian Congress 'representing the Syrian Arab nation', drew up a historic resolution on 7 March 1920, proclaiming the full independence of a united Syria, i.e. Syria with its 'natural boundaries', including Palestine (thus rejecting the claim of the Zionists for a National Home for the Jews) and Lebanon with the understanding that the latter would have its autonomy within its pre-war frontiers provided it did not accept any foreign influence in its affairs. The Congress also asked for 'the full independence of Iraq' and its eventual political and economic union with Syria. The following day, 8 March, Fayṣal was proclaimed, in Damascus, king of the 'United Kingdom of Syria' while his brother the *Amīr* 'Abd Allāh was proclaimed king of an independent Iraq. As 'Abd Allāh was at that time about a thousand miles away in the Ḥijāz, and Iraq was in British occupation, his proclamation as king of Iraq could not be taken seriously. Fayṣal's kingship was repudiated by the British government, and ignored by King Ḥusayn, who felt that it was contrary to the original aim of the Arab revolt, and a blow to Arab unity. The French government was greatly irritated, and protested to the British. The Lebanese took matters into their own hands—with the knowledge and support of the French authorities—to maintain their freedom, and protect their sovereignty. The Lebanese delegation in Paris had already protested to the prime minister, Millerand, against the *Amīr* Fayṣal proclaiming himself king over Lebanon, and the Maronite Patriarch Hoyek (Ilyās al-Ḥuwayyik) had received, on 17 March 1920, renewed assurances that the interests of Lebanon would be safeguarded by France. Consequently, on Monday, 22 March, in the midst of an imposing ceremony, the first Lebanese flag was unfurled on the Government House at Ba'abdā and the independence of Lebanon was thus proclaimed.

Events were now moving fast, and it was more than ever necessary for Great Britain and France to work out their own final plans for the

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

Arab lands of the Near East. Hence it was that the Allied Supreme Council met at San Remo, and on 25 April the assignment of mandates for Mesopotamia (Iraq), Palestine, Syria and Lebanon took place. These were the 'A' mandates, and the mandatories chosen by the principal Allied powers were Great Britain for Mesopotamia and Palestine, France for Syria and Lebanon. Cynics have considered the mandate system a substitute for the old imperialism. Actually, the idealism on which the Covenant of the League of Nations was based could not admit the principle of annexation by the victorious powers of any new country arising from the break-up of the states they had defeated. But, in the words of General Smuts's memorandum on the League of Nations, 'The peoples left behind by the decomposition of Russia, Austria and Turkey are mostly untrained politically; many of them are either incapable of or deficient in power of self-government; they are mostly destitute, and will require much nursing towards economic and political independence.'¹ This nursing towards independence was expressed in mild and conciliatory language in article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which stated,

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory ... ²

Nevertheless, the plain facts were that the 'power vacuum' created by the destruction of the Ottoman empire was filled by the combined presence of Great Britain and France in the form of mandatory governments, and that the Arab provinces fell under the tutelage of those two powers. If this was not virtual annexation, it certainly was Western domination. This foreign control was, however, sugar-coated by the steps which it took to establish local Arab governments in the mandated territories. Unfortunately the first experiment in establishing an Arab government came to a violent and bitter end. Twenty-one months and twenty-two days after Fayṣal's triumphal entry into Damascus, his Arab government in Syria was brought to an end. On 25 July 1920, Damascus was occupied by an imposing French force, and Fayṣal had to abandon

¹ D. Lloyd George, *The truth about the peace treaties* (London, 1938), I, 622.

² *Ibid.* I, 549.

the city. He finally left Syria for Haifa, on his way to England, on 1 August 1920. France had, at last, obtained her Syrian share of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, though not without being obliged to resort to force.

The events in Syria had a profound effect on Iraq. Ever since 1918, when virtually the whole of Mesopotamia was under British military occupation, there had been opposition and resistance to British rule in Baghdād and in various parts of the country. Iraqi nationalists and religious leaders rebelled in April 1920; the rebellion became an insurrection, in July of the same year. Its suppression towards the end of 1920 was costly in men and materials, and embittered the relations between the nationalists and the occupying authorities.

The occupation of Syria by General Gouraud's troops and the Iraqi revolt marked the end of an era in the relations of the Arab lands of the Near East with Great Britain and France. The events which led to the downfall of Fayṣal in particularly humiliating circumstances convinced the Arab nationalist leaders that, for the success of their nationalist aspirations, an armed conflict between the Arabs and the West would, in the long run, become inevitable.

The situation of Egypt was different from that of the Arab territories of the Fertile Crescent. No sooner had Turkey entered the war against the Allies in November 1914 than Egypt was declared a British protectorate. The proclamation of this protectorate created many problems and much discontent among Egyptian nationalists, who considered it the extinction of Egypt's autonomy. No solution short of independence could satisfy them.

Egyptian nationalism at the end of the First World War, like Lebanese nationalism, was stronger than the ties of Arabism with the rest of the Arab lands. It is of much interest to note that, when the Arab revolt started in 1916, the Egyptian leaders had neither the interest nor the time to get involved in it. Nūrī al-Saʿīd, who was then in Cairo, went to confer with the distinguished Egyptian nationalist, Saʿd Zaghlūl, before proceeding to Mecca to join the revolt. Zaghlūl's observations were to the effect that the Arab lands in those days did not form any political or sovereign entity which might perish if the revolt failed. They did not constitute an independent state, the very existence of which was in jeopardy, as was the case with the Ottoman empire. Those who worked for the future of the Arabs and who struggled for their independence and national sovereignty were pioneers and might even become martyrs. But as far as he, Zaghlūl, was concerned, he was too busy working for the

independence of Egypt. All that he could do was to wish the *Sharif* Ḥusayn and the Arabs every success in their 'noble endeavours'.

Two days after the war came to an end, i.e. on 13 November 1918, Zaghlūl had an interview with Sir Reginald Wingate, the British high commissioner in Egypt, and 'demanded complete autonomy for Egypt, as an ancient and capable race with a glorious past—far more capable of conducting a well-ordered government than the Arabs, Syrians and Mesopotamians to whom self-determination had so recently been promised'.¹ On the same day, the Egyptian prime minister, Rushdī Pasha, made it clear to Wingate that it was very necessary that he with 'Adli Pasha Yegen, the minister of Education, and a deputation (*Wafd*) representing the Egyptian nationalists, headed by Zaghlūl should be invited to London to discuss the Egyptian question. The British Foreign Office replied on 27 November that 'no Nationalists should be allowed to leave Egypt'. In the days that followed, political tension and agitation began to mount ominously, and by 1920 the nationalists had intensified their demands for 'complete independence' for Egypt.

Thus, as far as Egypt was concerned, the year 1918 came to an end with Great Britain in full control of the country. But dark clouds were gathering on the horizon ready for the violent storm which burst during the next three years in the form of strikes, demonstrations and a widespread insurrection.

Turning to Arabia, where the Arab revolt had started in 1916, we find that here, by 1920, the tide of events had gone against King Ḥusayn. He had, finally, become so inflexible and uncompromising that British support for him had dwindled greatly. When he was proclaimed 'king of the Arabs', on 30 October 1916, the Allies refused to recognize him as such, and finally accepted the title of king of the Ḥijāz. In 1919 he came into conflict with 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Su'ūd, the recognized Wāhhābī leader from the House of Su'ūd. In the summer of 1924, a serious attack by the Wāhhābīs on the Ḥijāz led to the abdication of King Ḥusayn on 5 October, in favour of his son 'Alī. On 11 March 1924, King Ḥusayn had been proclaimed caliph while on a visit to 'Ammān in Transjordan. It may well be that this event hastened the Wāhhābī attacks on him. The king withdrew to Jedda then proceeded to 'Aqaba and, later, in July 1925, left for Cyprus on board a British destroyer. The Wāhhābīs renewed their attacks and occupied Jedda, Medina and Yanbu'. 'Alī abdicated and went into exile to Baghdād, where he died in 1934. Three

¹ Ronald Wingate, *Wingate of the Sudan* (London, 1955), 229.

years earlier, in 1931, King Ḥusayn had passed away in ‘Ammān at the age of seventy-five. He was the last descendant of the Prophet to become grand *sharif* of Mecca, and the first illustrious Arab victim of the exigencies of power politics after the First World War. He did not know the rules of Western diplomacy, and was militarily and financially weak. He played for very high stakes, and lost. But whatever may be said of King Ḥusayn, of his shortcomings and limitations, he had, in most testing circumstances, the courage of his convictions and a clear conscience. He did not compromise and did not falter, but remained, to the end, loyal to his principles of the Arab revolt and to his ideal of Arab unity.

Although King Ḥusayn was not destined to rule Arabia, no foreign power dominated that country at the end of the war. Eventually, central Arabia became an independent kingdom under King ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Su‘ūd, originally the ruler of Najd. In the coastal regions, however, the British government had direct or indirect control, through treaty relations, over no less than twenty rulers of various principalities and shaykhdoms—from Kuwayt, at the tip of the Persian Gulf, to Aden Colony and Protectorate, and the island of Perim at the southern entrance of the Red Sea, passing by the island of Baḥrayn, Qaṭar, the Trucial Coast (known originally as the Pirate Coast), and the sultanate of Masqaṭ and ‘Umān. In certain cases, British relations with some of the rulers in this area were of long standing, such as with Masqaṭ, whose treaty of alliance with Great Britain started in 1798. Various other agreements dated from 1820, 1835, 1839 (when Aden was occupied), and thereafter. Thus, a ring of British protection and advice given by resident British advisers encircled almost the whole of eastern and southern Arabia.

While speaking about Arabia, perhaps one other Arab country should be mentioned here; a country which remained outside the political and social influence of the Western Allies. This was the Yemen. It had preserved its own independence and its own way of life. Although it remained loyal to the Ottomans during the First World War, and was attacked from ‘Asīr to the north by Idrīsī invaders with the support of the British in Aden, and although the latter were in turn attacked by the Turkish troops in the Yemen, the country, on the whole, was very little affected by the war. When the Ottoman empire was defeated and lost the war, the Yemen became independent and continued to be ruled by the Rassid dynasty of the Zaydī *imāms*. The extreme religious conservatism of the Yemenis, their intrepid valour as fighters and soldiers,

as well as the inhospitable deserts, and the formidable mountain fastness of the Yemen, kept this country well protected from foreign invaders and foreign ideas until the last few years.

In the light of the foregoing events, the years 1918–20 seem to have been crucial in the modern history of the Arabs. They ushered in the first phase of Arab struggle with the West for political independence. Arab nationalism reached its formative age, became more militant, more anti-Western and anti-imperialist. It lived almost exclusively on deep-seated suspicion, resentment and hostility towards Anglo-French domination in Arab lands, and towards the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine.

Meanwhile, the mandatory powers were, on their part, trying to show as much goodwill as was possible and compatible with their own national interests. On 1 September 1920, General Gouraud, the French high commissioner, proclaimed the birth of the state of Greater Lebanon with Beirut as its capital. The *Amir* Fayṣal, who had been forced out of Syria, was proclaimed king of Iraq on 23 August 1921. However, on 24 July 1922, the Council of the League of Nations approved the mandate system for Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine with Transjordan.

During the period between the two World Wars, Great Britain, and, to a lesser degree, France, tried to regulate their relations with the countries under their tutelage by means of various treaties, which slowly granted larger measures of self-government, and which helped in laying the foundations of indigenous governments in those countries. Thus, in the British-dominated areas, Egypt was the first country to become formally independent and sovereign by a British declaration on 21 February 1922 terminating the British protectorate, subject to a number of conditions which secured certain rights and responsibilities for the British in Egypt. This was followed by the promulgation of a constitution on 19 April 1923 which made Egypt a constitutional, hereditary monarchy under King Fu'ād I. Negotiations continued for several more years until a new Anglo-Egyptian treaty was signed in 1936. Though in this treaty Britain retained, among other rights she had stipulated in the 1922 declaration, that of protecting British lines of communication through Egypt, and that of defending the country, it was on the whole more palatable to the Egyptians.

During the following years, the British government signed with Iraq a number of treaties for close alliance and collaboration. On 10 July 1924, an Iraqi Constituent Assembly enacted a constitution for the

kingdom of Iraq in which the latter was declared 'a sovereign State, independent and free'. Iraq was the first of the mandated Arab countries to become formally independent by being admitted to the League of Nations on 3 October 1932, as a result of the support and recommendation of the British government. Syria and Lebanon under the French mandate developed a republican parliamentary form of government. Constitutions were promulgated in both countries—in Lebanon on 23 May 1926, and in Syria on 14 May 1930.

Nevertheless, nationalist leaders in the vast majority of Arabs opposed the mandates from the start. To them the mandates were simply foreign domination with the ultimate objective of keeping the Arabs divided and deprived of genuine and untrammelled independence. Consequently, in spite of all the treaties signed and the independence conferred, the resentment of the nationalists increased in a climate of mutual suspicion and distrust, and they never abandoned their common aim: to eliminate completely Anglo-French domination and attain unconditional independence. Strikes, demonstrations and agitation followed, in which schoolboys and politically minded university students took a prominent part. It must be said that during this period the educated and uneducated youth of the Arab countries, with their enthusiasm and idealism, became a fertile soil for political exploitation and, at times, perhaps without realizing it, the tools of unscrupulous extremists and agitators.

Perhaps the most violent insurrection was the one which broke out in Jabal al-Durūz in Syria in July 1925, and led to serious fighting in which several thousand French troops took part. Soon afterwards, disaffection and unrest grew also in Damascus, and disorders spread to other towns. The French authorities took energetic and drastic military measures to check the rebellion and to prevent a general conflagration. For three days, certain quarters of Damascus were shelled and bombed. Unfortunately, much bloodshed and destruction occurred. It was only in June 1927 that armed rebellion was finally brought to an end.

In addition to Arab nationalism, which was becoming almost daily a more potent force, against the mandatories, there was another force, equally if not more potent. This was Islam. It is idle and superficial thinking to ignore or to minimize the influence of Islam in politics in the Arab lands of the Near East, where Islam is the religion of the great majority of their inhabitants. At the beginning of the twentieth century of the Christian era, Islam was getting into its fourteenth century. The

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

Arab Muslims were the heirs of a culture and a civilization which were deeply rooted in Islam. Islam had glorified the Arabs, not only by its moral power, but also by its conquests and military triumphs, and had also awakened Arab national consciousness. The Muslim leaders, and with them the vast majority of the Muslim Arabs, felt that Western domination was not only humiliating to their splendid and glorious past, but that its secular and materialistic culture was a threat to the sacred religious principles embodied in Islam. Hence, the Arab struggle against Great Britain and France was also a revolt against the cultural imperialism of the West.

Another factor which tarnished the prestige of the West, and greatly encouraged the Arabs in their opposition to the mandatory powers, was the spread of communism, and the rise of Hitler and Mussolini in Europe. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, by their military defiance of the West, became very popular in the Near East, and their ideologies caught the imagination of the nationalists. Between the two World Wars, the Western powers were bullied, vilified and challenged by the new dictators in Europe. Following the Arabic proverb, 'The enemy of my enemy is my friend', the Arab nationalists felt a secret joy that the political superiority of the West, long admitted and grudgingly admired, that its military power, long held in awe and terror, seemed neither respected nor feared by the European dictators. The spectacle of Chamberlain, prime minister of an empire on which the sun never set, going with nothing more than an umbrella on pilgrimage to Munich to appease an ex-corporal thundering ruin to that empire, of Daladier, prime minister of a haughty France which had fought, bled and won, with her Allies, the First World War, trotting sheepishly on that same journey, was considered a humiliating sign of the decline of the imperialist powers. Why could the Arabs not defy the West? Its armour was full of holes.

Needless to say that the Arabs, at this time, received much encouragement from this new revolutionary Europe, Communist and non-Communist alike. Communism began to take root in Arab lands after 1928. It presented itself as the liberator of the Muslim world from Western imperialism and the rule of the bourgeoisie in general. Indeed ten years earlier, in 1918, the Union for the Liberation of the East had been organized in Moscow. Was it not the Soviet government that had revealed to the world for the first time, in 1917, the existence of the secret arrangements made by the Allies during the war, particularly the Sykes-

Picot Agreement, for the partitioning of the Arab lands among themselves? These documents were made public by orders of Trotsky, as commissar for foreign affairs. Their full text was published by *Izvestia* and *Pravda* in their issues of 23 November 1917; and the *Manchester Guardian* was the first paper in Great Britain to produce summaries of these documents in its issues of 26 and 28 November 1917. The Turks also learned through the Bolsheviks about the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and they gave it the widest possible publicity in the Arab countries.

The resentment of the nationalists increased all this time, and led to more unrest and agitation in 1936, in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. General Bakr Šidqī, supported by young nationalist army officers, carried out a successful military *coup d'état* in Baghdad on 29 October 1936. The military dictatorship he established came to an end within ten months, but the army's interference in the government continued in the years that followed. The French government entered into prolonged negotiations first with a Syrian and then with a Lebanese delegation for the purpose of 'turning a new page' of peace and friendship between France and the Arab nationalists. The result was a Franco-Syrian treaty and a Franco-Lebanese treaty. The first was initialled in September and the second in November 1936, both were to last for twenty-five years. There were certain difficult and complicated conditions to be fulfilled before these treaties were to enter into force. Syria and Lebanon were first to be admitted to the League of Nations and, of course, the French, Syrian and Lebanese parliaments had to ratify the treaties; finally, after a period of transition which was to last three years, Syria and Lebanon were to emerge as fully independent states. Hopes ran high for a little while. However, the next blow to nationalist aspirations was the loss of the district of Alexandretta which, after Franco-Turkish negotiations, became autonomous as Hatay in 1937, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, and in 1939 was integrated in Turkey. Moreover, after waiting for two years, the French government, under various national and international tensions, and especially with the gathering of menacing war clouds in Europe, was still hesitating to ratify these treaties.

Great Britain's troubles in Palestine were not any less than France's tribulations in Syria. The enormous increase of Jewish immigration into Palestine between 1933 and 1936 intensified Arab resistance and opposition to the Balfour Declaration, and led to disorders, strikes, bloodshed, and finally open rebellion from 1936 to 1939. Soon after the

outbreak of serious disturbances on 19 April 1936, a Royal Commission of enquiry was appointed on 7 August 'to ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances which broke out in Palestine... and whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the Mandate, either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances...' On 22 June 1937, the commissioners submitted their report, with the conclusion that partition was 'the only method we are able to propose for dealing with the root of the trouble' on the basis that 'half a loaf is better than no bread'. They added in a last paragraph:

Nor is it only the British people, nor only the nations which conferred the Mandate or approved it, who are troubled by what has happened and is happening in Palestine. Numberless men and women all over the world would feel a sense of deep relief if somehow an end could be put to strife and bloodshed in a thrice hallowed land.¹

But the Woodhead Commission, which was sent out to Palestine in 1938, found it impossible to recommend a workable scheme of partition. The White Paper of 1939 was one more attempt made by the British government to solve the Palestine problem. The gist of the White Paper was a proposal of self-government for an Arab-Jewish Palestinian state at the end of ten years. But neither the Zionists nor the Arabs were satisfied: the former demanded a higher quota of Jewish immigrants and no restriction on the sale of Arab lands to Jews, while the latter demanded a stop to all Jewish immigration and all Jewish land purchase. The White Paper was condemned by the Zionists, and rejected by the Arabs. A major clash between Zionism and Arab nationalism in Palestine was avoided only by the great convulsion which burst upon the world in September 1939.

On the eve of the Second World War, Egypt was a constitutional monarchy. By the convention of Montreux in 1937 the capitulations had been abolished, and in the same year, Egypt had been admitted to the League of Nations. Iraq was also a constitutional monarchy and a member of the League. And finally, there was the Sa'udi Arabian kingdom. Thus, here were three Arab kingdoms and three Arab kings: Fārūq I in Egypt, Fayṣal II in Iraq (with the *Amir* 'Abd al-Ilāh as regent) and 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Su'ūd in Sa'udi Arabia. To all appearances they had achieved national sovereignty. Syria and Lebanon too had achieved a certain measure of independence through their democratic institutions and parliamentary form of government.

¹ Palestine Royal Commission, *Report* (Cmd. 5479) (London, 1937), 380-97.

However, complete political independence was still far from being a reality. Moreover, after twenty-one years, Arab unity was further from realization than ever before. Cynics and realists pointed out that there was more Arab unity under the 'yoke' of the Ottoman empire, which the Arabs had thrown away in order to gain their freedom and independence. During the four hundred years of Ottoman rule, an Arab could travel from one end of the Near East to the other without having to stop at any political frontiers. Only the physical obstacles of geography—deserts and mountains mainly—could hinder or retard his movements.

When the Second World War began in September 1939, the Syrians, the Lebanese and the Iraqis had had twenty-one years of experience of either British or French administration; the Egyptians, by then, had known British rule directly or indirectly for fifty-seven years. These were years of trial and tribulation for all concerned. It is true that this period of foreign rule imposed upon the Arabs by military conquest and victory was unpopular, but it is untrue to say that there was no co-operation whatsoever with the representatives of Great Britain and France in this region. There were those who by education, temperament and political inclination, admired the Western institutions of democracy, Western culture, and Western ways of life. They were a minority, but some of them were influential and helpful to the mandatory powers. At the same time, the struggle for political independence consolidated regional and territorial nationalism in the mandated territories. Thus, while the ideal of Arab unity was maintained, a strong attachment developed in every newly born country to the preservation of its independence.

It would also be unjust to ignore the benefits that the mandates bestowed, and to lay the blame for all disillusionments, frustrations and, at times, even bloodshed, at the door of the 'Allied and Victorious Powers'. It is, of course, undeniable that these powers had their national interests to safeguard, and their political prestige to maintain, that their minds were still engrossed in the patterns of international politics which had characterized the European diplomacy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But there is no evidence that the Allies were devoid of good intentions, that they desired to create political, economic and social evils to retard the progress of the inhabitants in their mandated territories. They believed that their victory in the Near East had insured 'the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by the Turks'. They equally believed that, being themselves

highly civilized states, their guidance and tutelage would be necessary to make it possible for those people to progress from a medieval to a modern society. France believed in her *mission civilisatrice*, and Great Britain in the superiority of her system of 'order and good government'. An unbiased student of the mandate period must admit that much progress took place in Arab lands during that time. There were great improvements in the systems of communication and transport. Telephone and telegraph lines were multiplied. Cars and aeroplanes immensely reduced travelling-time between the Arab countries. Large numbers of roads were newly built, widened or asphalted. New schools and hospitals were opened. In the economic field, trade with foreign countries expanded, and new industries sprang up. The basis of a modern administration, and of a system of public finance and taxation, was laid; the judicial system was reorganized, civil courts with modern codes of law were introduced, and security services established law and order throughout the land. Above all, democratic institutions were established for the growth of self-government based on principles of individual liberty and individual equality before the law without distinction as to race, language or religion.

However, what was important to the extreme nationalists was the fact that foreign domination was still over their lands, and that Arab leaders had no direct authority in their own countries. It seemed as if they were still where they were almost a quarter of a century earlier.

But the extraordinary events which took place during and after the Second World War did not keep the Arabs in the same place. The Arab lands found themselves directly involved in the war after the collapse of France in 1940. In June 1940 the French authorities in the Levant threw their weight on the side of the Vichy government in France, with the result that British and Gaullist Free French forces, operating from Palestine, attacked and defeated the Vichy forces in Syria and Lebanon in July 1941.

Another theatre of war, for a short time, was Iraq. Following Rashid 'Ālī al-Gaylānī's rebellion in 1941, supported by the army and by German arms and aircraft, British and Indian troops defeated the Iraqi army. Rashid 'Ālī and his ministers left the country. Once more Iraq returned to the fold, under the premiership of Nūrī Pasha al-Sa'īd.

In Syria and Lebanon, General Catroux was appointed by General de Gaulle, chief of the Free French, as delegate-general of Free France in the Levant. On 8 June 1941, the day on which Free French troops and

Imperial forces entered Syria and Lebanon, General Catroux said in a declaration on behalf of General de Gaulle that he was putting an end to the mandatory régime, and proclaiming the Syrians and the Lebanese to be free and independent. On the same day, in another declaration, the British ambassador in Cairo, Sir Miles Lampson, said, 'I am authorised by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to declare that they support and associate themselves with the assurance of independence given by General Catroux on behalf of General de Gaulle to Syria and the Lebanon.'¹

Having checked the establishment of a German bridge-head in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, the Allies won another victory over the Axis, this time on Egyptian soil, when the Afrika Corps, commanded by Field-Marshal Rommel, was finally and decisively defeated by the Eighth Army under General Montgomery at al-'Alamayn on 2 November 1942. A few days later, the Anglo-American Expeditionary Force landed in North Africa under General Eisenhower, and put an end to any Axis threat to Africa and the Near East.

But the Allies had not ended their long-standing problem of giving full independence to the areas still under their control. Nationalist fronts were being consolidated in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. In Lebanon, where Christian, Muslim and Druze communities had lived side by side for centuries, it was more necessary than ever before that good relations should exist among them, so that they might be able to stand by themselves in a free and independent state. Consequently, the National Pact was born in September 1943. This pact was not a written, signed and sealed contract. It was a 'gentleman's agreement' between the Christian and Muslim leaders to live in a united and independent Lebanon without allowing any outside influences, whether from the West or from the East, to interfere with that unity and independence. The pact became one of the corner-stones of Lebanese political independence and territorial integrity.

Soon elections were held in Lebanon for a Chamber of Deputies, and on 21 September Bishāra al-Khūrī was elected president of the republic. He, in turn, appointed as prime minister Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ of a well-known Sunnī family. Elections were also held in Syria during the same year and Shukrī al-Quwatlī became president of the republic. Both governments wanted now to delete from their constitutions those articles

¹ *Syria No. 1 (1945): Statements of policy...in respect of Syria and the Lebanon*, 8 June–9 September 1941 (Cmd. 6600) (London, 1945).

conceding attributes of sovereignty to the mandatory. A Free French Committee of National Liberation sitting in Algiers under the presidency of General de Gaulle refused to recognize the validity of any unilateral amendment of the Lebanese constitution. When the Lebanese parliament went ahead with the constitutional amendments, Jean Helleu, the French delegate-general in the Levant states, had the president of the republic and most members of his cabinet arrested at 4.00 a.m. on 11 November 1943. Strikes, demonstrations and riots in Beirut and other Lebanese towns were followed by a British ultimatum to General Catroux, supported by the United States government. The president and Lebanese ministers were set free on 22 November—a day which continues to be celebrated as Independence Day.

Further tensions in Lebanon, and two serious crises which developed in Syria in 1944 and 1945, led the nationalists to press more vehemently their demand for complete independence, until finally the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the end of foreign occupation took place in Syria on 17 April 1946, and in Lebanon on 31 December of the same year. It was also during 1946, on 22 March, that independence was granted to Transjordan. Two months later, the *Amir* 'Abd Allāh was proclaimed king, and two years later the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan was born.

With the tide of the Second World War receding from the Arab lands, the tide of Western domination had also ebbed. Two World Wars and over a quarter of a century of Arab-Western relations had produced numerous and painful lessons for anyone who wanted to learn. One thing was very clear indeed: Arab nationalism and Arab unity could no longer be ignored. Hence it was that less than two months before the end of the war, on 22 March 1945, the Arab League was born. The Arab League not only confirmed and respected the independence and sovereignty of its member states but it also laid down the foundations of an Arab federation, in which the Arabs could develop and strengthen to the utmost their political, economic and cultural ties without interfering in one another's system of government. The precursor of the Arab League was Anthony Eden's statement in the Mansion House on 29 May 1941, in which he said,

The Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last War, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and

economic ties between the Arab countries, and the political ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval.¹

Between the end of the Second World War and the present day, five new factors have produced the greatest impact on the internal conditions of the Arab countries and their external relations with the West: Arab oil production, the birth of Israel, the entry of the United States and of the U.S.S.R. into the political and economic arena of the Near East, and the Egyptian revolution of 1952. No event, whether minor or major, which has happened in any corner of the Arab lands since 1945 can be divorced from the direct or indirect influence of either one, or a combination, of these factors.

Much has been written, and numerous statistics compiled, on the oil reserves and oil industry of the Arab countries. The ever-expanding oil operations of American oil companies in the Arabian peninsula since 1933 has resulted in the discovery of new oil-fields, the building of new refineries, and the laying of pipelines from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. Oil revenues have brought fabulous wealth to the governments of Sa'udi Arabia, Kuwayt and Iraq, and have provided them with a golden opportunity, unprecedented in their history, to develop their resources, raise the standard of living of their peoples and give financial aid, in the form of loans, to other Arab countries with no oil income. At the same time, the oil of the Arab lands is a great source of income to the foreign oil companies, and is of major importance to the economy and industrial life of western Europe. The safeguarding of these oil interests thus became interwoven with Western politics in the Near East.

The Arab leaders were determined, however, to put an end after the Second World War to all forms of Western domination. They would deal with the West only on equal terms. Hence the Arab reaction during this period was violent; first, though unsuccessfully, against the Zionists in Palestine in the war of 1948 on the termination of the British mandate on 15 May; secondly, in a series of political assassinations and military upheavals, overthrowing the previously established Arab governments and Arab dynasties, which were considered to be either pro-Western or old-fashioned and reactionary. The immediate consequences of the Arab-Zionist war were the consolidation of the state of Israel which was proclaimed in May 1948, and recognized immediately by the U.S.A. and

¹ G. Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (2nd edn.) (London, 1953), 334.

the U.S.S.R.; the presence of over a million Palestinian refugees in the neighbouring Arab countries—more than half of them in Jordan; and intense bitterness and lack of confidence in Arab-Western relations.

(B) ARAB NATIONALISM

The first obstacle to the understanding of Arab 'nationalism' by a non-Arab and a non-Muslim is that of language. There is no word, no expression in the English language that could convey the exact meaning and, particularly, the exact concept of *al-'urūba*, *al-umma al-'arabiyya* and *al-qawmiyya al-'arabiyya* loosely translated in English as 'Arabism', the 'Arab nation' and 'Arab nationalism', respectively. Indeed, the term 'Arab' has a much wider meaning today than it had at the beginning of the twentieth century. A 'pure' Arab was then considered to be a bedouin or nomad of Arabia. He was traditionally and popularly associated with the Arab symbols of a *kūfiyya* and an *'iqāl* for his headwear, a loose flowing gown, a curved dagger, a black tent, a camel, occasionally a palm-tree, and he was always surrounded by an interminable desert of sand dunes. Today, the word 'Arab' has a much more inclusive significance, and applies to all the Arabic-speaking (and generally Muslim) inhabitants of the Middle East, whether riding on a camel and living in a tent, or owning a chauffeur-driven car and living in an air-conditioned and centrally-heated villa in one of the capitals of the Arab countries.

In addition to the language obstacle, there is a further difficulty which lies in the fact that many writers on 'Arab nationalism' are either Westerners with their own Western concept of nationalism, or are from among the non-Muslim Near Eastern intelligentsia, with a western education and a western secular view of nationalism. The latter have tried to draw their own image of 'Arab nationalism' either out of ignorance or wishful thinking. They find it more convenient and comfortable to live in a make-believe world of their own, than to face the reality of the Muslim world, on the margin of which they themselves happen to be. Hence, all the confusion and ambiguity in the use of such terms in English as 'Arabism', the 'Arab nation' and 'Arab nationalism', leading to much misunderstanding and misinterpretation of their original Arabic meaning.

Arabism—the nearest equivalent to *al-'urūba*—signifying the sum total of the ethnic, linguistic, social and cultural characteristics which distinguish an Arab from a non-Arab, is as old as the Arabs. It certainly existed before the birth of Islam in the Arabian peninsula, because there

were Arabs before there was Islam. As to the concept of *al-umma al-‘arabiyya*, i.e. of an Arab ‘nation’, embodying the religious, social and political unity of the Arabic-speaking peoples, this concept is inseparable from the rise of Islam and the islamization of the Arabs. *Al-‘urūba* was, naturally, the bedrock upon which the notion of *al-umma* was built.

There remains the modern idea of *al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya*, generally rendered in English as ‘Arab nationalism’. Actually, the word ‘nationalism’ is not equivalent to the Arabic *al-qawmiyya*; indeed, the latter, derived from *qawm*, is a newcomer to Arabic political terminology. The Arabic word *qawm* refers to ‘a number of people’ specially to ‘a number of men’, particularly those men who have achieved ‘great and important things’. The Qur’ān speaks of *qawm Nūḥ*, ‘the people of Noah’, and of *qawm Mūsā*, ‘the people of Moses’, and the word is similarly used in other passages. Before the twentieth century, the word *qawm* had no political or patriotic connotation, but as used during the last two decades, it has come to denote all the Arabic-speaking or Arab peoples, disregarding, in principle, the geographical and political boundary lines which separate the Arab states. Thus, the term *al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya* stands, today, not only for Arab ‘nationalism’ but also for Arab unity, and should not be confused with the idea of patriotism (*al-waṭaniyya*), i.e. the love of one’s fatherland or place of habitation.

What, then, is the origin of Arab nationalism and what evolutionary process has it followed? To begin with, Arab nationalism is inconceivable without Arabism. When the Arabs embraced Islam in the seventh century of the Christian era, they became even more conscious of their Arabism. Indeed, Islam itself, although a universal religion which addresses itself to all mankind, was revealed by an Arab Prophet, in the Arabic language, in Arabia. We read in the Qur’ān: ‘A Messenger has now come to you from among yourselves.’ It was the Muslim Arabs of Arabia whom the Prophet glorified in these words: ‘Ye are the best *umma* that hath been raised up unto mankind.’ There was no place in the universal, all-embracing Faith of Islam for kinship and tribal ties existing among the Arabs in pagan days, or for any colour-bars and geographical boundaries separating its adherents. As far as the Arabs were concerned, they were to be united into one great community, which was the *umma* of Islam. ‘Verily, you are of one *umma* and I your Lord: Therefore, worship me’, and ‘Verily, the believers are brethren’. Thus, Islam gave the Arabs a special consciousness of their identity and a sense of pride and superiority in their *‘urūba*. Consequently, in the case of

the Arabs who became Muslims, Islam and the Arabic language became the two prime movers of their national unity and political sovereignty. The birth of modern Arab nationalism, or *al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya*, is, however, a very recent event. It is closely associated with the decline and fall of the Ottoman empire, and with Arab aspirations to political independence and unity.

The Turks and the Muslim Arabs lived side by side for four hundred years in a non-national Ottoman empire as members of one great Muslim community, united by their Faith and their allegiance to a Muslim sovereign who was sultan and caliph at the same time. But, towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the reign of Sultan ‘Abd ül-Ḥamīd II and, subsequently, the government of the Young Turks, led to increased discontent and rebelliousness in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. The rule of ‘Abd ül-Ḥamīd was disastrous for the survival of his multi-racial and multi-national empire. Despotism, corruption, injustice, and an army of spies intensified the disaffection of the Turks and the Arabs alike towards Turkish misgovernment. Forced at the beginning of his reign into accepting Midhat Pasha’s reforms, and particularly his Constitution of 1876, ‘Abd ül-Ḥamīd acted for a while as a constitutional monarch. The first Ottoman Parliament met on 18 March 1877. But on 14 February 1878, the Parliament was dissolved *sine die* and the constitution suspended by the sultan’s command. As for the deputies, the more enlightened and outspoken in their criticism were ordered to leave Constantinople. Among them were a number of prominent Arab representatives.

‘Abd ül-Ḥamīd’s next attempt to win over his discontented subjects was through the ingenious device of pan-Islam. The dream of uniting the Muslim world and rebuilding the Muslim empire had been very close to the hearts of many Muslim leaders. The sultan was persuaded by some of his very close associates to utilize his position as caliph and as the champion of Islam for politically strengthening and preserving his throne. He was led to believe that if he put himself at the head of the Muslims as the protector of those who were living under Christian governments, particularly under Britain and France in Asia and Africa, the Sunni Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs, would rally round the Ottoman caliphate and give it their full allegiance. The Ḥijāz Railway which was built with monetary contributions from Muslims throughout the world, was not only of great strategic value for the quick transport of

troops to troublesome areas in Arabia, but it was, undoubtedly, a demonstration of the pan-Islamic policy of ‘Abd ül-Ḥamid. Nevertheless, this policy did not affect the Arab and Turkish demands for reforms, as the internal situation continued to deteriorate with alarming speed.

Meanwhile, ‘Abd ül-Ḥamid’s iron hand and oppressive measures led to the rise of secret revolutionary societies with the object of overthrowing his régime and restoring Midḥat Pasha’s Constitution of 1876. The secret societies were driven underground, or beyond the boundaries of the empire, particularly to Geneva, Paris, London, Brussels, and (after the British occupation of Egypt in 1882) to Cairo. Many of their members belonged to the main body of the Young Turks and to the latter’s Committee of Union and Progress. The anti-Hamidian journals, pamphlets and leaflets which were printed in Europe and clandestinely introduced into the Ottoman empire, greatly frightened the sultan. During this time, no conscious Arab national movement had yet developed in the Arabic-speaking provinces of the empire to replace the loyalty of the vast majority of the Muslims to the sultanate and the caliphate. Most of the reformers were apostles of pan-Islam. The best known among them, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abduh, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī and Muḥammad Rashid Riḍā, sought to cleanse and to strengthen the Ottoman empire by a return to the purity of Islam and Muslim institutions, for the defence of the Muslim peoples against the encroachments of the West. But, here and there, during the second half of the nineteenth century, principally in Damascus, Beirut and Cairo, there were small groups of Arab patriots who preached *ḥubb al-waṭan*—love of one’s birthplace. Buṭrus al-Bustānī in Beirut, Shaykh Rifā‘a Rāfi‘ al-Ṭaḥṭāwī, ‘Urābī Pasha and Muṣṭafā Kāmil in Egypt—to mention only a few well-known names—were among these early patriots; but their patriotic movements did not seek the secularization of the Muslim institutions of the Ottoman empire, or the unification of the Arab countries against the Turks. Indeed, Egyptian patriotism was, after 1882, more anti-British than anti-Turk.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century, and particularly in the vilayets of Damascus and Beirut, the anti-Turkish struggle emphasized Arabism and Arab unity rather than local patriotism. Hence Arab nationalism became a secret and revolutionary movement. Actually there is a remarkable indication of the possible existence of a nationalist sentiment for Arab independence, at an earlier date. On 31 July 1858,

the British consul-general, I. H. Skene, reported from Aleppo on 'the hatred felt by the Arab population of this part of Syria for Turkish troops and officials in general . . .', and he concludes with the extraordinary remark that 'it would also appear that the Mussulman population of Northern Syria harbours hopes of a separation from the Ottoman Empire and the formation of a new Arabian State under the sovereignty of the Shereefs of Mecca . . .'.¹ But most of the Arab nationalist activities were born after 1878, particularly after the Russo-Turkish war and the dissolution of the Ottoman Parliament. The despatches of the British and French consuls from Beirut and Damascus to their respective embassies in Constantinople contain several reports on the growth of Arab national sentiment against Turkish despotism and misgovernment.

The French consul, Delaporte, wrote from Beirut on 9 October 1879 about the possible existence of an Arab conspiracy with ramifications in Aleppo, Mosul, Baghdād, Mecca and Medina, and the intention of forming an Arab kingdom ('un royaume arabe') at the head of which there would be an Arab ruler. The consul was not in a position to confirm this rumour but he added that the Ottoman empire was in such a state of disorganization and anarchy that the realization of such a scheme was neither improbable nor impossible.² About a year later, on 28 June 1880, the British acting consul-general in Beirut, John Dickson, considered it important enough to inform by telegraph the British ambassador, G. T. Goschen, in Constantinople, that 'revolutionary placards' had appeared in that town. The telegram was followed by his despatch of 3 July 1880,³ in which he wrote that such placards had recently appeared several times in Beirut, 'calling upon the people to revolt against the Turks', and he enclosed two placards—an original and a copy. The despatch contains various theories as to the origin of these placards, one of them being that they may have emanated from a 'secret society'. Indeed there was a revolutionary society in Beirut, and its existence was one of the best kept secrets of the time. Many of its members belonged to the young Christian *élite* of Lebanon, some of whom had studied at the Syrian Protestant College (now the American University of Beirut). The last surviving member of that *élite*, the late Fāris Nimr Pasha (who was for many years the owner and editor of the well-known Egyptian newspaper, *al-Muqaṭṭam*) told the writer that this society was responsible for

¹ F.O. 78/1389—Turkey—Despatch No. 33 of 7 August 1858, enclosing copy of Skene's despatch No. 20 of 31 July 1858.

² France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Turkey—vol. 22, 1879, Despatch No. 19.

³ F.O. 195/1306—Turkey—1880, vol. II, Despatch No. 47.

issuing the anonymous placards and that many of them were in his handwriting, including the one enclosed in the above-mentioned despatch.

More placards continued to appear towards the end of 1880 in Syria where 'a certain amount of discontent manifests itself amongst a class of persons connected probably with some secret society'.¹ Even in far-away Baghdād, revolutionary leaflets apparently printed in London appeared, entreating the Arabs and 'the Christians of Syria' to unite and emancipate the 'Arab *umma*' from its enslavement by the Turks.²

These anti-Turkish sentiments soon received a powerful stimulus from the revolt of 'Urābī Pasha in Egypt, and the subsequent British occupation of that country in 1882. 'Urābī was regarded as a champion of Islam and of Arabism. On 14 July 1882, the vice-consul, John Dickson, wrote from Damascus to the Earl of Dufferin, British ambassador in Constantinople³: '... There is no doubt, however, that among a few persons, especially Moslems, there has been a tendency to adopt the ideas of the National Party in Egypt⁴. . . It is certain that the object of the Authorities in Syria is to crush out, at once, any patriotic sentiments that might exist amongst the people. . . ' About two months later, on 23 September, John Dickson reported again from Damascus that 'Urābī Pasha 'has always had on his side the sympathies of the whole Mussulman sect and by some has been even looked upon as a prophet almost equal to Mohamet. . . '⁵ On that same day, the British consul in Jerusalem, N. T. Moore, stated in a despatch to the Earl of Dufferin that 'it is quite certain that the native Moslems profoundly sympathised with Arabi both as a Mohamedan. . . and more especially, as the champion of the Arab Mussulman race, upon whose success they based possibilities affecting the future of their race other than the mere repelling of the invasion of Egypt.'⁶

Two years later, the rebellion of the Mahdi in the Sudan stirred up, again, not only anti-British but also anti-Turkish feelings. On 19 April 1884, John Dickson's despatch to the Earl of Dufferin contained the following statement:

With regard to the state of feeling amongst the Mussulman population in consequence of recent affairs in Egypt and the British expedition to Eastern

¹ F.O. 195/1368—Turkey—1881, vol. II, Despatch No. 1 of Beyrout, 3 January 1881.

² F.O. 196/1370—Turkey—1881, vol. I, Despatch No. 21 of Baghdad, 20 May 1881.

³ F.O. 195/1412—Turkey—1882, Despatch No. 3.

⁴ A reference, undoubtedly, to *al-Hizb al-waṭānī* formed by a group of Egyptians in 1879.

⁵ F.O. 195/1412—Turkey—Despatch No. 10. ⁶ *Ibid.*, Despatch No. 7.

Soudan, I have the honour to report that, as far as I am able to gather, from my own observations and from inquiries I have made of persons generally well informed, there has been almost entire sympathy with the Mahdi... and it is undoubtedly a fact that the Mahdi has been considered by the Arab race in Syria as not only the champion of the Mohammedan religion but as an opponent of the Turkish Government...¹

But these early rumblings against Turkish misgovernment should not be interpreted as widespread and organized attempts on the part of the Muslim Arabs to break away from the Ottoman empire and establish an independent Arab state based on Arab nationalist aspirations. Dickson ended his despatch of 3 July 1880 by saying that the placards had produced 'very little effect' on the minds of the people. 'However,' he added, 'they may be taken as an indication of the times, and that the Moslem as well as the Christian has at last begun to raise his cry against Turkish misrule.' Thus, it is an error to consider any Arab who came out openly against the Ottoman sultan and the Turkish government to have been an Arab nationalist. It is equally wrong to conclude that an Arab who wanted to preserve the Ottoman sultanate and caliphate was not a nationalist.

When the Young Turks came to power in 1908, they promised equality to all Ottoman subjects, without distinction of religion or race. But they soon realized that the political ideals of the non-Turkish nationalities—Arabs, Armenians, Greeks and Slavs—were not compatible with a centralized Ottoman state. They even fell back, for a time, on the pan-Islam of Sultan 'Abd ül-Hamid. This policy, also, was doomed to failure: it was too visionary and unpractical. Moreover, many Turks and Arabs doubted the religious sincerity of the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress. The only alternative for the Young Turks was to rely on the Turkish element in what remained of their empire, to stir the Turks to a national regeneration, and to seek the eventual unification of all Turkish-speaking peoples, to fulfill their new ideal of pan-Turan.

As a result of the turcification programme of the Young Turks based on Turkish nationalism, the Arabs' pride in their race, religion and language spurred them to assert their Arabism. Moreover, the increasing impact of Western education and Western political ideas of independence and nationalism, coming mainly from French and British sources, and the revival of interest in the study of the Arabic language and literature, particularly in Lebanon, led the Arab leaders to carry their objective of

¹ F.O. 195/1480—Turkey—Despatch No. 16.

independence a great step forward. Thus, it was the national and racial policies of the Young Turks which, eventually, intensified the Arabs' desire for political independence and national unity. A number of Arab secret societies and political parties were formed to defend the Arab cause, to protect Arab rights, and, finally, to obtain complete autonomy for the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. Well-known among these organizations were *al-Muntadā al-Adabī* ('The Literary Club'), *al-'Abd* ('The Covenant'), *al-Fatāt* ('The Young Arab Society') and *Ḥizb al-Lāmarkaẓiyya* ('The Decentralization Party'). But it can safely be asserted that until the eve of the First World War (and with the exception of the Maronites of Mount Lebanon, the Wahhābīs and, in general, the Arab tribes of Arabia), the majority of the Muslim Arab leaders had no intention of destroying the Ottoman empire, 'the only powerful Islamic Empire that remained'. Their aims and aspirations were expressed in the resolutions passed by the First Arab Congress (*al-Mu'tamar al-'Arabī al-Awwal*) which was held in Paris under the auspices of *al-Fatāt* and *Ḥizb al-Lāmarkaẓiyya*, from 18 to 23 June 1913. They were summed up in the following words of Iskandar 'Ammūn, the vice-president of the Decentralization Party:

The Arab *umma* does not want to separate itself from the Ottoman Empire... All that it desires is to replace the present form of government by one more compatible with the needs of all the diverse elements which compose that Empire, in such wise that the inhabitants of any province (*vilayet*) will have the final word in the internal administration of their own affairs... We desire an Ottoman government, neither Turkish nor Arab, a government in which all the Ottomans have equal rights and equal obligations, so that no party or group may deprive any other party or group of any of its rights, or usurp them for reasons of either race or religion, be it Arab, Turk, Armenian, Kurd, Muslim, Christian, Jew or Druze.¹

When the Ottoman empire entered the First World War in 1914, many of the Arab leaders, after much hesitation, found it imperative for the Arabs to think in terms of complete separation from that empire and the establishment of their independence. The despotic policy of Jemāl Pasha, commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army in Syria, during the war, widened still further the gap between the Arabs and the Turks. Finally, the promises of the Allies to liberate the Arabs from the Turks and help them to determine their own future, encouraged the Arab Revolt which started in Mecca on 10 June 1916, under the leadership of the *Sharif* Ḥusayn.

¹ See *al-Lajnat al-'Ulyā li-Ḥizb al-Lāmarkaẓiyya, Al-Mu'tamar al-'Arabī al-Awwal* (Cairo, 1913), 103-4; 132-4.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 16 May 1916 and the mandate system which was approved by the Allied Supreme Council on 20 April 1920 for the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire, ushered in the next stage of the evolution of Arab nationalism between the two World Wars. The presence of the mandatory powers as foreign rulers and imperialists intensified the struggle for political independence, and consolidated Arab opposition to the West. In particular, the successful Turkish revolution led by Muṣṭafā Kemāl Pasha (Atatürk) and his establishment of a modern Turkish state, had a profound influence on Arab nationalist leaders.

The Arab struggle for independence continued during the Second World War. By the end of that war, all the Arab countries of the Near East had obtained their political independence and sovereignty. But at the same time, regional nationalism in the various Arab states was inevitably accentuated and consolidated with a distinctness and particularism of its own. Although in the Arab lands which were preponderantly Muslim, religion and the Arabic language remained, potentially, the most important factors of unity, various divisive forces based on social, economic and individualistic factors, dynastic rivalries and the struggle for power made the Arab states cling jealously to their political boundaries and separate political existences. Indeed, a new Arab state was created recently and recognized by all the other Arab countries: Kuwayt became a fully independent state in June 1961.

Nevertheless, the ideal of Arab unity, based on *al-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya* and on the oneness of the Arab *umma* continued to be the major goal of the new leaders of Arab nationalism during the second half of the twentieth century. From a small *élite* of literary men, students and middle-class intellectuals, often working in secret and with little following, the new nationalist leadership had now moved to a much larger group of the military, professional and proletarian classes—soldiers, lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists, government officials and an increasingly vast number of students, backed and supported by the masses.

It is worth noting that several projects for Arab unification had already been put forward by a number of Arab leaders. When the Arab Revolt of 1916 started, the *Sharif* Ḥusayn envisaged the establishment of an all-embracing sovereign Arab kingdom arising out of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In a memorandum submitted to the Peace Conference on 1 January 1919, the *Amir* Fayṣal wrote:

The country from a line Alexandretta–Persia southward to the Indian Ocean is inhabited by ‘Arabs’—by which we mean people of closely related Semitic stocks, all speaking the one language, Arabic... The aim of the Arab nationalist movements... is to unite the Arabs eventually into one nation... We believe that our ideal of Arab unity in Asia is justified beyond needs of argument...¹

In an eleventh-hour attempt to foil the Sykes-Picot Agreement and reject the claim of the Zionists to a National Home in Palestine, the General Syrian Congress in Damascus proclaimed Fayṣal, on 8 March 1920, as king of the ‘United Kingdom of Syria’, i.e. of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. About four months later, the French occupied Syria, and Fayṣal was forced to move out of Damascus. After 1921, with Fayṣal as king of Iraq and his brother, ‘Abd Allāh as *amīr* of Transjordan, Baghdād and ‘Ammān became the two focal centres of Arab unification. Two major schemes embodying the concept of Arab unity were submitted to the British government; one in 1941 by the *Amīr* ‘Abd Allāh, and the other in 1943 by Nūrī Pasha al-Sa‘īd. The *amīr* pressed with untiring zeal for the establishment of a Great Syrian state, which was to include Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan.² Nūrī Pasha, at the request of Richard Casey (subsequently Lord Casey), British minister of state for Middle East affairs, worked out a Fertile Crescent plan which advocated the union of Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan, while recognizing the ‘special position’ of the Maronites of Lebanon.³ The Fertile Crescent countries were to be joined immediately by Iraq, and to form an Arab League. Both projects, viewed in the light of the circumstances of the day, were very unpractical and failed to be realized.

For some time, it was believed that the Arab League formed in 1945 was a major step towards the establishment of a federation of the Arab countries. But soon after 1952, Egypt moved, full steam ahead, into the sphere of Arab nationalism and Arab unity. On 1 February 1958, the birth of the United Arab Republic, formed by the union of Egypt and Syria, was proclaimed in Cairo. This was followed, almost immediately, on 14 February, by a union between the kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. This latter union was soon brought to an end by the Iraqi *coup d’état* of 14 July 1958, and Syria severed its ties with Egypt in September 1961.

¹ David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris, 1918–1919*, IV (New York, 1924), 297.

² See Government of Transjordan, *The Jordan White Book on Greater Syria* (‘Ammān, 1947), 19–23.

³ General Nūrī al-Sa‘īd, *Arab Independence and Unity* (Baghdad Government Press, 1943), 11–12.

But Egypt (which retained the name of the United Arab Republic) remained the rallying point of Arab unification.

The Arab nationalists believe today that it is through Arab unity that Arab independence can best be defended, and an Arab victory over Israel and imperialism can best be ensured. One of the major aims of the Arab unity movement is to gain more military, political and economic power to defend the territorial integrity, and preserve the political sovereignty, of the Arab lands. Hence, *al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya* becomes a protective armour, an instrument of resistance to the West, the major weapon in the Arab struggle against the imperialists, and a movement of emancipation from the political, social and religious evils of the past.

Meanwhile, the tensions, the conflicts, and the pressures, both internal and external, in the struggle for unification and for the leadership of the Arab world, have led to several military, political and economic upheavals since the end of the Second World War, overthrowing several régimes and dynasties. As a result, revolution and socialism have become closely associated with *al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya* and its new motto of ‘Unity, Freedom and Socialism’.

The unity of the Arabs in the past was part of a larger Muslim spiritual unity, and led to the establishment of a theocratic Muslim empire. It was Islam that gave the Arabs their spiritual and political unity and their place in history. Will the final stage in the evolution of *al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya* be Arab unity on the principles of arabism and secularism, or on the basis of the universalism of Islam which commands the final loyalty of every Muslim, or will there be yet a third alternative? If the Muslim Arabs separate their culture from its Islamic moorings, will they not run the risk of abandoning the most valuable contents of their past history? Secular nationalism demands the supreme loyalty of the citizen to the national god of his country. If the evolution of Arab nationalism in the independent Arab Muslim countries should follow the Western pattern and become rooted, finally, in the political and economic organization of a nation-state, it can only do so at the expense of Islam. Islam will then become a private matter, left to the conscience of any individual who may continue to believe in it, but it will inevitably lose its supreme authority. On the other hand, to what extent could religion—in this case, Islam—remain one of the fundamental pillars of a purely nationalistic and materialistic state? Only time, education and enlightened leadership may be able to work out a happy compromise between Arab nationalism and Islam.

CHAPTER 3

MODERN PERSIA

(A) POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS: 1906–47

On 30 December 1906, the Qājār monarch Muẓaffar al-Dīn Shāh signed the fundamental law (*qānūn-i asāsī*). By his signature of this instrument, the shah in theory converted Persia from a traditional Islamic society to a constitutional monarchy. The fundamental law provided for the establishment of a National Consultative Assembly (*Majlis-i shawrā-yi Milli*), which actually met for the first time on 7 October 1906, prior to the signature of the fundamental law by the shah, and of an upper house or Senate, which was not called into being until 1950. The instrument of the constitution was completed by the ratification by Muḥammad ‘Alī Shāh, on 7 October 1907, of the supplementary fundamental law. This dealt with the rights of the Persian people and of the members of the National Consultative Assembly, and defined the powers of the crown, ministers, judicial tribunals and the army. The real dividing-line between traditional Persia and modern Iran, however, is not 1906, but 1921 when Rizā Khān (later Rizā Shāh Pahlavī) came to power by a *coup d’état*. The promulgation of the constitution was, of course, an important step forward, but for a variety of reasons it did not fulfil the hopes of the constitutionalists, and did not lead immediately to the remodelling of Persian political, economic and social life along Western lines. The measures introduced by Rizā Shāh, on the other hand, represented a definite break with the traditional past. It was he who launched Persia into the twentieth century.

The bloodless victory over absolutism proved an illusion. In reality, the struggle between the new National Consultative Assembly and the shah had barely begun. On 8 January 1907, just over a week after he had signed the fundamental law, Muẓaffar al-Dīn Shāh died, and was succeeded by his son Muḥammad ‘Alī Shāh. Although the latter had countersigned the constitution, and had sworn a solemn oath not to subvert it, he at once set out to do so by every means possible, including a plot to assassinate the leaders of the Constitutionalist party at Tabriz. For its part, the *Majlis*, as the National Consultative Assembly was popularly known, hastened to pass legislation designed to curtail the power of the throne; to restrict, by means of sumptuary laws, the extravagant

spending and huge allowances of the royal family; and to prevent the negotiation by the shah or his supporters of further foreign loans. The assassination on 31 August 1907 of the prime minister, Amīn al-Sultān (Atābeg-i A'zam), who, in defiance of the law, was trying to win support in the *Majlis* for a new Russian loan, temporarily had a sobering effect on the more extreme reactionaries, and the *Majlis* took advantage of the favourable climate of opinion to persuade the shah to sign the supplementary fundamental law.

The assassination of the prime minister coincided with the publication, on the same day, of the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. By the terms of this convention, Persia was divided into a British and a Russian sphere of influence, separated by a neutral zone. The convention was inspired by a mutual fear of resurgent German militarism: it was designed to demarcate each party's sphere of influence in Persia in order to avoid the possibility of armed conflict in that area, and to leave the signatories free to give their full attention to events in Europe. The Persians saw the convention as an instrument which would reduce their country to semi-colonial status. The publication of the convention had three immediate consequences: first, Britain at one stroke lost the goodwill which it had acquired by its support of the Constitutionalists in 1905–6; secondly, Persia began to regard Germany, a strong power with no previous history of interference in Persian affairs, as a possible bulwark against Anglo-Russian pressure; thirdly, the Russians were given a free hand in their sphere of influence. They interpreted 'sphere of influence' as 'protectorate', and saw in the convention an opportunity to tighten their grip on northern Persia with relatively little danger of provoking British retaliation.

Meanwhile the relations between the shah and his supporters on the one hand, and the *Majlis* and the Constitutionalists, or nationalists as they were more commonly termed, on the other hand, had again worsened. In December 1907 Muḥammad 'Alī attempted to overthrow the constitution by a *coup d'état*, his instrument being the Persian Cossack Brigade, formed in 1879 by Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh as a royal body-guard. The nationalist *anjumans*, or political societies, successfully rallied to the defence of the parliament building in Tehran. A temporary reconciliation between the shah and the *Majlis* was followed by a rapid deterioration of their relations, and on 2 June 1908 both the Russian and the British diplomatic representatives in Tehran threatened direct intervention if the shah were deposed. Heartened by this support, the shah

became even more intransigent. On 11 June he placed the capital under martial law, and on 23 June the Cossack Brigade surrounded the *Majlis* and opened fire on it with artillery. Many nationalist leaders were killed or executed on the spot, others were arrested later. Colonel Liakhov, the commander of the Cossack Brigade, governed Tehran as a military dictator for a year. The *mujtahids* denounced the tyranny of the shah, and urged the people to resist, but the existence of a state of martial law made opposition in the capital impossible. Thus ended what the Persians call the 'First Constitutional Period', which extended from the granting of the constitution on 5 August 1906 to the forcible closure of the *Majlis* by Muḥammad 'Alī Shāh on 23 June 1908.

In the provinces, various forces rallied to the defence of constitutional government in Persia. At Tabriz, nationalist forces resisted troops who blockaded the city. The blockade of Tabriz was raised under Russian pressure to allow foodstuffs in, and Russian forces occupied the city on 29 April 1909. At Iṣfahān, the Bakhtiyārī tribe had meanwhile risen in support of the nationalist movement, and a third nationalist force assembled at Rasht in Gilān. The two nationalist columns from Iṣfahān and Rasht respectively marched on Tehran, which they occupied on 13 July. Muḥammad 'Alī, refusing to meet their minimum demands, which included the evacuation of all foreign (i.e. Russian) troops, and the restoration in full of constitutional government, abdicated on 16 July 1909 and went into exile. An *ad hoc* meeting of members of the former *Majlis* and *mujtahids* formally declared Muḥammad 'Alī deposed, and named his eleven-year-old son, Aḥmad, as the new ruler of Persia.

This action inaugurated the 'Second Constitutional Period', which extended from 16 July 1909 to 24 December 1911. If constitutional government was difficult between 1906 and 1908, it was virtually impossible between 1909 and 1911. Dominating the whole political scene was what Shuster justly termed 'the open hostility of Russia, and the scarcely less injurious timidity of England'.¹ The entente between Germany and Russia signalled by the Potsdam Agreement (November 1910) enabled Russia to pursue a more blatantly aggressive policy in regard to Persia. Even without external pressures, however, it is doubtful how far the nationalists would have been successful in restoring orderly and stable government during this period, because serious dissension within the nationalist ranks had led to the appearance of several mutually hostile factions.

¹ W. Morgan Shuster, *The strangling of Persia* (London and Leipzig, 1912), 43

On 19 July 1911, the ex-shah Muḥammad ‘Alī was landed by the Russians in northern Persia, in the hope that he would be able to overthrow the constitution for a second time. After suffering several defeats at the hands of the nationalist forces, the ex-shah fled, and took refuge on a Russian vessel on the Caspian. It became clear that Russian support of Muḥammad ‘Alī had been merely an excuse for strengthening Russian control of northern Persia. On 29 November 1911, the Russians presented an ultimatum to the Persian government, demanding *inter alia* the dismissal of the American treasurer-general Morgan Shuster. Faced with the presence on Persian soil of over 12,000 Russian troops, and by the imminent occupation of the capital by a Russian detachment, the government capitulated on 23 December. The following day the *Majlis* was closed, and the ‘Second Constitutional Period’ was at an end.

Between 1911 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, no restraint was placed upon the activities of the Russians in northern Persia, and they continued to violate with impunity both the spirit and the letter of the 1907 convention. The Russian forces seized and executed nationalist leaders at Rasht, Tabrīz and Enzeli (now Bandar Pahlavī). In March 1912, they gratuitously bombarded the shrine of the *Imām* Rīzā (‘Alī al-Riḍā) at Mashhad, one of the holiest of Shi‘ī sanctuaries. A helpless Persian government was forced to grant concessions in respect to fisheries, railways, and mineral resources, and was saddled with still further debts. The Swedish-led gendarmerie alone prevented the complete breakdown of the civil administration and a lapse into anarchy.

During the First World War, Persian territory became a battlefield for Turkish, Russian and British forces. An imperial firman dated 1 November 1914 stated that Persia’s official policy was one of neutrality. Simultaneously with the advance of Turkish forces into Āzarbāyjān, the Germans launched a major diplomatic offensive designed to turn to profit the fund of pro-German sentiment which was the legacy of the 1907 convention. They hoped to win over the cabinet and the *Majlis* to the cause of the Central Powers, and they achieved a marked degree of success in this aim. On 16 November 1915 the German minister in Tehran, von Reuss, led to Qumm a rump parliament in which all the four principal groups in the *Majlis* were represented. This rump eventually established itself at Kirmānshāh, and called itself the ‘national government’ (*hukūmat-i millī*). The success of the German *putsch* was to a large extent nullified by the fact that the British and Russians managed to

persuade the shah to remain in the capital. At the same time, German agents such as Wassmuss and Zugmayer were active in southern Persia, with the object of exploiting inter-tribal feuds and disrupting the operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in south-west Persia. Since the decision in 1913 to convert the ships of the Royal Navy from coal to oil fuel, Persian oil had become vitally important to the British war effort. To protect the oil installations and prevent sabotage of the pipeline, the British raised a body of levies known as the South Persia Rifles, and established the East Persia Cordon in an attempt to prevent German agents from reaching Afghanistan. In order to deny German agents freedom of action in the 'neutral' zone, Britain, by agreement with Russia, added most of this zone to its own sphere of influence. In return, the Russians demanded full liberty of action in their sphere of influence.

Persia emerged from the war in a state of administrative and financial chaos. Famine prevailed; there was a complete breakdown of the authority of the central government, and the treasury was empty. The Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919 was designed to remedy this situation. Lord Curzon saw this treaty as a means of preserving Persia as an independent state, under the guidance of British financial and military advisers. The Persians viewed it as a thinly veiled attempt to make Persia a British protectorate; the *Majlis* refused to ratify the treaty, and Sayyid Ziyā al-Dīn Ṭabāṭabā'i's government repudiated it in 1921.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 at first promised to inaugurate a new era in the relations between Persia and Russia. These hopes were embodied in the Soviet-Persian treaty of 26 February 1921, which renounced the imperialist policies of the former tsarist régime. As a corollary, it annulled all treaties concluded with that régime, and cancelled (with the important exception of the fisheries concession) all concessions granted to it. To the traditional tsarist weapons of open aggression and economic pressure was now added the characteristic Communist weapon of subversion from within. Persia was seen by Marxist theorists as the key to the Communist liberation of the East. As K. M. Troianovsky put it: 'Owing to Persia's special geopolitical position, and because of the significance of its liberation for the East, it must be conquered politically first of all. This precious key to revolutions in the East must be in our hands; at all costs Persia must be ours.'¹

¹ Quoted in X. J. Eudin and R. C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East 1920-1927* (Stanford, California, 1957), 92.

At the Second Congress of Muslim Communists, held in Moscow in 1919, two main lines of policy were agreed upon: first to form local Communist parties throughout Asia as branches of the Comintern; secondly, to support local nationalist movements as a means of overthrowing Western imperialism in Asia. Persia was considered to be the Asian country most ripe for the application of these policies.

In regard to the formation of a Persian Communist party, the Soviet government had ready to hand a useful nucleus in the '*Adālat*' ('Justice') party, which had been formed in 1916 among the Persian oil-workers at Baku, and which claimed a membership of 16,000. The '*Adālat*' leaders proceeded to establish local Communist party committees at Tabriz, Tehran, and in the Caspian provinces. In regard to the use of local nationalist movements as a means of promoting their revolutionary goals, the Bolsheviks again had an instrument ready to hand, in the form of the Jangali movement in Gilān. On 18 May 1920 Soviet forces under the command of Raskolnikov landed at Enzeli, and on 4 June the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilān was officially founded. This was the first such organization to be set up outside Soviet territory. At the same time, the name of the '*Adālat*' party was officially changed to 'the Communist Party of Persia' (*Ḥizb-i Kumūnist-i Irān*). In October 1921 the Soviet government withdrew its troops from Persia, and the authority of the central government was restored in Gilān. The reasons for the withdrawal of Soviet support were: first, the fourth *Majlis* delayed ratification of the Soviet-Persian treaty pending the withdrawal of Soviet troops; secondly, the Bolsheviks had become to some extent disenchanted with the Jangalis; thirdly, by 1921 there had been a significant shift away from the dogma formulated by Lenin at the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920, namely, that it was possible for the primarily agrarian countries of Asia to proceed directly to the phase of Communist revolution, by-passing the stage of bourgeois capitalism postulated by Marxist theory as a prerequisite of revolution. The Gilān experiment had led some Soviet theorists to declare that revolution in Persia would have to be postponed pending that country's completion of the phase of bourgeois development. In other words, direct revolutionary methods would be temporarily abandoned in favour of more conventional diplomacy.

At the beginning of 1921, Persia seemed weaker than at any time in the nineteenth century. Foreign troops, both Russian and British, were still on Persian soil. The government was virtually without troops, and

unable to maintain internal law and order. As the Persian minister for foreign affairs put it: 'Iran was... in a state of anarchy, with bands of brigands infesting the country, destroying commerce and endangering the lives of its citizens.'¹ On 20 February 1921, Rīzā Khān overthrew the government by a *coup d'état* and assumed the titles of commander-in-chief of the armed forces and minister of war. The previous year, he had become the first Persian to be appointed to the command of the Cossack Brigade, which had been raised to the strength of a division in 1916.

Rīzā Khān's first thought was to abolish the monarchy and establish a republic, with himself as president. There seemed to be 'a general feeling of disillusionment among the people in regard to the monarchical principle which was caused by the character and behaviour of the last three rulers of the Qajar line'.² The '*ulamā*', with the spectre of secularized Turkey before them, reacted strongly against the idea of a republic, and in 1924 Rīzā Khān performed a *volte-face* on this issue. A republic, he declared, was contrary to the tenets of Islam; he was willing to retain the monarchy if he were made shah.

Between 1921 and 1925 Rīzā Khān proceeded steadily along the path to supreme power in Persia, or Iran, as it was henceforth to be known. His principal means to this end were unification and control of the army; restoration of the authority of the central government in the provinces; the temporary appeasement of the '*ulamā*'; domination of successive cabinets; and manipulation of the *Majlis*. After forcing into exile his partner in the 1921 *coup*, the prime minister, Sayyid Ziyā al-Dīn Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Rīzā Khān caused the resignation of four prime ministers and six cabinets between 1921 and 1923. On 28 October 1923, Aḥmad Shāh finally capitulated and appointed Rīzā Khān prime minister. By this time, Rīzā Khān had sufficient control of the *Majlis* to risk a head-on clash with the shah, and on 31 October 1925 he obtained approval in the *Majlis* of a bill terminating the Qājār dynasty, and entrusting to himself the provisional government, pending a decision on the nature of the permanent government of Iran. Among the handful of deputies who voted against this bill was Dr Muṣaddiq (see below). On 12 December 1925 a Constituent Assembly (*Majlis-i Mu'assisān*) voted 257-3 to vest the monarchy in Rīzā Khān, and in the spring of 1926 he was crowned as the first ruler of the new Pahlavī dynasty, with the style Rīzā Shāh Pahlavī.

¹ Naṣr Allāh Sayf-pūr Fāṭimī, *Diplomatic history of Persia, 1917-1923* (New York, 1952), 83.

² L. Lockhart, 'The constitutional laws of Persia', in *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1959, 383.

Rizā Shāh's most significant characteristic was his intense patriotism, accompanied by a not unjustified, but nevertheless at times pathological, suspicion of the motives of foreigners. His principal aims were to rid Iran of foreign political influence, and to lessen its economic dependence on foreign countries, especially the U.S.S.R. It may be argued that his domestic policies were largely subordinated to these cardinal aims of his foreign policy. He wanted Iran to be taken seriously as a modern nation; he wanted to get away from the picture of a country where the only forms of transport were the horse, the donkey and the camel, and where the women appeared in public only if heavily veiled.

Shortly after the 1921 *coup d'état* Rizā Khān was attracted by the idea of enlisting the support of a distant and disinterested power, both to offset British and Russian influence, and also to aid in the reconstruction of the economy. In 1921, the United States was an obvious choice as a third power. Iran's previous experience with Americans had been a happy one; Morgan Shuster had been both vigorous and popular until foreign pressure terminated his work in 1911. President Wilson appeared to be the champion of the small nations; the United States had denounced the 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement, and had disapproved of Britain's refusal (on the grounds that Iran was a non-combatant) to allow Persian representatives to appear at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Finally, the American 'open-door' economic policy suited Iran, which wished to prevent its economy being tied exclusively to Britain and Russia. It was decided to invite an American financial adviser for a second time and on 14 August 1922 Dr Arthur C. Millspaugh was appointed. He was voted wide powers by the *Majlis* and given the title of administrator-general of the finances. He was to have 'general charge of the financial administration and the preparation of the government budget', and 'effective control over the personnel of the financial administration, over expenditures, and over the creation of financial obligations'.¹ The exercise of these wide powers brought Millspaugh into conflict with Rizā Shāh, who first demanded a reduction of his powers, and then, in 1927, terminated his contract.

In 1925, Rizā Shāh set the seal on his creation of a new, unified standing army from the motley units of provincial and tribal levies, palace guards, the Cossack Brigade, gendarmerie, and South Persia Rifles which he had inherited, by introducing a conscription law which provided for a twenty-five-year term of service—two years of active duty

¹ A. C. Millspaugh, *The American task in Persia* (New York and London, 1925), 20-1.

followed by twenty-three years on various types of reserve. Backed by this new army, Rīzā Shāh felt strong enough to challenge those forces in the traditional social order, which were likely to oppose his programme of westernization and modernization, namely, the landowning classes and religious classes, the merchants, and the tribes. The vested interests of each of these were likely to be affected in a different way: as the shah arrogated more power to himself, the prestige and influence of the landowners would wane; the power of the religious classes would be drastically curtailed by the secularization of the legal system and of education; the extension of state control in industry and commerce would restrict the free enterprise of the individual merchant; and the shah's determination to make the writ of the central government effective in the tribal areas, and his policy of forcible settlement of the tribes, would strike at the base of tribal life.

The most hated symbol of western domination was the system of capitulations, or extra-territorial privileges granted to foreign nationals resident in Iran. The most controversial of these privileges was that which accorded foreign residents exemption from the jurisdiction of Iranian courts. This right had been demanded by foreign powers because of the maladministration of justice and the corruption of the courts, and because of the conflict of jurisdiction between the religious courts (*maḥākim-i sharʿ*) and those which tried cases on the basis of customary law (*maḥākim-i ʿurf*). Rīzā Shāh, realizing that the establishment of a modern legal system along Western lines was a prerequisite of the abolition of the capitulations, charged the minister of justice with the preparation of new legal codes. In 1926 the draft penal code, and in 1928 the draft civil code, were completed. These were subject to repeated amendment, and the definitive versions did not appear until 1940 and 1939 respectively. On 10 May 1928 the capitulations were declared to be abolished, and new non-capitulatory treaties were signed with Britain, France, Belgium, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Italy and Sweden. The U.S.S.R., as part of its policy of repudiating all agreements made by the tsarist régime, had already concluded such a treaty on 1 October 1927.

The abolition of the capitulations represented a major victory for Rīzā Shāh in his struggle to restore Iranian sovereignty and national self-respect, but his reform of the legal system was also a severe blow to the power of the religious classes. The religious courts were progressively stripped of their functions, as whole categories of law were transferred

to the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and, when a secular law degree was laid down as the minimum requirement for judicial office, the majority of the religious classes were automatically disqualified. Indeed, the shortage of properly qualified persons was for a number of years a serious obstacle to the implementation of judicial reform.

The second area which Rīzā Shāh considered to be in urgent need of modernization and reform was the educational system. In general, elementary education was still carried on in *maktabs*—schools in which children of all ages from seven upwards were taught by a religious teacher (*ākhūnd* or *mullā*). The curriculum of the *maktab* was confined to reading and writing, calligraphy, the study of the Qur’ān and Arabic grammar, the Shi’i catechism, a little poetry, and book-keeping. Great emphasis was placed on rote-learning. Parents paid whatever fees they could afford. Secondary education was conducted mainly on a private, tutorial basis, and the principal institutions of higher learning were the *madrasas* at such places as Qumm and Iṣfahān.

It is true that a *Dār al-Funūn*, or polytechnic school, had been established in Tehran in 1851, and that from about 1861 onwards some of its students had gone to Europe for further studies. This school was intended to train officers for the army and officials and administrators for the bureaucracy; although its establishment had important political implications, it did not materially affect the overall educational picture. The same is true of the School of Political Science, founded in Tehran in 1901, from which students entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government departments. It is also true that, between 1898 and 1921, attempts were made to establish a number of state schools, and in 1910 a Ministry of Education, *Waqfs* and Fine Arts was set up. Its name betrays its close association with the religious institution; and, because of the opposition of the religious classes, many of its regulations regarding the recognition of schools, the training of teachers, the standardization of textbooks, and the regularization of examinations, remained a dead letter. Perhaps the most important educational development prior to the accession of Rīzā Shāh was the establishment of a large number of foreign missionary schools. Some of these, such as the American Presbyterian Mission School in Tehran, and the Church Missionary Society’s Stuart Memorial College in Iṣfahān, assumed national importance, and many of the leading figures of Rīzā Shāh’s period received their education at these schools.

Soon after the 1921 *coup d’état*, a comprehensive, compulsory system of

state education was introduced, with a westernized curriculum covering six years of primary and six of secondary education. For the first time, girls' schools were established. Gradually all foreign schools were brought under the control of the Ministry of Education, and finally closed in 1940. In 1928 the *Majlis* voted to send a hundred students annually to Europe and America for their higher education. In 1934 a law was passed which led to a rapid growth of teachers' training colleges, and the following year the university of Tehran was founded, initially with five faculties: arts, science, medicine, law and engineering. In 1936 Rīzā Shāh launched a programme of adult education, designed to combat illiteracy and to give training in good citizenship. Classes were held in secondary schools, six days a week, in the evenings. The response was astonishing. Nearly 10,000 adults received certificates of literacy in the first year, and in 1940 over 150,000 people, from many walks of life, were enrolled. Students of school age were also accepted in these classes if they were obliged to work during the day.

The net result of Rīzā Shāh's educational reforms was to effect a drastic break with Islamic tradition, and to cause a major upheaval in the social order. Taken in conjunction with his reform of the legal system, they permanently reduced the power of the religious classes. No previous ruler had questioned the authority of the *Shari'a*, and all previous attempts to restrict the power of the '*ulamā*' had been made within the Islamic framework of society.

The third important component in Rīzā Shāh's programme of westernization and modernization was the development of commerce and industry. In this aspect of his programme, as in many others, domestic interest and foreign policy objectives were closely linked. The incompetent financial administration and the extravagance of the later Qājār monarchs had left Iran economically weak, and had enabled foreign concessionaires to obtain control of important sectors of the economy. Further, the U.S.S.R. in particular was pursuing a policy of economic colonialism designed to keep Iran in a state of permanent dependence on Soviet trade. In the absence of any industry of its own, Iran was obliged to sell its raw materials to the U.S.S.R. and buy them back in the form of manufactured articles, or to exchange them for industrial goods. The Soviet practice of channelling commerce entirely through state trading organizations and state economic agencies enabled these to trade on terms with which the individual Iranian merchant could not compete. Russia was a natural outlet for the produce of the Caspian provinces:

fruit, rice, livestock, fish and hides. Between 1921 and 1927, when trade between Iran and the U.S.S.R. was not regulated by any commercial treaty, the Soviet policy of low tariffs on Iranian exports encouraged the Caspian merchants to think only in terms of the Russian market. In order to exert powerful economic and political pressure on the Iranian government, therefore, the U.S.S.R. had merely to place an embargo on Iranian imports, as it did in 1926. But the U.S.S.R. brought economic pressure to bear in a variety of other ways also. Embryonic Iranian industrial enterprises were bankrupted by Soviet undercutting and dumping. The Soviet government from time to time refused to provide foreign exchange, or suddenly withdrew transit privileges for Iranian exports across Russian territory, a practice which left the Iranian merchants with stocks of unsaleable goods.

Rizā Shāh realized that this state of affairs could not be changed overnight, but he was determined to make his country economically less dependent on the U.S.S.R. A series of *ad hoc* trade agreements with the Soviet government were concluded in 1927, 1931 and 1935; the terms were generally unfavourable to Iran, and the best that can be said for these agreements is that to some extent they regularized trade relations between the two countries. Despite the existence of these agreements, the Soviet state trading organizations continued to apply economic pressure by the methods mentioned above, and it was not until the volume of Iranian trade with Germany increased that any relief was felt.

The U.S.S.R. retained about one-third of Iran's total foreign trade until 1938-9. In 1938, when the trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. expired, Iran demanded, and failed to get, better terms from the Soviet government. Iranian trade with Germany had by that time increased to the point at which Rizā Shāh for the first time felt able to move from the defensive to the offensive in his negotiations with Russia. Ordering a virtual cessation of trade with Russia, he stepped up trade with Germany dramatically. Between 1938 and 1941, Russia's share of Iran's exports fell from thirty-four per cent to just over one per cent, while Germany's rose from twenty per cent to forty-two per cent; over the same period, Iran's imports from Russia fell to 0.04 per cent, while those from Germany increased to forty-seven per cent. On 25 March 1940 Iran signed a commerce and navigation treaty with the U.S.S.R. which was the most comprehensive commercial agreement as yet concluded between the two countries.

Meanwhile Rizā Shāh took urgent and effective measures to develop

Iranian industry in order to reduce dependence on imported manufactures and heavy goods. At the same time he took two other steps which demonstrated his determination to be master in his own house: first, he dismissed the efficient but unpopular Belgian officials who controlled the customs, and, secondly, he established a National Bank (*Bānk-i Milli*), and transferred to it the sole right to issue banknotes, a privilege previously held by the Imperial Bank of Persia (later the Imperial Bank of Iran), a British concession.

A prerequisite of the development of industry in Iran was the improvement of communications, and Rīzā Shāh's most striking achievement under this head was the construction of the Trans-Iranian railway. Begun in 1927, and completed in 1938, the railway ran 850 miles from Bandar Shāhpūr on the Persian Gulf to Bandar Shāh on the Caspian. The construction of this railway was a magnificent engineering feat: at one point on the northern section the altitude drops 4,500 feet in twenty miles. It was paid for by means of a tax on tea and sugar, without recourse to a single foreign loan. The actual construction was begun by an American-German syndicate, and completed by Scandinavian contractors. The Czech firm of Skoda was active in the construction of new highways, bridges and other public works.

The industrial plant and factories installed by Rīzā Shāh were mainly in the nature of light industry. One of his principal concerns was to reduce Iran's dependence on Russian textiles, and in this area he achieved a large measure of success. Textile factories were established at Iṣfahān, Kirmān and Tehran, and in Māzandarān, and the value of imported Russian cotton piece goods dropped rapidly from 21 million roubles in 1930 to 8½ million in 1932. In the case of sugar, another basic Iranian need, eight new factories increased production twelvefold between 1932 and 1940. Large quantities of cement were needed for construction projects and public works, including the imposing new government buildings being built in Tehran, and cement factories were built to satisfy this need. Other factories built by Rīzā Shāh included tea-drying and packing plants, a fruit-drying and packing plant (dried fruit is still one of Iran's most valuable exports), a tobacco factory, meat and fish canneries, a paper-manufacturing plant; vegetable oil refineries, bakeries, rice-cleaning plants, factories for the production of soap, glass, matches and cigarettes; and breweries, wineries and distilleries. Plans for an iron and steel plant proved abortive. In the absence of any domestic steel production, Iran continued to be entirely dependent on

imports for machinery, automobiles and vehicles of all kinds, locomotives and rolling stock, and both industrial and domestic appliances. German and, after the German conquest of Czechoslovakia, Czech firms supplied a large part of the machinery and industrial equipment which Iran needed; the German firm of Siemens, for instance, had a monopoly in telephone equipment and electrical installations.

Many of the new factories were owned by the state, and were under the jurisdiction of the Department of Industry and Mines, itself a branch of the Ministry of National Economy. In some cases, these state-owned factories had a monopoly of the production of a particular commodity; it was the fact that the production of tea and sugar, for instance, was a government monopoly, that enabled the government so effectively to impose the tax which paid for the Trans-Iranian railway. Rīzā Shāh, however, had another, and even more important, object in creating these state monopolies, namely, to enable Iran to meet the Soviet state monopolies, if not on equal, at least on their own terms, and also to prevent their dealing with private merchants. In 1929 the Soviet government tightened its control of foreign trade still further by the establishment of a central Soviet organization for trade with the East, and, as a result of this, Iranian merchants were debarred from free trade in the Russian market. In 1931 Iran retaliated with its own state trading monopolies, which probably afforded as great a measure of relief as was possible in the circumstances.

Iran's most important industry was and is the oil industry. Oil was first struck at Masjīd-i Sulaymān, in Khūzistān, in 1908; the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was formed in 1909, taking over the concessionary rights granted to William Knox D'Arcy in 1901; and the great refinery on the island of Abadan, at the head of the Persian Gulf, was completed in 1915. The first major dispute between the Iranian government and the company occurred in 1915, when the company, declaring that the government was responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Khūzistān, claimed £500,000 for the loss it sustained when the pipeline from the oilfields to the refinery was cut by tribes roused by the German agent, Wassmuss. The government made various counter-claims: they complained, *inter alia*, that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had sold oil to the British Admiralty at less than the market price.

After the accession of Rīzā Shāh, further conflict between the government and the company was inevitable. The existence on Iranian soil of a foreign oil company, particularly one in which a foreign government

held a controlling interest, may have been an affront to Rīzā Shāh's nationalist instincts. Moreover, the Iranian government was not satisfied with its share of the profits, in view of the rapidly increasing scale of the company's activities; it alleged that its share of the revenue was unfairly reduced by such devices as the omission of the profits of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's subsidiary companies; that the process of introducing Iranians into responsible positions within the company was proceeding far too slowly; and, finally, that the concession itself was far too extensive. The fact that the company by 1931 gave employment to over 20,000 Iranians; that the conditions of work it offered far exceeded any contractual obligations; and that it provided housing, medical services and educational facilities on a generous scale counted for little in the eyes of the nationalists. All they saw was a company, controlled by a foreign government, in which Iranians held none of the high executive or managerial positions. This emotional, and therefore irrational, viewpoint did not undergo any fundamental change during the twenty years which preceded the final oil crisis and the nationalization in 1951 of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company—the name by which the company was known from 1935 onwards.

Rīzā Shāh's political realism, which had stood him in good stead in his dealings with the Russians, again served him well when he determined to extract from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company terms which were more favourable to Iran. After discussions between the Iranian government and the company between 1929 and 1931 had failed to yield any result, Rīzā Shāh, on 27 November 1932, cancelled the concession, but left the door open to negotiations. As a result of direct negotiations between the company and the Iranian government, a new contract was signed in 1933; this extended the duration of the concession until 1993, but drastically reduced its area.

Another aspect of Rīzā Shāh's skilful diplomacy was his unremitting efforts to improve relations with Iran's neighbours, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan. With all three countries, Iran had long-standing boundary disputes which were a constant source of friction. The dispute with Iraq over the boundary in the Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab, and that with Afghanistan over the regulation of the waters of the Helmand river, were perhaps the thorniest problems. Relations with Turkey, despite the centuries-old Ottoman-Persian conflict, were more readily placed on a friendly basis, because Rīzā Shāh was an ardent admirer of the Kemalist régime. The culmination of more than fifteen years of diplomatic activity was the

signature of the Sa'dābād Pact on 8 July 1937. This was a non-aggression pact between Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Afghanistan; the treaty called for the establishment of a permanent council and secretariat. Largely as a result of the support of its fellow treaty-members, Iran was elected to a seat on the Council of the League of Nations in September 1937. The Sa'dābād Pact represented a complete reversal of Iran's foreign policy from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. There is no doubt that Rīzā Shāh's primary object was to free Iran's hands in its dealings with Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., but it must be admitted also that, in pursuing a policy of regional friendship and co-operation, and the settlement of boundary disputes by arbitration, Rīzā Shāh was ahead of contemporary Middle Eastern political thinking. The Sa'dābād Pact was the first regional treaty of friendship in the Middle East.

Rīzā Shāh's most positive achievements—the establishment of internal order, the restoration of government control in the provinces and the crushing of separatist movements, and the emancipation of Iran from foreign political and economic domination—were accomplished only at the cost of the curtailment of individual liberties and the suspension of certain constitutional rights. With the increasing concentration of power in the hands of the shah, he became progressively less tolerant of criticism. Newspapers which opposed his policies were suppressed; the *Majlis* existed only to give approval to legislation which he initiated. When the largely Communist-organized trade unions caused widespread labour strikes which threatened the shah's programme of industrial development, he not only outlawed the Communist party but abolished the trade unions as well (1931). Other political parties gradually faded from the scene as Rīzā Shāh demonstrated his uncompromising hostility towards criticism of his policies. Rīzā Shāh, essentially a man of action, was naturally impatient with politicians, who, he considered, had had their chance between 1906 and 1921 to rebuild Iran. They had failed, and he was not going to allow them to obstruct him.

In agricultural and tribal matters, Rīzā Shāh was less successful. Such progress as was made in agriculture during his reign was confined to forest conservation, the establishment of a veterinary college and an agricultural college, and research stations which conducted experiments to improve seed strains and the quality of farm stock; and the development of new crops, such as tobacco and tea. He failed to bring about any fundamental change in the system of land tenure or to integrate the tribal element into society. He failed not only because of the harsh and some-

times treacherous methods he employed to subdue the tribes, but also because his policy of forcible resettlement was impractical as well as inhumane. He was blinded to other considerations by the fact that the tribes constituted a threat to internal security, and that as long as they were allowed to flout the authority of the central government they could avoid such ordinary civic responsibilities as the payment of taxes. He felt, too, that the transhumant pattern of life of the tribes, the most important groups of which migrated in the spring from the lowlands near the Persian Gulf to the mountain valleys of the Zagros, and returned in the autumn, was anachronistic, and did not conform to the picture of a modern, progressive Iran which he wished to project abroad. In the hot, waterless lands of Khūzistān which were amongst the areas allotted to some of the tribes under the resettlement project, men and beasts died in large numbers.

Something has already been said about the growth of German influence. Already before the advent of the Nazis to power, the Weimar Republic had done much to regain the lost influence of imperial Germany in Iran. As early as 1920, commercial relations were restored when firms resumed their import-export business in Tehran, and the important part played by German companies in supplying the machinery and equipment demanded by Rīzā Shāh's industrial development programme has already been noted. Before long, German capital was at work, or German technical assistance was being provided, in almost every branch of Iranian industry other than oil. German firms participated in the building of the northern section of the Trans-Iranian railway, and the first airline to operate an external route from Tehran was Lufthansa, which in 1937 inaugurated its Berlin-Baghdād-Tehran route.

After 1933, the Germans rapidly extended not only their economic control of Iran, but also energetically fostered cultural relations of all kinds. In 1934 the Deutsche Orient Verein was founded, and the Deutsch-Persische Gesellschaft issued publications and arranged lecture-tours. From 1933 onwards, the curricula of German universities began to indicate a marked interest in the Orient. In 1936, the Nazi minister Dr Schacht visited Iran, and assured the Iranians that Hitler considered them to be pure Aryans; as proof of this, Iranians were specifically exempted from the provisions of the Nuremberg race laws. The *rapprochement* between Germany and Russia in November 1940 caused Rīzā Shāh some uneasiness, but he still believed that Germany had no imperialist designs in the Middle East.

By 1941, Germany had organized in Iran an effective fifth column and espionage system. The abortive pro-German coup by Rashīd 'Ālī in Iraq in May 1941 was a portent of what might be expected in Iran, where Rashīd 'Ālī took refuge. The invasion of Russia by Germany in June 1941 transformed the German espionage system in Iran from a potential to an actual threat to Britain and Russia, and introduced a note of extreme urgency into the situation. As in the First World War, the Iranian oilfields were vital. Britain could not afford to have them sabotaged. Britain was also extremely anxious to open up a supply-route through Iran in order to pass munitions and war material of all kinds to the Russians, then fighting desperately to check the German advance across southern Russia. The only other available route, the Arctic route round the north of Scandinavia, was fraught with extreme climatic difficulties, and was also within range of German submarines and aircraft. The Russians also saw the German fifth column as a threat to their security. With Vladivostok threatened by the Japanese, and Murmansk icebound for part of the year, they were even more anxious than the British to open a supply-route through Iran. A vital link in this supply-route was the Trans-Iranian railway, which German agents were in a position to sabotage as long as their espionage network remained intact.

Accordingly, on 19 July and 16 August 1941, the U.S.S.R. and Britain addressed notes to Rīzā Shāh, demanding the expulsion of a large number of Germans as a matter of urgency. There is no evidence that Rīzā Shāh ever intended to take effective action to comply with the Allied demands, and on 25 August 1941 British and Russian forces invaded Iran simultaneously. Only in the Abadan area did the Iranian army make a determined stand, and within forty-eight hours all resistance had ceased. When Rīzā Shāh procrastinated over the expulsion of German diplomats and the internment of German citizens resident in Iran, British and Russian troops marched on Tehran. Leading German intelligence agents, however, had already escaped; and it was not until August 1943 that the main body of German agents and their Iranian collaborators was rounded up. One group continued to operate in Fārs until the spring of 1944.

Rīzā Shāh abdicated in September 1941, and was succeeded by his son, Muḥammad Rīzā Pahlavī. In the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance (29 January 1942) the Allies promised to withdraw their troops not later than six months after the end of all hostilities with the Axis powers. This

undertaking was reinforced by the statement issued at the Tehran conference (1 December 1943) by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. This statement recognized the assistance rendered to the Allies by Iran, promised economic aid, reaffirmed Iran's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and reiterated the adherence by the Allies to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Nevertheless, government during the war years was fraught with difficulties. Normal economic life was impossible, and the large sums of money expended in Iran by the Allies caused inflation. In political life, there was sudden freedom, with the removal of the strong hand which had ruled Iran for twenty years. Political parties proliferated, and anti-liberal forces, both of the extreme right and the extreme left, made their reappearance. The Shi'ī '*ulamā*' sought to regain some of the power of which they had been deprived by Rizā Shāh. After the Persian Communist party had been banned by Rizā Shāh it had been kept in being by a small group of activists living in exile, particularly in Germany. The new leaders of the party tended to be Western-educated Iranians who had learnt their Marxism in Europe, rather than the old-style professionals trained in Russia. Typical of these expatriates was Dr Taqī Irānī, a Berlin-educated physicist from Āzarbāyjān, who returned to Iran about 1935 and began to gather together a small group of supporters. In 1937 he and some fifty of his associates were arrested on charges of violating the 1931 anti-Communist act, and were imprisoned. Dr Irānī died in prison in 1940, but his supporters were released in 1941 under the general amnesty for political prisoners, and formed the nucleus of the Tūdeh party which was founded in January 1942.

Paradoxically, Rizā Shāh had aided the cause of Communism in Iran by bringing into being some of those ingredients for a successful revolution which had been lacking in the early days of Communist activity in Iran, namely, a middle class, an intelligentsia, and a labour force. This enabled the Tūdeh party to have a broader basis of membership than the former Persian Communist party. It described itself as a 'mass¹ organization based on a union of workers, peasants, artisans and intellectual democrats'. Initially, it was careful to disguise its Communist affiliations. After the German reverses at al-'Alamayn and Stalin-grad in 1942, many pro-German intellectuals joined it. In 1943 the Freedom Front, backed by a formidable section of the press, was formed, and the Tūdeh got eight members elected to the fourteenth *Majlis*. The

¹ The word *tūdeh* means 'mass'.

Tūdeh party worked actively to revive the trade unions. Its first party congress in 1944 was attended by 168 delegates claiming to represent a total membership of 25,000. At this congress, the central committee successfully overrode the protests of those who considered that participation in democratic elections was a betrayal of Communist principles.

When, in 1941, relations with Germany came to an abrupt end, the Iranians turned again to the United States as the third power which would protect them from Anglo-Russian pressure. In 1942, Dr Millspaugh was appointed a second time, with the title of director-general of the finances, and was empowered by the *Majlis* to engage sixty American experts. The measures he recommended to restore the health of the Iranian economy—income tax, price controls, cuts in government spending—aroused great opposition. Further, like Shuster in 1911, Millspaugh was hampered by the obstructiveness of Russian officials in northern Iran, who prevented Iranian government officials from carrying out their duties. In 1945, Millspaugh's attempt to secure the dismissal of the director of the national bank raised a storm of protest, and Millspaugh resigned.

In 1942, American influence in Iran was reinforced by the creation of the Persian Gulf Command. Some 30,000 American troops were engaged in facilitating the flow of supplies to the U.S.S.R., and to that end they rebuilt and modernized harbours on the Persian Gulf and in the Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab, constructed roads and airports, and improved the Trans-Iranian railway from the Gulf to Tehran. Between 1942 and 1944, some 150,000 vehicles and 3,500 aircraft were delivered to the Red Army. American military missions to the Iranian government had more success than their financial one; in particular the Ridley military mission (1942), and the mission appointed to reorganize the gendarmerie, headed by Schwarzkopf, former chief of the New Jersey State Police, achieved a large measure of success. As American influence gradually replaced that of Britain in Iran, the United States ceased to have any function as a third power; moreover, in so far as the United States took Britain's place in the dialogue with Russia in Iran, it incurred the opprobrium formerly reserved for Great Britain. Until the end of the Second World War, American policy in Iran was characterized by a reluctance to take a long-term view, by a desire to avoid foreign commitments. In 1947, however, the United States extended the Truman Doctrine to include Iran as well as Turkey and Greece, and thus made a definite commitment to preserve Iran's independence.

Whereas the British considered the presence of Allied troops in Iran to be a temporary expedient, the Russians used the opportunity to exert pressure on the Iranian government for political purposes, to foster separatist movements in the areas occupied by the Red Army, and to assist the Tūdeh party in its efforts to prepare for Communist revolution in Iran. The north of the country, the zone in which Russian troops were stationed, was virtually cut off from the rest of the country. This policy was in line with the secret protocol to the Four Power Pact (13 November 1940), between the U.S.S.R. and the Axis powers, which had stated: 'The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations centre south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean.'

As the war progressed, it became increasingly difficult for the Tūdeh to maintain its fiction of non-alignment with the Comintern. The most dramatic illustration of the fact that the aims and policies of the Tūdeh party and those of the Soviet government were identical occurred in 1944, when the latter launched a major diplomatic offensive for an oil concession in northern Iran. The Tūdeh party at once adopted as a principal point in its programme the concept of 'positive equilibrium', that is, the granting to the Soviet Union of an oil concession analogous to that held in the south by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. At the end of October, Dr Muṣaddiq made a speech in the *Majlis* in the course of which he advocated a policy of 'negative equilibrium'; the implications of such a policy, namely that the existing concession of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company should be cancelled, were not fully realized at the time. On 2 December 1944, Dr Muṣaddiq tabled a bill in the *Majlis* under double urgency procedure which made it a punishable offence for any member of the government even to enter into negotiations for the granting of an oil concession without the prior approval of the *Majlis*, and further specified that no oil concessions of any kind would be granted while foreign troops were in the country. The passage of this bill isolated the Tūdeh party, which alone supported the Soviet demand.

The Soviet Union reacted in two ways to this check: first, the Tūdeh party stepped up its subversive activities in Tehran and the provinces; secondly, the Soviet government, playing on the susceptibilities of minorities, engineered two separate revolts, in Āzarbāyjān and Kurdistān. In Āzarbāyjān, the Democrat party formed by the veteran Communist leader Ja'far Pishavari (who as Mīr Ja'far had been secretary to the Communist 'Adālat group in Baku in 1918) seized power by a *coup*

d'état on 4 November 1945. On 8 November an Iranian detachment despatched to deal with the insurrection was stopped near Qazvīn by Red Army troops. Pishavari demanded complete provincial autonomy, and on 13 December 1945 the establishment of the autonomous republic of Āzarbāyjān was proclaimed. The programme of the Democratic party included the introduction of Āzari Turkish into the schools and its use as the official language, the nationalization of the banks, and the distribution of land to the peasants. Two military units were formed: the *Qizilbaş* (a word obviously calculated to have emotional overtones in Āzarbāyjān, the birthplace of the Safavids), or regulars; and the *Fedailer*, or irregulars. The Kurdish revolt occurred on 15 December 1945, and in January 1946 Qāzī Muḥammad was elected president of the Kurdish People's Republic.

On 19 January 1946, Iran, on the grounds that Soviet interference in Iranian internal affairs had created a situation which might constitute a threat to international peace, requested the secretary-general of the United Nations to bring the matter before the Security Council. This was done. The Council referred the matter to direct negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union. The new Iranian prime minister, Qavām al-Saltāna, spent two months in Moscow, negotiating with Stalin and Molotov. All Allied troops were, under article 5 of the 1942 Tripartite Treaty of Alliance, to be withdrawn from Iranian soil by 2 March 1946. Britain and the United States honoured the agreement, but the Soviet Union, far from withdrawing its troops, had moved in fresh ones. In April, Qavām al-Saltāna returned to Tehran, having finally reached an understanding with the Soviet government. Iran promised to grant the U.S.S.R. an oil concession, and to reach a peaceful solution with the Āzarbāyjān Democrats having due regard to their legitimate grievances; in return, Soviet troops were to be withdrawn within six weeks if no unforeseen circumstances occurred.

Qavām al-Saltāna gave the impression that he intended to carry out his side of the bargain. The most outspoken anti-Soviet politicians and journalists were muzzled. Sayyid Ziyā al-Dīn Ṭabāṭabā'i, who had returned from exile in 1943 and whose National Will (*Irāda-yi Milli*) party was the only party apart from the Tūdeh which possessed a definite programme and effective organization, was arrested, and the party disintegrated. May Day 1946 was celebrated by some half million Tūdeh party members. Qavām al-Saltāna still continued to give evidence of his good intentions. In June, he reached agreement with the Āzarbāy-

jān Democrats by means of conceding all essential points: the Āzarbāyjān *Majlis* was to continue in being, but was to be termed a 'provincial council'—a type of body sanctioned by the constitution but never, except in the very early days of the constitution, set up; the Āzarbāyjān minister of the interior was to be called the governor-general; Persian was again to be taught in the high schools, but Āzari Turkish was to remain the official language. In August, Qavām al-Saltāna reshuffled his cabinet, and included three members of the Tūdeh party—a clever tactical move which both further placated the Russians and alienated the extremist elements in the Tūdeh party from the party leadership; the radicals were outraged by the readiness of the Tūdeh central committee to co-operate with the bourgeoisie in order to obtain power by constitutional means. At this time, the Tūdeh party was still confident that it would win the elections to the fifteenth *Majlis*—the fourteenth *Majlis* had come to the end of its term in March 1946.

Behind the scenes, Qavām al-Saltāna was planning his counterstroke. In June 1946, he formed the Democrat party of Iran. In September, there occurred a rebellion in the south by a coalition of Bakhtiārī and Qashqā'ī tribes. The rebels demanded similar status to Āzarbāyjān and Kurdistān if these two provinces were granted provincial autonomy, and the expulsion from the cabinet of the three Tūdeh ministers. Qavām al-Saltāna acquiesced. In November, he suddenly arrested in Tehran a number of Tūdeh leaders, and ordered the Iranian army to march into Āzarbāyjān to supervise the elections. After only token resistance, the Āzarbāyjān satellite régime collapsed in mid-December. Ja'far Pīshavarī escaped to the Soviet Union, and was later reported to have been killed in a road accident near Baku. Shortly afterwards, the Iranian army overthrew the rebel régime in Kurdistān, and Qāzī Muḥammad and his brother were hanged.

With the authority of the central government restored in these two provinces, the way was open for the elections to begin. In July 1947, Qavām al-Saltāna's Democrat party was returned with a substantial majority; the group led by Dr Muṣaddīq secured some twenty-five seats. In October, Qavām al-Saltāna kept his promise to the Soviet Union to the extent of submitting to the *Majlis* a bill proposing the granting of an oil concession to the U.S.S.R. The bill was rejected by 102 votes to 2, the two Communist deputies voting for the bill.

(B) PERSIAN NATIONALISM

Nationalism in Persia has meant different things at different times, and

has also been interpreted differently by different groups of people at one and the same time. Of recent years, for instance, it has been possible for such disparate groups, with such widely divergent aims and ideologies, as the shah and his supporters, Dr Muṣaddiq and the National Front, and the Communist Tūdeh party, each to claim to be promoting the cause of nationalism, and each to brand the others as traitors and enemies of the Persian people. In order to see how this has come about, it will be necessary to trace the origins and development of the concept of nationalism in Persia.

It is axiomatic that foreign rule, or foreign political and economic pressure, is the principal means of fostering nationalist sentiments. It is logical, therefore, to look for the emergence of such sentiments in Persia from the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the great powers began to exert political and economic pressure, and Britain and Russia entered upon one hundred and fifty years of rivalry for dominance.

Āqā Muḥammad Khān, whose coronation in 1210/1796 inaugurated the one hundred and thirty-year dominion of the Qājār dynasty, had, by his campaigns in Georgia, given the Russians a pretext to resume their expansion southwards. The blows fell in quick succession: in 1800, under the guise of coming to the assistance of the Georgians, Russia annexed their country; by the Treaty of Gulistān (1813), Iran lost all her rich Caucasian provinces; by the Treaty of Turkomānchāy (1828), Persia ceded still further territory, and the imposition of the capitulatory system represented an infringement of its rights as a sovereign and independent nation. In the east, the creation of Afghanistan, and the occupation of Transcaspia by the Russians during the second half of the nineteenth century, reduced the province of Khurāsān to half its former size. In addition, the incompetence and extravagance of the Qājār monarchs led them to burden Persia with foreign debts, and to place much of the country's economic resources in the hands of foreign concessionaires.

Given that in the nineteenth century Persia was still a traditional Islamic state, it was to be expected that social protest against the Qājār administration would be expressed in the traditional way, that is, through the medium of a religious movement of a revolutionary and heretical nature. The revolts which began in 1848, following the manifestation of the Bāb in 1840 as the 'gate' between man and the Hidden *Imām* (the *Imām* of the Age, i.e. the twelfth *Imām*), and hence between man and God, were in the long tradition of messianic ultra-Shi'i heresies and, signi-

ificantly, of pre-Islamic Iranian socio-religious revolts such as that of Mazdak. Although certain 'proto-nationalist' tendencies have been noted in Babism, for instance, its rejection of the existing Islamic culture, and revival of certain pre-Islamic Zoroastrian beliefs and practices, it was not a nationalist movement in the generally accepted sense. It is possible, however, that the minority branch of the Bābīs known as the Azalīs, who remained faithful to the Bāb's appointed successor, may have transmitted in political terms, to the Iranian intellectuals of the Constitutional movement, ideas which were originally expressed in religious terms, and may in this way have contributed to the development of a nationalist ideology.

The first genuinely nationalist movement arose in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1892 the Shī'ī *mujtahids* and '*ulamā*' had led the people to a signal victory by forcing Nāṣir al-Dīn to rescind the 1890 Tobacco Concession granted to a British company. This was the first concerted expression of popular opinion, and it contained one of the essential ingredients of nationalism, hatred of the foreigner. Since the shah was considered to have bartered away the national birthright to foreign concessionaires, he became one of the principal targets for nationalist attack. Here were the seeds of a second basic ingredient of nationalism, the desire to vest sovereignty in the people rather than in a despotic ruler. The reformer and pan-Islamist Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, whose personal feud with Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh had moved him to support the demonstration against the Tobacco *régie*, followed this up by circulating throughout Persia literature which demanded the deposition of the shah, and called on the '*ulamā*' to take the lead in freeing the country from the tyranny and corruption of the governing classes, and in preventing foreigners from extending their control of the economy. In the spring of 1896 one of his supporters assassinated Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh. Here was a demonstration of a third characteristic of nationalist movements, the capacity for conspiracy, violence and murder.

The new ruler, Muẓaffar al-Dīn Shāh, was weak and indolent. He made no attempt to introduce reforms, or to check his personal extravagance. His constant need for money enabled the Russians to tighten their grip on the Persian economy, and behind their economic pressure lay, as usual, the threat of military aggression. Popular discontent increased after the appointment of 'Ayn al-Dawla as prime minister in 1904. 'Ayn al-Dawla was held responsible for the increasing power and

arrogance of the Belgian customs officials. Corruption and nepotism, not only in the central administration but also in provincial government, had reached proportions which wrung a protest even from those well accustomed to such practices.

In 1905 matters came to a head when a group of merchants, and members of the religious classes, using the traditional method of *bast*, or sanctuary, made certain specific demands of the shah: the dismissal of the prime minister, and the establishment of an '*adālat-khāna*, or house of justice. On this occasion, there was no talk of a constitution. The demand for a constitution was first heard the following year, when the nationalists (or Constitutionals; the two terms were used indifferently), frustrated by the failure of the shah to carry out his promises, and provoked by further acts of oppression by 'Ayn al-Dawla, again took *bast*, this time in the grounds of the British legation in Tehran. Muẓaffar al-Dīn Shāh acceded to their demands; a National Assembly was convened in October 1906, and on 30 December the shah signed the fundamental law (*qānūn-i asāsī*) which, together with the supplementary fundamental law of October 1907, is the instrument of the Persian constitution.

The events of the ensuing years, described in the preceding section, engendered in the nationalists a hatred of Britain and Russia, progressively blinded the nationalists to political realities, caused them to make serious errors of policy, and led to the emergence of the characteristic syndrome that every happening in Persia, no matter how trivial, is directly attributable to the machinations of a foreign power. This belief, by paralysing independent thought and action, has done more to hamper political development than have the direct interventions of foreign powers.

The nationalists' lack of success cannot be attributed solely to foreign pressure, harmful though that was. The monarchy, the traditional unifying force, had been discredited, but nationalism had not proved an effective substitute. There was no real unity of aim among the different groups which made up the nationalist movement, and some of the groups had no clear idea of what constitutional government entailed. As a result, at an early stage serious rifts began to appear in the nationalist ranks. The most important elements were the religious classes, the *mujtabids* and *mullās*, and the members of the lower middle-class craft and artisan guilds. Members of both these groups were to be found in the nationalist societies (*anjumanhā-yi millī*), which came into being in the

second half of the nineteenth century and were active both in Persia and in the Shī'ī centres in 'Irāq. As Professor Lambton has pointed out, these societies 'had little resemblance to the political parties of the West. Their affinity was rather with the secret societies characteristic of the extreme religious sects of medieval Islam.'¹ Both the religious classes and the guilds were inspired more by a hatred of social injustice and autocratic oppression, and resentment of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Iran, than by any desire for or understanding of constitutional government. Neither group wished to take any steps incompatible with the religious law of Islam. In short, the two principal groups supporting the nationalist movement were not Western-inspired, and had their roots in traditional Islam. The Western-educated intellectuals, whose exposure to Western political ideas had given impetus to the nationalist movement, were not well represented in the first *Majlis*. Their goals of westernization and modernization could not be achieved without detriment to the traditional position of religiously oriented groups and, as their influence grew, so the gap between them and the religious classes widened. Finally, the tribes were doubtful allies of the nationalists. Some, more through hope of reaping financial gain and political power than from any lofty political ideals, had rallied to the defence of the constitution, but many others continued to give their primary loyalty to the shah. A major weakness of the nationalist government was its inability to curb the lawlessness of the tribes, and its failure to maintain internal security led to further intervention by Britain and Russia.

As stated above, on the outbreak of the First World War Iran declared a policy of 'strict neutrality'. It soon became clear that strict neutrality meant only non-alignment with the Entente powers, for the strenuous efforts of the German minister in Tehran, von Reuss, to win the nationalists over to the side of the Central Powers, were attended by a large measure of success. A considerable number of *Majlis* deputies, moved less, perhaps, by the sight of the German diplomat von Kardoff weeping for the Shī'ī martyrs during the Muḥarram celebrations, than by a desire for revenge on Britain and Russia, sank their differences in their enthusiasm for the Central Powers. The German *putsch* ultimately failed. From the beginning of 1916 until the end of the war, the policy of the Persian government on the whole favoured the Entente, although some nationalists continued to desire an unattainable neutralism.

¹ A. K. S. Lambton, 'Secret societies and the Persian Revolution of 1905-6', in *St Antony's Papers*, Number 4; *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Number One (London, 1958), 49.

Two branches of the mainstream of Persian nationalism deserve brief mention at this point. The first is the Jangali movement, so called because it had its headquarters in the forest-country (Persian, *jāngal*) of Gilān. Its leader, Mīrzā Kūchik Khān, a member of the Moderate (*I'tidālī*) Group of the nationalist movement and a one-time pan-Islamist, gradually gained control of Gilān during the First World War with the help of arms from Germany and Turkey. He stood for the overthrow of the monarchy and the abrogation of 'unjust' agreements between Persia and foreign powers. His view of society was characterized by a desire to return to a rather nebulous 'Islamic democratic order'. In 1920 the Jangali movement was taken over by the Bolsheviks, and the Soviet Autonomous Republic of Gilān was declared, to be overthrown by Rīzā Khān in October 1921. The second local nationalist movement was that led by Shaykh Muḥammad Khīyābānī in Āzarbāyjān. Khīyābānī's National Democrats, initially aided by the Germans, did not join forces with the Gilān Bolsheviks, and the revolt was soon suppressed by the government (1920).

The whole question of the relations between indigenous, predominantly bourgeois, nationalist movements and international Communism, has exercised Marxist dialecticians for half a century. In 1921, seeking to rationalize the failure of the first experiment in revolutionary Communism outside the Soviet Union, some Marxist theorists saw the incompatibility between Asian nationalist movements, which were essentially xenophobic, and Communism, which advocated an international class-struggle. At the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East in 1920, the chairman, Zinoviev, cautioned against narrow-minded nationalism, and at the Third Comintern Congress in 1921, delegates were warned that their first duty was the promotion of world propaganda against nationalism. At the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, a relentless struggle against bourgeois nationalist movements was advocated, but at the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935, the Soviet leaders, alarmed by the growing threat of Nazism, performed a complete *volte-face*, and advocated an alliance with bourgeois nationalist movements in the common struggle against imperialism. A great deal of the Soviet leaders' perplexity derived from their disconcerting experience in Gilān, where the peasants rallied to the support of the '*ulamā*' when the latter were exposed to ridicule by the Communists. Eventually, the Communists evolved a rule-of-thumb: nationalist movements were 'progressive' as long as they were concerned with the struggle against

feudalism and imperialism; they became 'retrogressive' if they impeded the advance to socialist revolution. Even so, this formula could not always be applied with precision to specific cases.

In 1921, Rīzā Khān seized power by a *coup d'état* and presented Persian Communists and nationalists alike with a teasing problem: could Rīzā Khān (from 1925 Rīzā Shāh) be considered a nationalist? He satisfied many of the criteria: about his patriotism there was no doubt—his every utterance was redolent of the most intense love of his country; he had an equally intense dislike of foreigners—at least of those whom he suspected of having designs on Iran's independence; in overthrowing the established order by force, he had the tacit approval of the majority of Iranians, and could therefore be said to be giving expression to popular nationalist sentiment; finally, and most importantly, he reached many of the objectives, and carried through many of the reforms, which successive nationalist governments between 1906 and 1925 had aimed at but had, for whatever reason, failed to achieve. These governments had failed to maintain law and order; had neglected to reorganize and modernize the armed forces; had made only limited progress in administrative and judicial reform, and virtually none in educational reform; and had entirely failed to restrict foreign influence in Persia's political and economic affairs. Why then did the nationalists choose to oppose Rīzā Shāh so implacably, and even to deny that he deserved to be called a nationalist?

Basically, the nationalists, and particularly the intellectuals among them, opposed Rīzā Shāh because they considered that his assumption of power represented a setback to constitutional government. In the short term they were right. Rīzā Shāh was able to carry out his reforms only because he increasingly concentrated power in his own hands. He wanted to get things done quickly, and so he brooked no obstruction from the *Majlis*, which existed solely to approve his legislation, and tolerated no criticism in the press. His reorganized and greatly expanded army, on which he relied not only to maintain internal security, but also to supervise the effective implementation of his reforms, came to be hated by the nationalists as a symbol of oppression and the restriction of individual liberty. An uneducated man, and a man of action, Rīzā Shāh did not disguise his contempt for what he considered to be the inadequacies of more literate and articulate, but vacillating and disunited, reformers. Unlike Atatürk, he had no ideology which the intellectuals might have accepted as a salve to their wounded pride,

and which might have reconciled them to the loss of their intellectual freedom and constitutional rights. What the intellectuals failed to realize was, that nationalism and political liberties do not necessarily go together.

The rejection of the Pahlavī dynasty by the intelligentsia produced a fundamentally unhealthy and potentially dangerous situation in the Iranian body politic. The more intransigent the stand adopted by the nationalist intelligentsia, the sterner the measures needed to preserve the régime, and these measures in turn made it necessary for the intelligentsia to adopt an ever more revolutionary attitude. During Rīzā Shāh's reign, the decision of the intelligentsia to oppose the régime led them into all sorts of absurdities. Thus when for a brief period it seemed that Rīzā Shāh might establish a republic in Iran they opposed this movement. Similarly they opposed his efforts towards secularization and social and economic reform, although in theory they were in favour of secularization and reform. The same romantic unrealism, typical of extreme nationalists everywhere, has led the intelligentsia, during the reign of the present shah, to support Muṣaddiq, to rebuff every overture made to them by the shah, and finally to allow themselves to be manoeuvred into the absurd position of opposing the shah's six-point reform programme. During both reigns, it led them to support the Iranian Communist party and thus, paradoxically, to help to undermine the very independence of Iran as a sovereign nation, the preservation of which was supposedly their primary concern.

In an attempt to rationalize their hostility towards Rīzā Shāh, the intelligentsia affected to consider him to be a British appointee. Although this view had not the slightest basis in fact, it was eminently satisfactory as a myth. If Rīzā Shāh owed his rise to power to the British, clearly he was subject to the influence of foreign masters, and consequently could not be regarded as a nationalist. The nationalism of the intelligentsia prevented them from appreciating the positive achievements of Rīzā Shāh. The nationalism of Rīzā Shāh blinded him to the danger of choosing Germany, from 1927 onwards, as a 'third power' to offset British and Russian influence in Iran.

The abdication of Rīzā Shāh in 1941 meant the end of a decade and a half of strong centralized government directed by a despot. The new shah, Muḥammad Rīzā Pahlavī, had been brought up in a more liberal school than his father, and believed that a constitutional monarchy was the form of government most conducive to national unity and progress.

In this more liberal atmosphere, the *Majlis* returned to life, and political parties flourished. Newspapers appeared overnight and disappeared just as suddenly. The religious classes won back some of the ground which they had lost under Rīzā Shāh. There was, however, no political stability. Ministries rose and fell, and once again excessive individualism militated against the formation of political parties with any real strength and cohesion. There were two exceptions, the Tūdeh party, formed in 1942, and the *Vaṭān* ('Fatherland'), later *Irāda-yi Milli* ('National Will') party, formed in 1943. The former was the old Persian Communist party under new management. Though its affiliation with the Comintern was only thinly disguised, many of the intelligentsia professed to regard it as a genuine reform party. Once it became evident that Germany might not, after all, win the war, many nationalists who had supported Germany during the First World War, hastened to declare themselves 'anti-Fascists', and joined the Tūdeh party. The *Irāda-yi Milli* party was a coalition of right-wing elements led by the old nationalist hero and co-organizer of the 1921 *coup d'état*, Sayyid Ziyā al-Dīn Ṭabāṭabā'i. The cohesion and discipline of the Tūdeh party made it infinitely the more effective of the two.

In 1944 the nationalists found a new leader in Dr Muḥammad Muṣaddiq, now aged sixty-five, who because of his opposition to the policies of Rīzā Shāh had lived in retreat during the latter's reign. The two driving forces behind Muṣaddiq were xenophobia, unrestrained by practical considerations or political realities, and hatred of the Pahlavī régime. In October 1944, in his famous 'negative equilibrium' speech, Muṣaddiq put forward the view that no oil concessions should be granted while foreign troops were on Iranian soil. In 1949 he formed the National Front, a widely based popular movement which embraced bourgeois nationalists, non-Tūdeh leftist intelligentsia, landowners, tribal leaders, members of the religious classes (including the fanatical groups of the extreme right) and bazaar merchants. Each of these disparate groups had its own reasons for fearing a recurrence of royal dictatorship.

One marked difference between the nationalism of Rīzā Shāh and that of Muṣaddiq is that, whereas the former sought impartially to eliminate all foreign influence from Iran, the latter directed his whole attack against Britain. This was partly because Muṣaddiq had accepted Communist support (whereas Rīzā Shāh had banned the Communist party in 1931), and partly because the only target selected for attack—the Anglo-

Iranian Oil Company—was a British one. A fundamental weakness in the National Front position was that, having achieved its goal of oil nationalization, it was devoid of further ideas, and made no attempt to introduce any social and economic reforms. In representing Britain as the sole source of all Iranian ills, Muşaddiq was merely demonstrating once again his complete lack of political realism.

Why have the Nationalists always been ready to direct more virulent abuse at Britain than at Russia? There are three main reasons: first, they were bitterly disillusioned with Britain, the mother of parliamentary democracy, which in 1905–6 supported the Constitutionalists, but in 1907 signed the Anglo-Russian convention, regarded by the nationalists as an act of betrayal, and in 1919 negotiated with the Persian government the Anglo-Persian agreement, regarded by the nationalists as a stratagem to establish a British protectorate in Iran. Secondly, the romantic unrealism inherent in nationalism made it impossible for the intelligentsia to make a rational appraisal of political realities at any given stage. Thirdly, fear of reprisals usually prevented the nationalists from going too far in their attacks on Russia. They were not inhibited in the same way in their attacks on Britain, because every nationalist in his heart knew that no action he took was likely to cause the British to behave in the way the Russians behaved in 1909–16, 1920–1 and 1941–6.

ISLAM IN THE SOVIET UNION

The Tsarist Russian Empire had the third largest Muslim population in the world, being surpassed only by the British empire, especially India, and the Ottoman empire. After the Orthodox Church, the Muslims were the largest religious group in Russia, with a population of between 15 and 18 millions. This Muslim population was found in all parts of Russia: the Volga-Ural region, Siberia, Central Asia (Turkistān), the Crimea, and the Caucasus. In the main cities of European Russia there had always been large groups of Muslims, especially Kazan Tatars, who, like the people of Āzarbāyjān were advanced materially and culturally, and were to some extent westernized. The Religious Council of the Muslims of Russia in Ufa¹ had been established in 1788 by an edict of Catherine II. The head of this organization, which was attached to the Ministry of the Interior, was a *mufti* appointed by the Russian government. There also was a board of *qāḍīs*. The Kazakh Turks eventually passed under the control of the Religious Council in Ufa in religious and cultural matters. After the Russian occupation and annexation of Turkistān (1865–84), the *mufti* of Ufa wanted to subject the Muslims in Central Asia to his administration, but the Russian government did not approve of this, and no central religious organization was founded following the annexation of the Crimea, Āzarbāyjān and the northern Caucasus. So, by the time of the Revolution in 1917 the only organization of the Muslims, which was officially recognized and had its expenses paid by the government, was the Religious Council in Ufa. Therefore this institution was of particular importance, and as soon as the Revolution started the possibilities of developing the organization were considered. The *mufti* ‘Aṭā’ Allāh Bayazitov (known for his absolute loyalty to the government), appointed by the tsar’s administration, was removed from his post, and at the first All-Russian Muslim Congress which met in Moscow on 1 May 1917, ‘Ālimjān Bārūdī was chosen as *mufti* of the Muslims in European Russia, Siberia and Kazakhstān.

The problems which most concerned the Muslims for some time were

¹ Since Ufa was in the province of Orenburg, the council was also known as the Orenburg Spiritual Council.

religious and civil rather than political. Under Russian rule they, mainly the Kazan Tatars and Bashkirs, had been subject to open or concealed pressure, and therefore the preservation of religion and of the national existence had become identical. For this reason, when the Revolution of 1917 began, the Muslims sought the means of obtaining the full religious freedom which they considered paramount. This large population of diverse origins took the same stand at least in matters of religion and culture. It was certain that this mass of people, if organized, would have an important political potential. Furthermore, the presence of the Muslims in large numbers in the frontier regions such as Turkistān, Caucasia and the Crimea was also significant. The Muslims would expect much from the Revolution, so the political organizations which could serve their purposes would easily draw them to their side. The Bolshevik party started to attract attention with its policy of making use of the Muslims.

After the October 1917 Revolution, Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders gave a special emphasis to the Islamic world. In the first place, the propagation and the reinforcement of the fundamentals gained by the Revolution could only be achieved with the backing of large masses. It was necessary to win the support of the people who had been 'oppressed' under tsarist rule, the most important of whom were the Muslims. Since, moreover, the military ability of the Kazan Tatars, Bashkirs and northern Caucasians had long been known, the Bolsheviks would profit greatly if they could gain their support. On the other hand, outside Russia there were more than two hundred million Muslims under imperialist, and especially British, rule. The Soviet leaders could create a completely new situation by assuming the role of protector of these oppressed people. According to the Bolsheviks, the importance of Islam was not as a religion, but as a description of the oppressed people of the East who had this name. They believed in the possibilities of using the Islamic world for the purposes of Bolshevism.

As soon as the Bolsheviks came to power, they started working towards winning the Muslims both inside and outside Russia. A declaration addressed to the Muslims of Russia and the eastern countries, and signed by Lenin and Stalin (the commissar of nationalities), was issued in December 1917. It contains the following appeal:

Muslims of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirgiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Chechens and mountain Cossacks! All you, whose mosques and shrines have been destroyed, whose faith and customs have been

violated by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia! Henceforward your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are declared free and inviolable! Build your national life freely and without hindrance. It is your right. Know that your rights, like those of all the peoples of Russia, will be protected by the might of the Revolution, by the councils of workers, soldiers, peasants, deputies!¹

Following this, the Muslims of the eastern countries (especially, that is, the Muslims of India) were asked to support the October Revolution. This declaration produced great repercussions. The majority of the Muslims in Russia, especially the intellectuals, believed in the religious and national freedom promised by the Bolsheviks, and started to support the Soviet régime. During the Civil War, a great number of Tatars and Bashkirs served (some of them voluntarily, but a great many as conscripts) in the Red Army. There were many Muslim soldiers, especially on the eastern front in the Fifth Red Army, and they played an important part in the defeat of Kolchak. Bashkir and Tatar soldiers played an important role on either front as well, for instance, in the suppression of the Kronstadt revolt of 1921, and Muslim troops were extremely useful in the battles against Denikin. However, it was soon realized that the promises made in the declaration of December 1917 had no validity. The national institutions and traditions of the Muslims, and especially Islam, were persecuted. But now the October Revolution had succeeded everywhere and, just as in tsarist Russia, the Muslim population in the Soviet area was left in the hands of the Russian administration.

Since Lenin and Stalin were Marxists and atheists, they of course would not protect the Islamic religion or any other. They had clearly declared that religion was the opium of the people and harmful to them, and that it could not be reconciled with a materialistic approach. Soon after the Soviet régime was established, religion was completely separated from the state, and no help of any kind could be expected from the state for religious institutions. The protection of the oppressed Muslim people was purely political, and had nothing to do with religion itself. Because the oppressed Muslims did not know the doctrines of the Bolshevik leaders, they regarded them as the friends and patrons of Islam.

One of the largest claims of the Bolsheviks after they came to power was that they would find a solution to the problem of nationalities. Every nation would be given the right to choose its own way of life and

¹ Quoted from G. Wheeler, *The modern history of Soviet Central Asia* (London, 1964), 188. The complete text is given in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, 1956), II, 27-28.

its own administration, and even be permitted to break away from Russia if it wished. The Tatars of Kazan had tried to organize their national life before the October Revolution. The three congresses that met in Kazan (the religious, military and General Assembly) came together and declared national and cultural autonomy on 22 July 1917. In November, a National Assembly had met in Ufa, prepared a constitution for the application of autonomy, and established national institutions—namely, a Department of Religious Affairs, with the *mufti* ‘Ālimjān Bārūdī at its head, a Department of Education and a Department of Finance. These three departments formed the National Administration which was headed by Şadrī Maqşūdī. In the meetings of the National Assembly it was also proposed to establish a republic with the name of the Idil¹-Ural States, and a committee was chosen to work on this matter. This committee defined the borders and the institutions of a state of seven or eight million people in the Idil-Ural territory where the Kazan Tatars and Bashkirs lived in large numbers. The final decision on this matter was left to the National Assembly which was to meet in March 1918.

However, after the October Revolution, and especially after the establishment of the Soviet régime in the cities of Kazan and Ufa, these activities came to an end. The nationalist movement of the Tatars in Kazan was stopped by the Bolsheviks on 28 March 1918, and the national organization dissolved. On 12 April 1918, the National Administration in Ufa was dissolved by the Red Tatar troops, and only the Department of Religious Affairs was left, on condition that it would not engage in politics. This action of the Soviets was absolutely contrary to their declaration of December 1917.

Among the Muslim leaders the illusion persisted that the dissolution of the national institutions might be the arbitrary actions of native communist extremists, unknown to the central authorities, that is the leaders in the Kremlin. A committee composed of Şadrī Maqşūdī, the head of the National Administration in Ufa, ‘Ālimjān Bārūdī the *mufti*, and Kurbangali, the head of the Education Department, came to Moscow early in May 1918 to meet the high Soviet authorities. They presented a long memorandum to the head of the Soviet Executive Committee. Their purpose was to avoid interference with the national institutions of the nine million Muslim people, Tatars and Bashkirs who had united according to the principles of national and cultural

¹ Idil is the Tatar name for the Volga.

autonomy declared in Kazan, and who were represented by the National Assembly and the National Administration at Ufa. The memorandum stated that these national activities had no relation with politics; that religion was of great importance to the Muslims. It added that the separation of religion and state by the Soviet government had caused the prohibition of religious teaching in Muslim schools and that the confiscation of the properties belonging to the *waqfs* was considered to be unjust. These activities would have an unfavourable effect on the Muslim people; therefore, the representatives of the National Administration asked the Soviet leaders to show some tolerance to the Muslims in religious and national matters. They are also said to have reported their demands to the Ottoman ambassador in Moscow, and to have expected some support.

The appeal to the Soviet authorities brought no positive results. In the Muslim territories where the Soviet régime was already established, the national organizations were to be readjusted according to Bolshevik principles, as nationalist in form, but socialist in essence. In this system, religion was not going to be given a high position.

Following the declaration of December 1917, the Commissariat of Nationalities, an important organ of the Soviet government, directed by Stalin, established the Central Commissariat for Muslim Affairs, to establish the Soviet régime and propagate the Communist ideology among the Muslim people. Mullā Nūr Vakhitov, a Kazan Tatar, who soon became a Bolshevik, was put at the head of this organization. The other two members who also soon became Reds were 'Ālimjān Ibrahimov, a well-known Kazan Tatar writer, and Sherif Manatov of the Bashkirs. This Commissariat of the Muslims started to establish Muslim Communist parties in the cities of the Idil-Ural region. Also through this Commissariat the Bolshevik leaders, mainly Stalin, tried to find some practical means for the solution of the nationalities problem. The first experiment in this matter was made on the Tatars and Bashkirs.

It has already been mentioned that the National Administration wanted to found the Idil-Ural States. The Tatar Communists now wanted to carry out this same project, but with the methods of the Soviet régime. After negotiations in the Kremlin, Stalin and Lenin approved of this project, and on 24 March 1918, it was announced that a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic was to be founded. However, this project was not realized, mainly because a Muslim republic with a large population so close to Kazakhstān and Turkistān seemed dangerous. The Czech

revolt of May 1918, and the Civil War which followed it, also hindered the realization of the project, which moreover was resisted by some Bashkir leaders, who did not wish to submit themselves to the domination of the Tatars.

After the Civil War, local republics began to be founded. The Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Republic, established in 1920, was the first of these experiments. In June 1920 the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Republic was founded, and it was followed by other republics at various dates in the areas where Turkish and Muslim peoples lived. These were patterned on the Soviet Russian Republic, and the same constitution and organization was accepted for all of them. No place was given to the Islamic religion. There was some toleration for the Islamic institutions of the Central Asian republics (such as the *Shari'a* and the *medreses*) but this was temporary. However, since the people of the Tatar, Bashkir, Kazakh and other Central Asian republics still belonged to Islam, these countries were regarded as Muslim. The Soviet government unwillingly accepted this situation and felt the necessity of a reconciliation with the religious beliefs of some twenty million people who lived in those lands. This can be explained both as a result of domestic considerations and also (probably more so) as a requirement of foreign policy.

According to the records of the Religious Council in Ufa, there were 7,800 communities attached to the office of the *mufti*, and the number of mosques and schools was 8,000, including some secondary schools and seminaries in the cities. None of these institutions was given any support by the Russian government; they were run with the money collected among the Kazan Tatars. They were open to the Bashkirs, Kazakhs and people of Turkistān, as well as to the Kazan Tatars. They played a great part in the enlightenment of the Turkish-Muslim people; and the rate of literacy in the Kazan province was as high as fifty per cent before 1917. A number of daily papers and periodicals were published in Kazan, and there were extensive publishing activities. *Shūrā*, published in Orenburg, was one of the best journals in the Islamic world as well as in Russia. In Āzarbāyjān, Baku, the Crimea and Siberia, campaigns for the propagation of religious and secular education were vigorously pursued in a number of cities, and teachers' training schools both for men and women had extensive activities. As a result of relations with Turkey and Egypt, the new movements in these countries had repercussions among the Muslims in Russia. The religious books published before 1917 included serious studies on Islamic religion, and important works on

Islamic philosophy were also being written. The Muslims in Russia were on the road towards a real awakening.

After the October Revolution all activities of this sort were suddenly stopped. Beginning early in 1918, *medreses* were closed down, and the '*ulemā*' were eventually prosecuted for one reason or another. After the state was secularized, religious lessons in the schools were stopped, but this was done gradually, and religious teaching continued in many places under the Soviet régime.

The parts of Russia where the Muslims lived had been most damaged by the Civil War. The revolt which the Czechs started in May 1918 spread towards Siberia along the Volga. The fiercest fights between the Whites and the Reds took place in Muslim areas. During these battles, many Muslims, especially from the higher classes and the '*ulemā*', were killed, and part of the people emigrated. The year following the foundation of the Soviet Tatar Republic, there was a great famine (1921-2). The total number of people who died of hunger or who emigrated from the Kazan province for this reason exceeded half a million. The majority went to Turkistān. In these circumstances, the establishment of the Soviet system in the Tatar Republic proceeded slowly, and the Soviet government showed tolerance in some national and religious affairs.

In order to win the sympathy of the Muslim peoples, the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1923 decided that the struggle should be fought against religion without using force but with propaganda. It was thought that the centre of the propaganda and fight against religion would be the village schools. While decisions of this kind were being made, the publication of works which introduced the methods of fighting religion was also started. Among the first works published in this field was one by Mīr Sayyid Sultangaliyev (Sultān 'Alioghlu), one of Stalin's assistants. Publications of this kind started to provoke popular reaction rather than support.

The organizations of the Russian Muslims had applied to the Soviet government to hold a congress for the discussion of problems concerning themselves, and this was finally permitted. Some considerations in foreign policy, especially the desire to resume the policy of inciting the Muslims in India against the British, were an important factor in this matter.

A congress was held at Ufa on 15 June 1923, with the participation of 350 delegates from various parts of Russia. Among the important items

for discussion were the organization and operation of the Department of Religious Affairs (i.e. the former Religious Council), and the recognition of 'Abd ül-Mejîd, who had been made caliph on 18 November 1922 by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. It was decided to send a telegram of gratitude and congratulations to Muṣṭafâ Kemâl Pasha through the Soviet commissar of Foreign Affairs. The telegram mentioned Sultan Mehmed VI Vahîd al-Dîn's treachery and the cruelties of the Entente powers. Muṣṭafâ Kemâl was thanked for making 'Abd ül-Mejîd caliph, and the action of the Turkish Grand National Assembly was praised. News about this telegram appeared in *Izvestia*, the official paper of the Soviet government. After the Congress was over, delegates paid a visit to the Turkish ambassador, to express orally what was in the telegram. All these moves were of course made with the knowledge and direction of the Soviet government, and demonstrated that it attached a special importance to the Muslims, both inside and outside the country.

According to a decision taken by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on 2 November 1923, Muslim children who had completed their fourteenth year could study Islam. This decision brought great happiness to the Muslim people. Lists of people who remained loyal to religion were immediately prepared in all districts, and arrangements were made for teaching in the mosques. But this decision of the central authorities was counteracted by the native Communist extremists. For instance, only one day in a week was appointed for religious lessons, or difficulties were put in the way of the teachers. Nevertheless the Department of Religious Affairs organized the teaching of religion, and children over fourteen years of age in the villages and towns were regularly given lessons on the fundamentals of religion, and on ritual and prayers. The teaching of religion to the children below the age of fourteen was forbidden by Soviet laws, and those who violated these laws were liable to three years penal labour in work-camps, but in spite of all these threats, there is no doubt that children learned their religion in their families. As a result, Islam did not disintegrate during the Soviet régime. The Islamic customs were kept as before, and the boys were still circumcized. The aid given to the mosques and *mullās* was an expression of the intensity of popular religious feelings. At that time, the economic conditions of the Kazan Tatars and other Muslims were rapidly improving as a result of the New Economic Policy of Soviet Russia, so people could afford financial aid to religious organizations and men of religion.

After 1923 the Department of Religious Affairs in Ufa had relatively convenient working conditions. When 'Ālimjān Bārūdī died on 6 December 1921, Rizā al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn was elected in his place. He was one of the most distinguished Russian Muslims, as a scholar, an historian and a writer. Among the *qāḍīs* there were able persons, such as Keshshāf al-Dīn Terjūmānī and Ziyā al-Dīn Kemālī, and also a woman *qāḍī*. The organization and functions of the Department of Religious Affairs had been determined in the Moscow Congress of 1917, but had to be readjusted according to Soviet conditions.

A new statute was accepted in the Congress that met in Ufa in June 1923, and was sent for approval to the Commissariat of the Interior to which the Department of Religious Affairs was attached. On 30 November 1923, it was approved by the Commissariat. According to new regulations, the Muslims in the republics of Tatarstān, Bashkiria, Kazakhstān, Ukraine, and the autonomous territories of Chuvash, Votyakh and Kalmukh, the cities in inner Russia (that is Moscow and Leningrad), and Muslims of other cities, as well as those in Siberia were to be subjected to the religious administration in Ufa. Thus eight to ten million Muslims were brought under the *muftī* of Ufa. In other areas, such as the Crimea, northern Caucasia (Dāghistān), Āzarbāyjān and Turkistān, there were local organizations and establishments. As a matter of formality, the decision taken at the centre had to be registered by the local authorities in different republics in order to be put into practice. Tatarstān was the first to act in this matter. Their decision was registered by the Commissariat of the Interior of the Tatar Republic on 1 February 1924. Bashkiria registered on 5 July 1924. Kazakhstān raised some problems in this respect. It is possible that the Kazakh Communists or others did not wish the Kazakhs to be subject to the Tatars even in respect to religion. In order to convince the Kazakhs, Keshshāf al-Dīn Terjūmānī was sent to Orenburg and the decision was finally registered on 2 January 1925.

According to the new statute, the local administration of the communities, that is, the boards of trustees in the villages and cities were the first step on the ladder of the religious organization. The head of the board was the *imām*, and the members were the muezzin and a few others chosen from the public. Above the boards stood the *muḥtesibs*, and at the very top was the *muftī*, the head of the Department of Religious Affairs. There was a board of *qāḍīs* attached to the *muftī*. The religious

administration was connected to the Commissariat of the Interior, as in tsarist times.

The religious administration supervised the activities of the *muḥtesibs*, the local administrations, the *mullās* and the muezzins, the construction and repair of mosques, and the teaching of religion. Under Soviet law, religious institutions and men of religion had a special status. The mosques were subject to certain taxes. As second-class citizens, *mullās* and muezzins were deprived of many rights. They could not participate in elections; they could not even obtain coupons for bread rations, since they were considered to be a parasitic group. The children of the *mullās* and muezzins were deprived of the right to education. Therefore thousands of *mullās* and muezzins resigned from their posts in order to obtain education for their children. In spite of this, thousands of men of religion went on carrying out their duties, sometimes openly and sometimes secretly, and as a result they faced hardships and persecution. The people supported them as much as they could, and made sacrifices when needed.

The *mufti* Riṣā al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn and the *qāḍi* Keshshāf al-Dīn Terjūmānī went to Moscow early in February 1925, to seek some concessions. They were well received, and some concessions were made. A meeting of the Muslim representatives in Ufa was held on 22 March 1925 with the permission of the government of Bashkiria. The account of the contacts made in Moscow pleased everybody, and telegrams of appreciation were sent to Kalinin and Stalin, and also to the Assembly of Soviets of Bashkiria, which was meeting at that time. It is not clear what was achieved after the Moscow visit and the meeting in Ufa, but it seems that the Soviet government did not rigorously suppress religious affairs. The invitation of Riṣā al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn as a great scholar to the ceremony of the bicentenary of the Russian Academy of Sciences indicates the importance given at that time to the Department of Religious Affairs in Ufa by the Soviet academic institutions and government.

According to the decision of 30 November 1923, the Religious Administration in Ufa was given permission for religious publishing. The most important publication was the monthly *Islām Mejellesi*. This journal, which started in 1924, contains very mature articles on religious, moral and philosophical subjects. Its motto, 'The happiness of humanity can be achieved by a religion preserving its vitality, and a religious life', was exactly the opposite of Marx's and Lenin's assertion that religion was the opium of the people. It served as a guide for the men of

religion, and filled the gap in religious studies. The journal was very well received by Russian Muslims and its copies were sold out, while the editors received many letters of appreciation. Its contributors were the contemporary scholars and intellectuals. It was probably closed down in 1925, when the struggle against religion that was begun by the Soviet government became harsher.

Propaganda against Islam by way of publications was emphasized from 1923. As mentioned above, one of the most important works in this field was written by Sultangaliyev. Sultangaliyev did not, however, attack Islam crudely, but tried rather to explain his own view of its nature, and sought to demolish the myths of Islam. During the period of the New Economic Policy, religion was relatively not treated harshly, but the opinion that religion was a harmful factor was maintained. The principle of struggling against religion was expressed in the Soviet constitution of 1924.

After 1924, many propagandist publications against Islam appeared. The pressure of the local Soviet organizations and their publications full of accusations against Islam aroused the people, instead of winning them. The Muslims attempted to organize meetings to defend their religious opinions, using the elasticity of certain articles in the Soviet constitution. They decided to appeal to the higher Soviet authorities, and wanted their rights to be recognized.

These decisions evoked severe criticism in the Soviet press, and were ascribed to reactionary groups working through the Department of Religious Affairs. In fact, these were the wishes and the opinions of the Muslim peasant groups themselves. The men of religion were formulating these opinions and wishes. Naturally all these were exactly the opposite of the Soviet system and the communist ideology, and severe measures were taken to suppress and to prevent this sort of movement.

Soviet policy towards Islam had an external as well as an internal aspect. The visit of a large mission to Mecca in 1926 under the leadership of the *mufti* Riẓā al-Dīn is connected with the external Islamic policy of the Soviet government. This mission went to Istanbul in May 1926, and stayed there for a while. The spokesman of the mission, Keshshāf al-Dīn Terjūmānī and other participants made statements that the Soviet government treated the Muslims in Russia very well, the mosques were kept open and no pressure was made against religion. One of the main reasons for sending the mission to Mecca was to have its members make such statements, in order to gain the sympathy of the Islamic

world for Soviet Russia, and there were certainly Soviet agents among the pilgrims.

However, statements of this kind were not totally false; some mosques were still kept open, and the number of Muslims who prayed and fasted reached twenty million. Furthermore there were still Islamic law-courts functioning in Turkistān and Kazakhstān. In 1925 there were eighty-seven Islamic law-courts in Uzbekistān; their number came down to twenty-seven in 1926, and seven in 1927. They were all closed by 1928. Religious courts in some isolated parts of Dāghistān probably went on functioning until 1929. But these were all temporary. Parallel to the establishment of the socialist order in Soviet Russia, preparations began in 1926 to attack the enemies of the Revolution on all fronts, and in this connexion, religion as well. For this purpose 'societies of atheists' (more exactly, 'societies of the godless') were founded in Tatarstān, Bashkiria, and in the republics of Central Asia, and Islam was attacked in their publications. The head of this movement was Yemil'yan Yaroslavskiy, a well-known Communist. Yaroslavskiy's activities were against all religion. The atheists of the Tatars, Bashkirs, Özbegs and Āzarbāyjānīs took Yaroslavskiy as a model in their fight with Islam.

The fight against Islam was intensified during the establishment of *kollehozes* (1929–38), and reached its climax in the years of Stalin's terror (1936–8). The abolition of the Arabic script in 1928–9, and the acceptance of the Roman script in its place was a heavy blow to the culture and religion of the Muslim Turkish people. With this measure, the strongest tie with the outer world was cut off, and it became impossible for young people to read the Qur'ān and devotional literature. A campaign was launched in the Volga-Ural area by the *Komsomol* (Young Communist Organization) to collect copies of the Qur'ān. Villages were searched, and the Qur'āns that were found were burned. During the establishment of the *kollehozes* the *mullās* were considered as part of the *kulak* group, and were burdened with heavy taxes. Many of them were forced to resign. Actually a majority of the *mullās* were poor, and they were no better off than the ordinary peasants. According to a news item in the *Yeni Köy* (*Yana Avul*) newspaper for 5 May 1930, the duties of 502 *mullās* and 363 muezzins were terminated, and 103 mosques were closed.

Thenceforth the campaigns of closing the mosques was accelerated. In a teachers' meeting held in Kazan on 31 January 1931, at which only 151 people were present, it was decided to close many of the mosques. In Kazan, where there were more than 50,000 Muslims and which was a

national and religious centre for the Kazan Tatars, only one or two mosques were left for worship. According to various sources the number of mosques that closed under Soviet pressure in the years 1929–39 were as follows: 14,000 in Central Asia, 6,000 in the Volga-Ural area 4,000 in northern Caucasia and 1,000 in Crimea. Since it is known that there were approximately 8,000 mosques in the Volga-Ural area in 1917, the figures given above may be somewhere near reality.

As a result of the closure of the mosques and various restrictions on Islam, the people in certain parts of Soviet Russia showed some resistance. The most important instance was the armed rising in the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Region (northern Caucasia). The Baskan area was occupied by Muslims, and severe measures were taken against the Soviet authorities, who only re-established control after sending large forces to the area. Thousands of people were severely punished, many being shot and others sent to labour camps. A rising of Muslim Georgians took place in the Adzhar Autonomous Region near the borders of the Turkish Republic in April 1929. The main reason for this was the pressure of the Bolsheviks on Islam. It was also severely suppressed, and thousands of Adzhars were removed from the border-zone and sent elsewhere. Among the Chechens there also was an armed rising against the Soviet government for religious reasons, and the fighting went on for a long time. The Muslim peoples were regarded as untrustworthy by the Soviets, and the fact that they lived in the border-zones of Turkistān, Caucasia and the Crimea was an important factor in increasing the distrust. The disastrous end that the Muslims came to after the Second World War is a bitter example of this distrust.

The suppression of Islam in Uzbekistān was also intensified. The anti-religious policy of the Bolsheviks, of some Uzbek (Özbeg) communists in particular, aroused popular fury. The clearest example of this is the events in Shahmerdan in 1928–9. Shahmerdan, in the mountainous south-east of Uzbekistān, was especially known for its religious feeling, and was the best-known Muslim pilgrimage centre. The Communist party of Uzbekistān began a campaign there. An Uzbek Communist named Hākim-zāde, known for his atheism, was sent to Shahmerdan in August 1928 to carry out propaganda. Hākim-zāde stirred the people with his words and actions to such an extent that in March 1929 he was torn to pieces by *mullās* and shaykhs, according to the Soviet account. Similar incidents happened in other parts of Uzbekistān. The armed struggles of the Basmachis, which lasted for

years, were also a result of the suppression of Islam. The Basmachis killed especially those Communists who were against religion.

An aspect of the struggle against Islam in Turkistān was the campaign against women's veils. The veil was particularly worn in Turkistān, and was more or less considered to be inseparable from Islam. March 8, which is known as 'International Women's Day', was declared in 1927 to be the day for attacking the veil by the Uzbek Communist organization. On that day, 100,000 women in Uzbekistān announced that they had taken off their veils, but most of them resumed their veils again the following day. Many women were killed by their husbands or the people in Uzbekistān for taking off their veils. In spite of all the efforts of the Communist party, the campaign against the veil could not achieve any success between 1928 and 1939.

During the years of liquidation between 1936 and 1938, many of the main leaders in Muslim territories, the '*ulemā*', the nationalists and also the Communists, were either destroyed or sent into exile. About 6–7,000 *mullās* and intellectuals from the Volga-Ural area alone were arrested and sent to Siberia or other places. In the Crimea and northern Caucasia, thousands of men of religion and intellectuals suffered the same fate. The fight against the intellectuals and the religious leaders also resulted in large numbers of victims in Āzarbāyjān. After this movement of liquidation the religious and cultural leaders of the Muslims in the Soviet Union were wiped out. Among them was the *muftī* Keshshāf al-Dīn Terjūmānī, who was accused of acting as a spy for the Japanese and the Germans. He and many of the men of religion close to him were shot. The years before the Second World War were most difficult for the Muslims in Soviet Russia.

The war, which started with the German attack on 22 June 1941, placed the Soviet Union in great danger. On the instructions of Stalin, it was decided to utilize the religious feelings of the people for the purpose of the country's defence. So the pressure against religion was relieved, and it was announced that the government would make concessions to the religious institutions. After this, Islam profited from these developments, although Muslim religious activities were subject to the directives and control of the Soviet government.

After Keshshāf al-Dīn Terjūmānī was shot (1938), 'Abd al-Rahmān Rasūl was appointed *muftī* at the Department of Religious Affairs in Ufa. Neither by his scholarship nor his personality was he qualified to occupy such a high position, but because of his father, who was a famous religious

scholar, he was respected among the Muslims. The Soviet government began to exploit him as a religious leader of the Muslims in Russia during the war against Germany. In a radio speech which he made on 18 July 1941 on the orders of the Soviet government, he requested the people to defend the Soviet fatherland in the name of Islam, and pray in all mosques for the success of the Red Army. Six weeks later in another speech he requested the Muslims to pray for the Red Army. The more desperate the war became, the greater was the respect accorded to the *mufti* 'Abd al-Rahmān Rasūl by the Soviet government. He was regarded as the spokesman of twenty-five million Muslims, and he was treated accordingly. It was necessary for the *mufti* to make himself heard not only in Russia, but also in the Islamic world outside, whose importance had increased during the war.

In May 1942, a meeting of eighty-five '*ulemā*' from various parts of the Soviet Union was held in Ufa. The main reason for this meeting was to stimulate the religious feelings of the Muslim soldiers in the fight against the Germans, and to find support in the Qur'ān. The *mufti* wanted the atrocities of the Germans committed in the Crimea against the Muslims to be known in Russia and the Islamic world outside, although the Germans had provided for the reopening and restoration of the mosques. In short, the *mufti* 'Abd al-Rahmān Rasūl performed the functions of a Soviet propagandist, and made every effort to accomplish his duty. His predecessor in Ufa during the First World War had done the same thing for tsarist Russia.

After 1943, a new *mufti*'s office, established in Tashkent, began to replace the Department of Religious Affairs in Ufa. In October of that year the religious representatives of the Republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstān, Kirghizia, Tājikistān and Turkistān met in Tashkent and established the Department of Religious Affairs of Central Asia and Kazakhstān. Eighty-five-year old Ishan Bābākhān 'Abd al-Majīd Khān, a scholar from Turkistān, who had been exiled before the war, was appointed its head. From then on, the *mufti* in Tashkent became the most important figure in the Muslim religious establishment, and began to assume a high position within the hierarchy of the Soviet government. Tashkent became a show-place for Muslim visitors of high rank. Ishan Bābākhān's son, Ziyā al-Dīn, was appointed assistant *mufti*, and subsequently succeeded his father.

Shortly afterwards, religious departments for northern Caucasia and Āzarbāyjān were also established. This was not the case with the

Crimea, which had had its own *mufti* previously. Because the Tatars of the Crimea were accused of collaborating with the Germans, they were totally expelled from the Crimea, and sent to Kirghizia. The Karachays in northern Caucasia and certain other Muslim Circassians were similarly treated.

Thus after the Second World War there were four departments for Muslims in the Soviet Union. The Department of Religious Affairs for the European part of the Soviet Union and for Siberia, with its centre in Ufa, survived from tsarist times. It was important because of its antiquity and the high reputation of its member scholars. The Religious Department of Islam for Central Asia and Kazakhstān had its centre in Tashkent. In this way, the religious administration of Kazakhstān, which had formerly been connected to Ufa, was attached to Turkistān. The office of the *mufti* in Tashkent is most important since the majority of the Muslims in the Soviet Union (approximately fifteen millions) are found in Central Asia, and religious centres like Bukhārā, Samarqand, and the Khīva area are also situated there. Hence this department has an important place in the Soviet external propaganda. The Religious Department of Trans-Caucasian Muslims has its centre in Baku. This is the central organization for the Shī'a in Āzarbāyjān, whose number does not exceed two millions. However, in Āzarbāyjān there is no difference between the Shī'is and the Sunnīs, and the old conflicts have been forgotten. The Religious Department of the Muslims of northern Caucasia has its centre at Buynak. The religious affairs of the Muslims in Dāghistān and the adjacent areas are run by this department.

These religious departments are under the strict control of the Soviet government. The *muftis* and other religious leaders of high position, as well as the *imāms* and preachers of great mosques, have to serve the Soviet government with complete loyalty. During the prayers on Fridays and on feast-days, the Soviet government is praised as being 'sent by God', implying that those who disobey the government disobey God and the Prophet as well.

The Muslim areas are completely administered by the Kremlin, and form an inseparable part of the Soviet Union; hence it is impossible to consider their political history separately. The present-day political boundaries were delimited in 1924, on the basis of Lenin's Nationalities Policy. This had as its ostensible object 'the liquidation of existing inequality', but critics have seen in it nothing more than the application of the principle of 'divide and rule' by the Soviet administrators,

through the separation of peoples (e.g. the Tatars and Bashkirs) who are closely related by language, religion and traditions.

There are today six 'union republics' which are or were predominantly Muslim. The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, formed in 1924, is the main cotton-producing area of the Soviet Union. The capital, formerly Samarqand, was transferred to Tashkent, which has become the centre of Uzbek cultural activities, with its branch of the Academy of Sciences, its university and opera. The Kazakh S.S.R., an autonomous republic in 1920, was raised to the status of a union republic in 1936. The Russians enforced the stabilization of the nomadic Kazakhs—a policy which produced resistance and emigration to China. Large-scale Russian immigration and the founding of industrial cities have reduced the Kazakhs to a minority. A similar development took place in the Kirghiz S.S.R., which also became a union republic in 1936. The Turkmen S.S.R. was formed in 1924. Its nomadic population was sedentarized, and the cultivation of cotton developed. The Tājik S.S.R. achieved the status of a union republic in 1929, when it was detached from the Uzbek S.S.R. The Āzarbāyjān Republic, formed in 1920, is the oldest. Shortly afterwards it was combined with Armenia and Georgia in the Trans-Caucasian Federation, and when this was dissolved in 1936 it became a union republic. There are in addition ten 'autonomous republics' in territories which are (or were) mainly inhabited by Muslims. These form part of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic. The most important of them are the Tatar and the Bashkir A.S.S.R. In the Tatar A.S.S.R. the Tatars form only half the population, while a majority of the Tatars are to be found in other parts of the U.S.S.R. Bashkirs are also a minority in the republic which bears their name. Kazan, the capital of the Tatar A.S.S.R., has long been a centre of culture for the Turkish peoples in Russia.

CHAPTER 5

COMMUNISM IN THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS

BEFORE 1917

The period of radical reform at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was one in which all revolutionary energy was mobilized in the upsurge of the nationalist movement. It was in the wake of this movement that Marxist ideas began warily to make their way into the Muslim world. For a long time, until the Russian Revolution of 1917, socialism could only show itself as the extreme left wing of the nationalist movement.

There are two basic reasons for this slowness in the spread of Marxist ideas: the indifference of the first leaders of European socialism to the *dār al-Islām*, and the lack of receptivity to socialism offered by Muslim society as a whole.

Marxist socialism, a complex system of economic, political and philosophical doctrines, originally conceived for the industrial societies of the West, was thought to be applicable, sooner or later, to the whole world. The ideas of the founders of socialism and their successors until 1914 were, with some considerable variations in their positions, centred on Europe and the West. The Muslim East interested them only in so far as it affected their international policy. It offered no objective reasons for supposing that socialist proselytization would have much chance of success there. They regarded it as a marginal problem, dependent on the general problem of the proletarian revolution in the West. They applied to it theses designed to apply to Europe, and predicted for it the same revolutions, passage through the same economic and social 'patterns', and the same crises as the West. The 'Muslim problem' as such did not exist for them.

Marxist ideas could be reflected in the Islamic countries only by following certain well-defined channels. In fact, with a very few exceptions, the proletariat, which was small and widely dispersed, completely lacked any feeling of class, industrialization being still at a very early stage. The petty bourgeoisie, usually excellent revolutionary material in non-industrial countries, was here weak and in every instance

still entirely under the influence of the ideology of the nationalist reformist movement. Finally, the peasants had in general no revolutionary traditions and were politically unorganized. Conceived as it was for the industrial societies of the West, socialism had very little hold over the East in the pre-capitalist stage of production, and it could be implanted only where certain conditions were fulfilled, namely:

1. A definite willingness by the European socialists to make the Muslims share their ideas, since socialism could not arise spontaneously in a Muslim society.
2. An atmosphere of political or religious agitation and a tradition of secrecy (such as offered by Shi'ism in Persia, for example), or of anti-feudal revolts.
3. A crisis in the nationalist movement which was beginning to lose its impetus and seemed incapable of winning the fight against the Western powers or against local despotism by force of its own ideology alone.
4. Finally, and most important, the presence of elements likely to welcome Marxist ideas, that is, in the absence of a native proletariat or petty bourgeoisie, foreign groups or active non-Muslim minorities. It has been established that the first socialist organizations in the East were in fact controlled by foreign minorities such as the Dutch in Indonesia or the Macedonians in Salonica, or non-Muslims of minority groups such as the Greeks, Lebanese Christians, and Jews in the Ottoman empire, Armenians in both the Ottoman empire and Persia, and Lebanese Christians and Jews in Egypt.

The few Muslim groups which were receptive to socialist ideas at the beginning of the twentieth century were those which, as a result of exceptional circumstances, had come into direct contact with European groups converted to these ideas. Such were the Tatar intellectuals of the Volga or of the Caucasian proletariat of the industrial region of Baku.

Thus socialist ideas could penetrate into the *dār al-Islām* only at certain points which, before 1914, were limited to Kazan and Baku in the Russian empire, Salonica and thence Istanbul in the Ottoman empire, Tabriz in Persia, Java in Indonesia, and Alexandria in Egypt.

Kazan and the Tatar towns of the Middle Volga and Ural regions were probably the first towns in which groups of Muslim socialists appeared. There were three conditions which were favourable to this growth.

First, the special structure of Tatar society, dominated by a powerful commercial bourgeoisie and a numerous intelligentsia, which had long been in contact with the outside world, and were supported by all

classes of society including the proletariat, which was numerically strong, but scattered and as yet unorganized.

Secondly, the existence, since the middle of the nineteenth century, of a powerful current of liberal reform very much in advance of the other Muslim national movements. This had removed the conservative groups from the political scene, but at the beginning of the twentieth century was already beginning to weaken and was splitting into two parts, of which the more radical left was ready to accept certain Marxist ideas.

Finally, the presence of very active groups of Russian Social Democrats and socialist revolutionaries, who as early as 1880–90 had already been trying to recruit members from the Muslim areas.

The extremist wing of the Tatar reform movement consisted mainly of students and intellectuals from the petty bourgeoisie, the majority of them being former pupils of the Russo-Tatar Teachers' Training College founded in 1876. In 1885 there had appeared the first Muslim political group which, in 1901, joined firmly in the revolutionary agitation and inspired the *Islāh* movement which unsettled all the *medreses* of the Middle Volga. This movement, the most radical outcome of reformism, was not organically connected with the Russian revolutionary current; but it drew its inspiration from it, and was already using some of its tactics, such as strikes, mass demonstrations and even individual acts of terrorism. This was the first attempt by the Muslims at imitating the methods of the Russian revolutionaries and, as the first school of revolutionary action, it left indelible traces. All the future nationalist, socialist or communist leaders among the Tatars were to be former militant members of the *Islāh* movement.

The influence of the Russian Marxist groups made up of intellectuals and of authentic proletarians was also very strong in Kazan, which indeed had the unusual advantage for the emergence of socialism of being at the same time a large university town and an important industrial centre. These groups very soon tried to attract Muslims and had little success among the workers because of the political inertia of the native proletariat. However, between 1902 and 1905 there were formed a few Muslim trade unions, such as that of the Printing Workers and the powerful Union of the Employees of Commerce, both of them dominated by the Social Democrats. Their militant members played a not inconsiderable part in the Revolution of 1917, and in the spreading of Communism in the East. The attempt by the Russian socialists to convert

the Muslim intellectuals met with more success. In 1902, some Tatar students and writers, including Yamashev, Kulakhmetov and Akhtamov, became members of the Social Democrat group of Kazan, and in 1907 they founded the first internationalist Muslim Marxist organization. Although it was numerically small—hardly more than about a dozen militant members—this group played a very important role. It was driven from Kazan by the repressive measures of the police and re-formed at Orenburg. Here it published the first Muslim Communist periodical, the magazine *Ural*, in the Tatar language, which was confiscated after its thirty-first number, its editors being once more dispersed.

Still more far-reaching was the action of the Muslim socialist groups *Berek* and *Tañchilar*. These were attached organically and ideologically to the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary party, and were active on the left wing of the nationalist movement, adopting from Russian socialism only its methods. Their programme provides an interesting example of a combination of Russian Marxism (in its populist form) and Muslim reformism.

Gradually Marxist ideas and methods, matured on the Tatar Volga, penetrated in 1905 and 1917 into Bashkiria and thence into Russian Turkistān, but those who propagated them remained, in spite of their Marxist veneer, the heirs of reformism and sometimes even convinced pan-Turks.

The second focal point of Marxism in Russian Islam was the large industrial centre of Baku. Here there were three factors which facilitated the birth of Muslim socialist groups:

1. The existence of an authentic native proletariat consisting of workers in the large textile and petroleum industries. The industrial proletariat of the Baku region consisted in 1901 of about 36,000 workers, more than fifty per cent of whom were Muslims. It was a cosmopolitan proletariat in which Āzari Turkish and Persian Muslims worked side by side with Russians, Armenians, Georgians and Jews. Baku was thus a crucible in which Marxist ideas from Russia or from Europe could reach the Muslim masses. It was also a very active centre of revolutionary agitation, with a tradition of strikes and riots dating back to the 1870s. The class-struggle there took the form of actual fighting and not, as in all the other Muslim areas, of theoretical discussions by a few intellectual coteries. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Baku was the only place in the world where the Muslim proletariat could acquire a real class consciousness.

2. The liberal tradition among the bourgeoisie and the Muslim land-owning upper classes, dating back to the reformist thinkers of the mid-nineteenth century, such as Feth 'Ali Akhundov and Hasan Bey Melikov Zerdābī, who had been influenced both by the ideas of the French Revolution and by Russian populism. This hot-bed of young intellectuals, open to all ideas coming from abroad, including those of Marxism, played a very active part in the revolutionary movement which appeared in the Caucasus in the early years of the twentieth century.

3. Direct contact with the Russian, Armenian and Georgian Marxists. Revolutionary literature, and particularly that of social-democrat inspiration, penetrated very early in the 1880s into Transcaucasia. In 1885 the police discovered in Baku a copy of the *Communist manifesto*. In 1896 there were founded in the principal towns of the Caucasus, Tiflis, Baku, Batum and Kutais, social-democrat groups composed of intellectuals and workers, organically linked with the centres at St Petersburg, Kiev, Rostov and Moscow. In 1897, a Georgian social-democrat organization, *Mesame Dasi*, opened a subsidiary branch at Baku. In 1899 there were six Marxist groups in this town, though they still had very few Muslim members. Two years later, in 1901, these groups re-formed themselves into a central organization with Bolshevik Leninist tendencies; it was affiliated to the Russian Workers' Social Democratic party, which rapidly became one of the most active Communist organizations in Russia. Baku thus appeared at the beginning of the century as a revolutionary centre of completely 'Western' type in the heart of a Muslim region, but with its leadership still in the hands of non-Muslims—Russians, Armenians and Georgians. For the Muslims of the Caucasus, Āzarī Turks and Dāghistānīs, this was much more a school of revolutionary action than of Marxist thought.

In 1904 there was founded in Baku the first entirely Muslim socialist group, the *Hümmet* ('Mutual Aid') party, attached to the Russian Workers' Social Democratic party, but reserved exclusively for Muslims, Āzarī Turks, Persians and Dāghistānīs, which was a departure from the principle of internationalism rigorously applied by the Russian social democrats. Its leaders included both intellectuals and workers, and from the time it was founded the *Hümmet* was exceptionally active, publishing social literature in Turkish and Persian translations and a number of periodicals, and organizing mass-action such as strikes and meetings. *Hümmet* was a nursery for Caucasian and Persian revolutionaries, and its part in the spread of socialist ideas, and in the organi-

zation of socialist, and later Communist, groups in Transcaucasia and in Persia, was a major and a lasting one. The party brought together Marxists from every side, as well as Bolsheviks and Mensheviks; and some of these, who remained faithful to nationalist ideas, were to abandon the socialist camp after 1911, and follow the nationalist movement.

Shortly before the First World War, the socialist movement in Transcaucasia suffered a serious setback, owing partly to harsh police repression, and partly to the growing influence of pan-Turanian ideology, which was being spread by the nationalist *Musavat* party. When the Revolution of February 1917 broke out it was the latter party which seized power, while the majority of the Muslim Communist leaders were to disappear in the turmoil of the Civil War.

Outside Russia, it was at Tabriz in Persian Āzarbāyjān, and at Salonica in the Ottoman empire that the first Muslim Marxist organizations appeared.

Socialist ideas penetrated from Transcaucasia into Persia by way of the many Persians who went every year to Baku to work in the petroleum industry: there were estimated to be more than 100,000 Persian nationals in Transcaucasia in 1905. The first Persian Marxist (Social Democrat) cell, the *Ijtima'īyyūni* 'Ammīyyūn group, was founded in Baku in 1904 by some Persians, members of the Russian Workers' Social Democratic party, who after their return to Persia became most ardent propagandists for Marxism. They found there a climate favourable to their activities. This was induced by several factors: the old Shī'ī tradition of clandestine action and of conspiracy; the existence of a liberal movement hostile to the Qājār monarchy; the anti-feudal agitation of the peasants and the artisans; strong opposition to the West shown by the Shī'ī religious leaders and the native bourgeoisie, who had been ruined by European competition; and finally the separatist tendencies in Āzarbāyjān and Gilān. All this agitation was to culminate in 1906 in the powerful Constitutional movement and in the revolt of Tabriz in 1908–11.

It would be a mistake to exaggerate the role of the socialist groups in these two movements, which were manifestations of the liberal revolution led by the bourgeoisie; nevertheless, the part which they played should not be minimized. It was former workers from Baku who laid in 1906 the foundations of the Persian Social Democratic party in Tabriz, and their participation in the *anjumans* (influenced by the Russian soviets of 1905) was not negligible. Neither was their role in the associations of the *Mujāhids* and the detachments of the *Fidā'īs* who began to organize

themselves in 1906–7 and who were the nucleus which directed the revolution of Tabriz in 1908, and of Gilān in 1909. Between 1908 and 1911 many Armenian revolutionaries (members of the socialist *Dash-naktsūtūn* and *Hinchak* parties), Āzari Turks belonging to the *Hümmet* party, Georgian Bolsheviks and even Russians, Social Democrats or Socialist Revolutionaries, came to lend their support to the Persian revolutionaries. They brought them Marxist literature and arms, and passed on to them their fighting experience and their methods of underground struggle.

The Persian Social Democratic party, whose groups proliferated throughout the whole country, was able to develop rapidly and to acquire an experience of real and often successful revolutionary struggle unique for a Muslim socialist party before 1917. But the power of the nationalist movement, and its dominant hold over the widest and most varied sectors of the population, prevented socialism from developing and from becoming a genuine mass party. The revolutionary movement at Tabriz where Russian troops were already present was crushed in 1911 and the socialist cells were dispersed by repressive measures; but the experience of the years 1908–11 was not wasted since it inspired the more radical revolutionary movements of the 1920s.

In Turkey the systematic spread of socialism did not begin until after the Young Turk Revolution of July 1908. Before this socialist groups were found only among the non-Turkish peoples—Greeks, Macedonians or Bulgarians. The most important was the social democrat group of the workers of Edirne and Macedonia, which was founded at Sofia in 1904.

After the Young Turk Revolution, the centre of the movement shifted to Salonica, the second town of the empire and an important industrial centre, where there was founded in 1909 the Socialist Federation of Workers of Salonica, attached to the Second International and composed almost exclusively of non-Turks—Jews, Bulgarians, Macedonians and Greeks. In 1910 there was formed the Ottoman Socialist party, the headquarters of which were first at Salonica and then transferred to Istanbul, with an important section in Paris. Although a fairly large proportion of this party came from the ethnic minorities, particularly Armenians and Bulgarians, its leadership was in Turkish hands. Its press was also Turkish. This party was attached to the Second International and was genuinely Marxist, playing an undeniable part in the spread of socialist ideas in the Ottoman empire, but because of its

'minority' character and its 'Ottoman' policy (claiming equal rights for non-Turkish nationalities in the empire), it was rapidly overshadowed by the ideology of Turkism.

The party was several times prohibited by the Young Turk government and was finally dispersed immediately before the First World War and its leaders were deported or went into exile. One of them, Muṣṭafā Şubhî, who was to become in 1920 the first leader of the Turkish Communist party, fled to Russia.

During this first phase of the history of Marxism in the Islamic countries, socialist ideas spread by agents of different origins—Russians, Germans, French, British in Egypt, and Dutch in Indonesia—all of whom interpreted them differently, were absorbed by different groups who made use of them for different, and often quite opposite, ends; sometimes to radicalize the nationalist movement as in Persia, sometimes, on the contrary, to oppose it as in Turkey. In places where the socialist ideas were able to amalgamate with the nationalist movement, the Marxist-inspired revolutionary groups which appeared after 1918 had little difficulty in making themselves into 'nationalist' parties which played a part in the political life of the country, e.g. in Persia and Indonesia. When, on the other hand, these ideas were rejected by the nationalist movement, the Marxist groups long remained 'minority' movements, and had great difficulty in gaining a foothold in the national life of the country.

What did 'socialism' mean before 1917 for the Muslims who embraced it? Only an extremely small minority saw in it an economic doctrine, or even a programme of class struggle, for at that time this was almost everywhere subordinated to the demands of a national struggle against the West. Socialism taught the Eastern revolutionaries techniques of agitation and of action; in its Russian form it provided them also with a number of organizational devices for the use of clandestine groups. Before 1914 few Muslims calling themselves socialists asked themselves the fundamental question: 'Is Marxism compatible with Islam?' This crucial problem did not arise until after 1917.

COMMUNISM IN THE MUSLIM LANDS OF RUSSIA (1917-24)

After 1917 this slow socialist infiltration into the Islamic world was suddenly accelerated. In October 1917, the triumph of Communism in Russia in overthrowing the tsarist monarchy, dispossessing the ruling classes, and in standing up to the intervention of the Western powers, was

a stimulating example for all the Eastern revolutionaries who were engaged in the same struggle against the same adversaries.

Henceforward socialism no longer appeared in the East as a distant dream, but as an imminent reality. It was no longer a question only of the spread of ideas, but also of the action of the revolutionary groups, which, rightly or wrongly, associated themselves with Communist doctrine, and were generally attached to the Third International.

From 1917 to the present day, the growth of Communist organizations in the Muslim countries has been influenced by many factors, some of them internal: the social, economic and political situation of the country concerned and primarily the vigour of its nationalist movement. Others were external: the tactics employed at the time by the Comintern which could either help the development of local Communism, or impede it by imposing on it a line of conduct which was sometimes inapplicable; and finally, the demands of the foreign policy of Soviet Russia, which until 1960 was the only country which socialism could call its own.

The Bolshevik leaders who assumed power in Russia in 1917 were not directly interested, at least at the outset, in the problem of Islam. They were strict internationalists and considered the socialist revolution as one and indivisible in content and in form. They believed that victory in Russia would be followed rapidly by the triumph of the proletariat in central and western Europe. The East, being still at the pre-capitalist stage of development and lacking a proletariat, could only expect to be liberated by a victory of communism in the West, and to follow from afar the way indicated by the European proletariat.

In 1918, as a consequence of the Civil War in Russia, the Bolshevik leaders gradually modified their attitude. This war took place mainly in the peripheral regions of the Caucasus, the Middle Volga, the Crimea and Central Asia, all areas with a high proportion of Muslims. The need to win these populations over to the cause of the revolution, to make them allies, or at least to induce them to remain neutral while the conflict lasted, was the first reason which led the Russian leaders to take a more serious interest in Islam. The second, which ensued after the intervention of the Entente powers, was the desire to break the 'capitalist encirclement' beyond the southern frontiers of Russia, in Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. Certainly, in calling on the colonial or semi-colonial Muslim peoples to revolt against the 'imperialist' West, the chief motive of the Bolshevik leaders was to weaken the capitalist powers. The Muslim East was not yet considered as a revolutionary subject in itself, but

only as a possible temporary ally, with whose help they could more easily defeat the enemy.

In December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) launched its famous appeal to the Muslims of Russia and the East, proclaiming the abrogation of the 'imperialist' treaties signed by tsarist Russia and inviting the Muslim peoples to rally to the flag of the Revolution. This first spectacular gesture was soon to take many concrete forms: on 19 January 1918 there was formed in Moscow at the People's Commissariat of Nationalities the Central Commissariat for Muslim Affairs, the direction of which was entrusted to three Tatar intellectuals, former militant members of the left wing of the reformist movement, Mullā Nūr Vakhitov, Mir Sayyid Sultangaliyev and Sherif Manatov. The Commissariat dealt with all questions concerning Muslims, and in particular their recruitment into the Communist party, and the formation of a Red Army of Muslim volunteers. For two years, during the disorder of the Civil War, and while the Bolshevik leaders in Moscow were engaged in a struggle for survival with the White Armies, the Central Muslim Commissariat was able to act with a large measure of independence, controlled only very loosely by the central authorities. It set on foot an intense activity of propaganda and organization. On its initiative the Muslim Socialist-Communist party was founded in March 1918, and some months later became the Muslim Communist (Bolshevik) party.

The early years of struggle and action among the Muslim masses had a profound influence on all the later development of the Communist movement among the Muslims in Russia. It was then that the Muslim leaders made attempts to find both a means of coexistence or of symbiosis between Islam and Communism, and the most effective methods of spreading Communism in the East.

The first reactions of the Russian Muslims to Communism were varied. The majority of the Faithful were hostile to it from the beginning. For conservative Muslims, Communism was only a new form of irreligion that must be opposed, as they opposed the heresies, the secularism or the religious indifference which came from Europe; and this was completely justified by the attitude of the first Russian Marxists, who considered that Islam as a revealed religion ought to be destroyed. The anti-Islamic campaign was just one instance of the Communist opposition to all religion as 'a false and harmful ideology which lulls or

confuses the revolutionary awareness of the oppressed classes, a mere survival of the feudal epoch in the socialist society now being built'.

The majority of the Muslims, unaware of the historical significance of the October Revolution and of its consequences for the future, for the most part remained neutral at the beginning of the Civil War. If, in the end, they were inclined to support the new régime, this was for opportunist reasons; the Whites, who were campaigning for a 'Russia, one and indivisible', seeming less disposed than the Reds to satisfy the demands of the non-Russians.

The intellectuals were deeply divided. Some of them, forming numerically the most important part, thought that in the Revolution they had found a unique and un hoped for opportunity to obtain their nationalist aims. They attempted to form independent Muslim states, and, attacked from 1920 onwards by the Bolsheviki, found themselves in the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist camp. A strong minority, however, among the young intellectuals, was attracted by Communism, but, with rare exceptions, without any individual conscious or reasoned adherence to Marxism. For Muslims to join the Communist party—and this was often done during the first years of the Revolution—was essentially an irrational psychological or sociological reaction, not an intellectual one. It implied neither a total acceptance of the Marxist principles nor a clear understanding of the practical corollaries of these principles. It did not involve the rejection of Muslim principles, ideas or concepts.

Having become Communists or Communist sympathizers while remaining Muslims, they attempted to discover points in common between the two ideologies and tried to reinterpret the classical ideas of Islam as equivalents of the Marxist theses, e.g. the internationalist, anti-capitalist or anti-racist character of Islam and of Communism, without, however, feeling obliged by this attempt at harmonization to accept the dialectical materialism and the atheism of Marxism.

This group of intellectuals saw the socialist revolution as the outcome of more than half a century's struggle by the reformists for the emancipation of their peoples and the modernization of Islam. They regarded it also as a prelude to the revenge of the colonial Muslim peoples on Europe. The most typical representatives of this ideology were the Tatar Communists of the Volga, gathered round Mullā Nūr Vakhitov and Sultangaliyev, who were the leaders of the Central Muslim Com-

missariat. Their programme, which was the only attempt at a synthesis between Islam and Communism, can be summarized as follows:

First, the Communist revolution in the Muslim countries must be at the same time a social revolution directed against the local exploiters (feudal landowners and conservative religious leaders) and a national revolution directed against foreign domination.

Secondly, as the structure of Muslim society does not permit the simultaneous furthering of this double revolution, absolute priority must be given to national emancipation. Meanwhile, because of the weakness of the native proletariat, the leadership of the revolution must be assumed by the bourgeoisie in alliance with all the 'progressive' elements of society, including the reformist religious leaders. The revolution as conceived by the first Russian Muslim Communists was thus a revolution without class struggle. The Muslim peoples having been, under European domination, 'oppressed peoples', were therefore 'proletarian peoples'; all classes of which, with the exception only of the upper bourgeoisie and a few feudal overlords, were to enjoy the benefits of the revolution.

Thirdly, the socialist revolution in Islamic countries should not be a servile imitation of the forms of the proletarian revolution in the West. It was neither to replace the domination of the European bourgeoisie over the colonial peoples by the domination of the European proletariat over these same peoples, nor to break the cultural and spiritual traditions of Islam. Consequently, in place of the anti-religious campaign, the Muslim Communists advocated an adaptable propaganda of the 'scientific' type. Although as Marxists they were the adversaries of all religion as 'the opium of the people', they considered that Islam, being 'the youngest and the most dynamic of the religions of the world', was to have favoured treatment. They did not underestimate the attachment of the masses to their spiritual leaders and thought that any ill-advised attack on the religion of the Prophet might be reminiscent of the anti-Islamic campaigns of the Christian missionaries. Further, they recalled that the offensive against fanaticism and obscurantism had been started in the nineteenth century by the Muslims themselves. It was enough therefore to pursue this campaign for a 'laicized' and secularized Islam to cease to be an obstacle to the building of socialism, and to become, on the contrary, a factor favourable to it. Thus the Muslim Communists of the first era (1918-24) appeared, at least in Russia, as the direct heirs of reformism.

Lastly, in order to overcome European capitalism, the Third International should turn away from Europe, 'where the fire of revolution no longer burned', and concentrate all its efforts on the Muslim East. But, said the Muslim Communists, the Western revolutionaries were incapable of understanding the East and its complex problems, hence the leadership of the revolution in Asia must be entrusted to an autonomous Muslim organization, an embryo 'Colonial International' which some Muslim Communists, Sultangaliyev for example, even dreamed of setting up in opposition to the Comintern. As the first phase of the re-grouping of the Muslim revolutionaries, the Tatar Communists advocated the formation of socialist states in the Muslim regions of Russia: Tatarstān, Bashkiria, Āzarbāyjān and Turkistān, which were to become models and also bases from which the revolution could spread to the neighbouring countries, Turkey, Persia and India.

Thus it can be seen that the Muslim Communists in Russia in the 1920s made use of a selection of certain themes within the Marxist doctrine which fitted in with their own aspirations. They chose only those which would serve to make more radical the reform of Muslim society and their national struggle against the West.

This programme, bold, but hardly acceptable to the Bolshevik leaders, raised the threefold problem of the autonomy of Muslim Communism in relation to the Comintern, of the status of indigenous cadres in relation to Western cadres, and of the general orientation of the strategy of the Comintern. On these three points the Muslim Communists were, after 1918, to clash with their Russian comrades. The latter rejected the principle of Muslim autonomy in the name of the monolithic structure of the international Communist movement (the autonomous Muslim Communist party was finally suppressed in March 1919 during the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist party); they were suspicious of the Muslim cadres because of their non-proletarian origin, and in addition they did not accept the idea of the strategic priority of the revolution in Asia. They considered that the national liberation of the East was dependent on the victory of the proletarian revolution in Europe.

This initial disagreement between Western (Russian or European) and Muslim Communists appeared to a greater or less degree in all the Muslim countries and was one of the major obstacles to the spread of Communism. The difference was most striking, however, between the pre-revolutionary period of indifference by the Communist leaders to the

East and the period which began in 1918, when Muslim Asia was one of the main preoccupations of the Comintern. The strategy to be applied in Muslim countries was discussed several times between 1918 and 1920.

The first occasion was at the First Congress of Muslim Communists, held at Moscow in November 1918, at which there were created a Central Bureau of the Muslim Organizations of the Russian Communist party, and a department of international propaganda under the leadership of the Turkish Communist, Muṣṭafā Şubhî. Then at the Second Congress of the Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, held at Moscow in November 1919, it was decided that the existing or future Communist parties in the Muslim countries should be attached to the Comintern. In particular it was discussed at the Second Congress of the Comintern at Moscow in July 1920, and at the Congress of the Peoples of the East at Baku in September 1920.

The proposals adopted at the two latter congresses admitted that the nationalist, anti-imperialist revolution in the East was an indispensable complement of the world Communist revolution, but stated that the initiative and the leadership should return to the European proletariat. They also recognized that the success of the revolution in colonial territory depended on the unity of all the local anti-imperialist forces. The Communists should therefore give their provisional and conditional support to the bourgeois democratic movements; in other words, form temporary alliances with the non-Communist revolutionary parties, in order to defeat the common enemy, while remaining organically independent of these parties. At the same time they should strive with their temporary allies in an attempt to transform the nationalist bourgeois revolution into a socialist one. According to the theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern, the victory of the democratic revolution was to mark the beginning of the decisive battle for socialism. This programme, which was difficult to apply, was for nearly ten years the theoretical basis of Communist policy in the Muslim East.

At the end of 1920, the Civil War ended in Russia. The victorious Communist régime had henceforward less need of fellow-travellers in Russia itself. The leaders in Moscow now began to encounter the opposition of their former Muslim allies, which appeared most often in the form of doctrinal deviations such as Sultangaliyevism in Tatarstān, Milli-Firkism in the Crimea, Narimanovism in Āzarbāyjān, or in open revolts, the most spectacular being those of the Bashkirs in 1920–2 and even more those of the Basmachis in Turkistān from 1920 to 1928. The

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

years 1920–8 were thus marked in Soviet Russia by the struggle of the central power against the centrifugal tendencies of the Muslim Communists who were trying to build socialism without Russian control. The conflict ended in the condemnation of all the Muslim deviations. For many years after this the Russian Communists were to retain a somewhat suspicious attitude, not only towards their own Muslims, but even towards the fraternal Communist parties in foreign Muslim countries, which they always suspected of falling back into nationalist deviation.

After 1918, Communist groups appeared spontaneously in nearly all the Muslim countries, e.g. Turkey, Persia, Egypt and Indonesia, but at first the Soviet government considered them of only secondary importance. Seeking above all to break the encirclement of Russia, it encouraged the advent in neighbouring countries of régimes which were independent of the West, and the internal shape which these régimes took mattered no more to it than their attitude to internal Communism. Friendly relations were established in 1921 with Kemalist Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, in spite of the fact that their governments did not permit Communist parties to exist within their territories. Thus between 1918 and 1928 the fate of Communism in the Muslim countries depended not only on local social and economic conditions, but also on the general strategy of the Comintern and of the Russian Communist party, and finally on the foreign policy of Soviet Russia, which was pursuing parallel objectives but at different levels. During this period, the Muslim Communist parties of the East were invited by the Comintern to support and to ‘push forward’ their temporary allies (the democratic parties) in order to oblige them to go as far as possible along the path of the anti-imperialist struggle, while at the same time denouncing their ‘inconsistent’ character, and preparing to oppose them. This atmosphere, which was not very favourable to the success of Communism, explains the reason why, after a brilliant start in several countries in the years 1918–20, the Communist parties there underwent a long eclipse, which for some of them still continues.

THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1918–28)

In 1918, of all the Middle East countries, Turkey was considered by the Comintern to be the one in which the Communist revolution had

COMMUNISM

most chance of success, which would have made it the starting point for the propagation of Communism throughout the Middle East and in Africa. The 'objective' conditions there were in fact fairly similar to those which had existed in Russia in 1917: military defeat bringing with it the collapse of the monarchy and the dissolution of power, foreign occupation, economic ruin, serious unemployment among a fairly numerous proletariat (more than 100,000 workers in 1918), and finally the existence of a movement of national liberation under non-proletarian leadership, but capable, according to the theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern, of being transformed into a socialist movement. Several socialist and Communist groups appeared spontaneously in Turkey after the signing of the Armistice. In Istanbul, the Turkish Socialist party, a reincarnation of the former Ottoman Socialist party, which was closer to the Second International than to the Comintern, reappeared on the scene in February 1919. The Socialist Party of the Workers and Peasants of Turkey was formed in September 1919 by former prisoners of war who had returned from Russia, and by Turks returned from Germany, where they had come under the influence of Spartacism. This party was of Leninist inspiration and was attached to the Third International. It published a number of journals. Mention should also be made of the Workers' International Association, composed mainly of members of minority groups—Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews. The influence of these three groups did not extend beyond the capital.

In Ankara other groups were to be formed in 1920. In June a secret Turkish Communist party was established, led by two Turks and a Bashkir who had come from Russia, Sherif Manatov. Soon after this an 'official' Communist party was formed by Tevfik Rüşdî, without any links with the Comintern, which refused to recognize it, but with the approval of Muṣṭafâ Kemâl. This party proclaimed that 'Islam contained all the elements of socialism'. Another was created in December 1920 by the leaders of the former secret Turkish Communist party, with cells in Ankara and at Eskişehir, and published periodicals. Finally there was a curious nationalist Communist party with a peasant basis, the Green Apple, which during the war against the Greeks led detachments of partisans called the 'Green Army', and which was at first tolerated but later dissolved by the government of Muṣṭafâ Kemâl.

But the main attempt to implant Communism in Turkey was made from Russia, where in July 1918 Muṣṭafâ Şubhî organized in Moscow a

Communist group among the prisoners of war, and published the first Communist organ in Turkish, at first in the Crimea, and then in Moscow.

In the spring of 1920, Şubhî settled in Baku, and from this town directed the organization of Communism in Turkey. A Central Office was formed in Baku, where in September 1920 a congress was held which resulted in the decision to amalgamate all the socialist and Communist groups in a single party. There now appeared the chief and permanent weakness of Communism in Turkey—its external if not foreign character, without any profound links with the country which at that time was completely dominated by the national problem. Kemāl's resistance galvanized all levels of the population, absorbed all the energies of the country, and subordinated everything to the demands of the struggle against the foreign powers. It is not surprising therefore that in 1919–20 Communism in Anatolia assumed some curious forms. The Green Apple party proclaimed that 'Communism is not an end in itself, but a means, the true end being the unity of Turkey' and accepted the Communist programme only as a means of buttressing the power of Turkey. It and the 'official' Communist party sought to adapt Communism to Turkish conditions, and rejected its Russian aspect which the national tradition and the Muslim religion could not 'tolerate'.

On 26 April 1920, Muşţafâ Kemāl sent a letter to Lenin in which he proposed the opening of diplomatic relations. In the name of the Council of People's Commissars, Chicherin replied agreeing to this on 2 June 1920. In July a Turkish delegation went to Moscow and, in spite of the temporary tension between the two countries in the autumn of that year over Armenia, the first ambassador of the new Turkey took up residence in Moscow in November. The contacts resulted in the signing on 16 March 1921 of the treaty of friendship between Soviet Russia and Turkey, followed on 13 October by the treaty of Kars between Turkey and the three Caucasian Republics (Georgia, Armenia and Āzarbāyjān) and finally, on 2 January 1922, in the treaty between Turkey and the Ukraine.

Although this diplomatic *rapprochement* was advantageous to both countries, since it helped Turkey in the struggle against the Greeks and freed Russia from the fear of encirclement of her southern frontiers, the friendship between the two countries turned out to be harmful for Turkish Communism. The leaders of the Comintern thought that the arrival of the Kemalîst régime would be the prelude to its being 'over-

COMMUNISM

taken' by socialism. Nothing of the sort happened. The government of Muṣṭafā Kemāl, able to rely on the support of the people, considered that there was no place for Communism in Turkey. When Muṣṭafā Şubhî and fifteen leaders of the Turkish Communist party of Baku went to Anatolia, they were assassinated at Trabzon (Trebizond) on 28 January 1921. There was no immediate protest from Russia.

In spite of the Trabzon catastrophe, the Socialist Party of the Workers and Peasants of Istanbul and the Communist groups of Ankara united to form the Turkish Communist party, which in 1922 held its first congress in Ankara. This congress was broken up by the police, and the party declared illegal on 21 July 1922. The Communists then attempted to extend their activity to the trade unions, and achieved some results there. Between 1922 and 1925 they succeeded in gaining control of the trade unions of the armaments factories in Ankara, of the railway employees in Eskişehir and of some workers' organizations in the textile industry at İzmir. They were also able to infiltrate into the leadership of the General Union of the Workers of Turkey. In 1924 the Communist party resumed a partial activity, and in 1925 it held its second congress; but on 4 March 1925, the law on the stabilization of state security made it once again illegal. In October of the same year its publications were suppressed, and almost all of its leaders were arrested.

From this date, the Turkish Communist party went completely underground, and no longer played an active part in the life of the country. In 1937–8 a new attempt was made to restore it to the public scene. A Communist periodical was even able to appear, but in 1938 renewed legal action stamped it out completely.

Because of the harsh repression by the police, and even more because of the prestige of Kemalism, Communism has always encountered great difficulties in establishing itself in Turkey and in becoming a party of the masses. Its members included some brilliant intellectuals, but few workers and practically no peasants. In opposition to the nationalist movement, and thus obliged to contend with a popular régime which in addition had at the beginning the support of Soviet Russia, the Turkish Communist party was practically swallowed up by the nationalist movement.

In Persia, conditions after the 1917 Revolution seemed almost as favourable as those in Turkey, for traditionally revolutionary events in Transcaucasia had automatic repercussions in Persia. However, the

first phase in the expansion of Communism there was of even shorter duration than in Turkey.

A Persian Socialist (Social Democrat) party, the '*Adālat* party, already existed in 1917 in Baku. This party was under the leadership of a veteran of the 1908 revolution at Tabriz, Ḥaydar Khān Amū, and had several thousand members and sympathizers in the Caucasus, most of them former militant members of the *Hümmet* party. It also had cells in Tehran, Tabriz and the towns of the province of Gilān, and was able to provide the Persian revolution with an experienced nucleus of Communists. The internal conditions of the country also appeared favourable for the spread of Communism: the double occupation of the territory by Russian and British troops, the economic ruin of the petty bourgeoisie and the artisans, the miserable poverty of the peasant masses, and finally the traditional separatist tendencies in Āzarbāyjān and Gilān. The Communists could reasonably hope to turn to their profit the pre-revolutionary climate which prevailed in Persia immediately after the First World War.

The region chosen was Gilān which since 1916 had been in the hands of the Jangalis, a movement which was pan-Islamic, nationalist, anti-imperialist, anti-monarchist and anti-feudal. Soviet Russia became interested in it in 1919, although the leadership of the revolt of the Jangalis was middle class and even 'clerical' (its leader Mīrzā Kūchik Khān was a *mullā*). After the conquest of Transcaucasia by the Red Army in April 1920, the revolution in Gilān gained new impetus. In the same month a Soviet flotilla in pursuit of the retreating Whites occupied the Persian port of Enzeli and drove from it the British troops which were in temporary occupation. The Jangalis took advantage of this to occupy Rasht, the capital of Gilān and, making contact with the commander of the Soviet flotilla, Raskolnikov, proclaimed on 4 June 1920 the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilān, of which Mīrzā Kūchik Khān was elected president, his government being a coalition of Jangali nationalist elements and Communists. The head of the '*Adālat* party, Ḥaydar Khān Amū, and the principal leaders left Baku for Gilān. On 20 June 1920 they held at Rasht a congress of forty-eight delegates of the '*Adālat* party, which changed its name to the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Persia.

Communism thus possessed in Gilān a solid territorial base. But as in Turkey, after a rapid beginning, it encountered obstacles which proved insurmountable. Among the causes of its failure must be in-

cluded the over-adventurous policy of the Communist party which, overestimating its strength, applied too harshly the policy of confiscating land, thus alienating its Jangali allies. The military operations of the Gilān Republic against Tehran also resulted in total failure. Furthermore the support of Soviet Russia very soon began to fail. The Moscow government was more interested in neutralizing Persia than in transforming it into a Communist country. It was anxious above all to obtain the evacuation of the country by the British troops, and the establishment of normal relations with a régime which would be, if not neutral like the Kemalist government, at least not overtly hostile to Soviet Russia. After several unsuccessful attempts, the two countries signed a treaty of friendship on 26 February 1921. After this the Russian rulers were no longer interested in the Soviet Republic of Gilān. In May the British troops evacuated Persia, and in September the Russian units left Gilān. On 29 September there was a fierce quarrel between Kūchik Khān and his Communist allies, whom he lured into an ambush and massacred. In November 1921 Persian government forces reoccupied Gilān. The Jangali movement was over.

Thus the only serious attempt of Communists in the Middle East to seize power ended in catastrophe. The Communist party disappeared from Gilān; but, in contrast to what happened in Turkey, where the movement was suppressed for many years, and in the Arab countries, where it lacked the necessary social foundations, in Persia its chances of development remained strong. Destroyed in the north of the country, it almost immediately recommenced its activities in Tehran and in other large towns.

In 1922 the Communist party consisted of some 1,500 members, mostly workers and artisans. They were mainly active within the trade unions, of which they attempted, not without success, to obtain the leadership. They succeeded notably in gaining control of the Trade Unions Council of Tehran, which had been formed in 1921 combining eleven unions in the capital, and which published a periodical, *Ḥaqīqat*. The Communist party itself published or inspired a number of periodicals either openly Communist or simply 'progressive', but, as in Gilān, it made the 'leftist' error of renouncing any alliance with the other democratic parties, and of overestimating the revolutionary possibilities of the time. After 1925 the advent of the new régime established by Rizā Shāh made the existence of Communism precarious. After 1928 particularly harsh repressive measures forced the party to go under-

ground completely; most of its leaders left the country, its periodicals ceased (one was henceforward published in Vienna), and the Communist-dominated trade unions were dissolved. The second (secret) congress, which the party held in 1927 at Urmīyya, showed its decline, and until the beginning of the Second World War its activities outside Tehran were confined to Tabriz and Khurāsān.

In the Arab East, the first socialist cells appeared in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said. The Egyptian Socialist party was founded at Alexandria in 1920 by a Jewish jeweller, Joseph Rosenthal. In 1922 the party sent a delegate to the Third Congress of the Comintern and as a result changed its name to the Egyptian Communist party, which joined the Comintern. In 1924, when it was at its height, it consisted of as many as 2,000 members, eighty to ninety per cent of them nevertheless being either foreigners or belonging to minority groups, e.g., Greeks, Armenians, Jews and Lebanese Christians. In external policy, the Egyptian Communist party, following the theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern, supported the demands of the Wafd, such as the union of Egypt and the Sudan, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal; but in internal policy, it made many 'leftist' errors, attaching greater importance to the class-war than to the nationalist struggle. It was particularly hostile to the middle-class supporters of the Wafd, and made vain attempts to turn itself into a proletarian party. Its attempts to gain control of the trade unions, which in Egypt were numerous and powerful, met with little success. The Egyptian workers, still not far removed from the *Lumpenproletariat*, were more attracted to the extremist nationalist parties whose simpler and more demagogic programmes were more readily accessible to them.

In July 1924, the government of Sa'd Zaghlūl arrested the Communist leaders, notably the leader of the Communist unions, Anṭūn Mārūn, who died in prison. Further repressive measures took place in June 1925 and the Communist leaders were again imprisoned. The Communist party, was declared illegal, and disappeared for many years.

In Palestine, the Communist party which was founded in 1919, and was a member of the Comintern, remained until 1928 an exclusively Jewish party. In Syria and Lebanon the first small socialist and Communist groups were formed in 1920, chiefly among the Armenians and other Christians. The Communist party was not officially founded until 1924 and did not become a member of the Comintern until 1928. In the

COMMUNISM

other Arab countries, Iraq and Jordan, Communist parties did not appear until after 1928.

The Communists in the Arab countries in the 1920s had certain common characteristics. They were generally non-Muslim intellectuals, uninterested in the nationalist preoccupations of the pan-Arab movement. Everywhere they were fundamentally opposed, not only to the governments of their countries, but also to nationalist parties, political institutions and religious traditions. Believing in the possibility of proletarian parties of the masses, they were further to the left than the theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern. To Islam they showed a systematic and intransigent hostility. All their different attempts to play a part in the political drama failed, and in 1923 a rapid decline set in, which affected all the parties equally until 1930.

In Indonesia, the Communist party was officially formed in May 1920, having grown out of two socialist groups, the East Indian Social Democratic Association (*Indische Social Democratische Vereeniging*) founded in 1914 at Surabaya by Hendricus Sneevliet (Maring) and consisting mainly of Dutch officials and employees, and the Islamic League (*Sarekat Islam*), a nationalist party founded in 1912. At the Seventh Congress of the Democratic Association, held in May 1920, there was a split and a radical group formed the Indonesian Communist party. Its three main leaders, Samoen, Tan Malaka and Ahmin, were Indonesians who for several years remained members of the *Sarekat Islam*. As a result of their efforts, an important left-wing group was formed within the *Sarekat Islam*—*Sarekat Rakjat* (the People's League) which collaborated closely with the Communist party. On 24 December 1920, the party joined the Comintern. Since it was recruited from the people, and thus unlike all the other Muslim Communist parties, the Indonesian Communist party rapidly became a genuine mass party, enjoying great prestige among both intellectuals and workers. After 1920 it represented an important factor in the political life of Indonesia, and reached its zenith in 1926–7, when it launched anti-Dutch uprisings in Java (1926) and Sumatra (1927). These, with the Gilān Republic, were among the few attempts made by Muslim Communists before 1944 to conduct a real revolutionary war. The suppression of the revolts was followed by the arrest, and later the deportation, of all the leaders of the Communist party. The party then suffered a long eclipse and did not become active again until after 1945.

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

COMMUNISM IN THE MUSLIM COUNTRIES BETWEEN 1928 AND 1941

The political programme outlined for the Communist parties at the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920, and applied with little success in the Muslim countries from that year on, was in 1928 officially abandoned at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. The change was the direct consequence of the failure of the commune of Canton in December 1927, and the resulting rupture with the Kuomintang, the model which the Second Congress of the Comintern had recommended all bourgeois democratic revolutionary parties in Asia to follow.

The new strategy directed towards the colonial and semi-colonial countries which was worked out at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern put an end to the tactical co-operation of the Communist parties with the democratic reform movements, which were accused of capitulating to Western imperialism. The Communists of the Muslim countries were invited to carry out simultaneously a threefold plan of action:

First, they were resolutely to take the lead in the anti-imperialist struggle 'which could triumph only under the aegis of the Communist parties'.

Secondly, at the same time, they were to denounce the treachery of the bourgeois democratic parties such as the Wafd in Egypt, the Destour in Tunisia, *al-Kutla al-Waṭaniyya* in Syria, and Kemalism in Turkey, and to oppose them. The struggle against the nationalist movements, which henceforward were considered as the main obstacle to the revolution, thus became inseparable from that conducted against Western imperialism.

Lastly, the Communist parties, most of which were experiencing extreme difficulties, both internally from deviations and externally from police repression, were called upon to intensify the class-struggle in the country districts and in the towns, to assume the leadership of the worker and peasant classes and to fight for the control of the trade unions, accepting as allies only the semi-proletarian elements of the petty bourgeoisie and the medium peasantry.

This programme was unrealistic in the sense that it isolated the already very weak Communist parties, and obliged them to struggle openly against the parties in power, which possessed effective means of repression: The programme was modified in 1935 at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which inaugurated the tactics of the Popular Front. In fact, after 1933, the chief danger threatening Soviet Russia was no

longer British, French or American imperialism, but Hitlerite Germany and Fascism, the ideology of which was often favourably received by nationalists in the Middle East. The anti-imperialist struggle was henceforward seen mainly as an anti-Fascist one. A new and equally difficult task was entrusted to the Communist parties in the Muslim countries—that of tactical co-operation with all the bourgeois parties which were anti-German, while refusing any organic alliances, and retaining complete ideological freedom. The narrowly proletarian policy and its over-radical demands, which had characterized the preceding period, were abandoned, as was the anti-religious propaganda.

The new direction of Comintern policy produced no positive result either in Turkey, where after 1925 Communism suffered a long eclipse, or in Persia, where the repression carried out by Rīzā Shāh's government kept the party completely underground, or in Egypt, where the struggle against the all-powerful Wafd in fact annihilated the last Communist groups; on the other hand in certain Arab countries, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, it enabled the Communist parties to obtain some results, in spite of the competition of political groups of a Fascist tendency.

In Syria and Lebanon, the leadership of the Communist party, which until then had been in the hands of Armenians, passed, in 1933–4, into those of Muslim or Christian Arabs: Khālīd Bakdāsh, Muṣṭafā al-'Aris, Niqūlā Shāwī, Fu'ād Qazān, and the whole party was arabized. From 1934 it had active groups in Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo and Ḥimṣ, and exerted a definite control over the trade unions. In 1936, the coming to power of the Popular Front in France had immediately favourable repercussions on the position of the Communists in countries under French mandate. The Communist party of Syria and Lebanon became a semi-legal party, with its own press, and controlled several organizations of fellow-travellers such as the Anti-Fascist League which was founded at Beirut in 1939. The success of Communism was due also to its flexible and intelligent policy, which was centred entirely on national liberation. The Syro-Lebanese Communist party was moreover the only Muslim Communist party to become, after the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, truly independent of that organization, and to be able to act as a really national party.

In Iraq, Communism at first appeared in the form of a Marxist club, which began in the early 1930s in the little Christian town of Nāṣiriyya. This club formed in 1932 a political group, which held a conference at Baghdād in 1934, and became the Iraqi Communist party. In its early

days this party consisted exclusively of intellectuals and students, and had no connexions with the workers and peasants; and its attempts to gain the leadership of the trade union movement were without result. The majority of its supporters and its leaders were members of minority groups: Kurds, Armenians, Jews and Assyrians, and its first secretary, Yūsuf Salmān Yūsuf (called Fahd) was a Christian from Nāṣiriyya. The Iraqi Communist party was declared illegal in 1933 and suffered harsh repressive measures. It then remained inactive until the war.

When the Second World War began, the Communist parties in the Muslim countries, with the sole exception of Syria and Lebanon, found themselves in a difficult, if not hopeless, situation. The failure of their action can partly be attributed to the repression to which they were subjected, but still more to the continual changes in strategy and tactics, and to the directives of the Comintern, which were unrealistic or difficult to carry out, and which the Muslim Communists of this period followed faithfully but unimaginatively. Highly orthodox Marxists, rigid and doctrinaire internationalists, accepting every sacrifice involved, even that of being ostracized by society, they were completely lacking in flexibility. Unlike their predecessors, the pre-1917 socialists, and their successors after 1945, they openly stated the problem of whether Communism and Islam were mutually compatible, and always solved it by the outright rejection of Islam. Except in rare instances, they refused alliances, and considered Russia as the only revolutionary model, to be conformed to always and everywhere. In spite of their failure they left a romantic heritage of struggles and sacrifices, without which the more firmly based post-war Communist parties could not have developed.

COMMUNISM AFTER 1945

With the Second World War there began a new phase in the history of Communism in the Muslim countries, which for several years was to progress at an unprecedented rate.

One primary factor explains the sudden outburst of sympathy which greeted Communist ideas in the Middle East during and immediately after the war. This was the prestige which surrounded the Soviet Union after the victory of Stalingrad. After this the Middle East countries were prejudiced in favour of everything coming from Russia, while Western ideas, doctrines or methods were suspect, or stigmatized as 'imperialist'. There was, however, a great difference between the prestige enjoyed by Soviet Russia in 1945, and the attraction which the

COMMUNISM

Russian Revolution had exercised in 1920. From now on it was not the example of victorious revolution and the triumph over the wealthier classes and over foreign domination which were found attractive, but rather the economic and political success of a powerful régime, based on a totalitarian ideology, which had enabled the Russian people, who in 1917 had been technically backward, to overcome this backwardness within forty years, and to place themselves in the forefront of world progress. The attraction of the Soviet Union, and thereby of Communism itself, no longer operated, as it had formerly, on only a small number of discontented people, often of alien origin and generally on the fringe of society, but on the whole of the population, including even the elements which were hostile to Communist ideology.

From the organizational point of view the Communist parties were no longer governed by one supreme authority, the Comintern having been dissolved during the war; nevertheless their strategy was inspired by programmes worked out in the Soviet Union. The Communist parties therefore have maintained in large measure a common policy and ideology, though these are capable of considerable variation. Such, at least, was the situation until the ideological conflict between Soviet Russia and China appeared, in 1962, to threaten the unity of thought and action of the Communist world.

After 1945 the constant preoccupation of the Soviet Union was to make the Muslim world neutral, to detach it from its western alliances rather than to attach it by political and ideological links to the Communist bloc. Thus, as was the case in the 1920s, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union can be tactically different from that of local Communist parties. The support given by Moscow to certain neutralist régimes which are, however, hostile to Communism is a proof of this.

The Communist strategy, progressively restated from 1945 onwards and fixed in 1954, is that of the 'New Democracy' which advocates the formation of National Fronts broadly open to all who profess opposition to imperialism. The Communists make no claims to assume the leadership of them but are content to represent the vanguard in the national struggle against the colonialism or the neo-colonialism of the West. Without renouncing any part of their doctrine, they have attempted, generally with success, to integrate themselves in the fullest possible measure into the national life. To this end they no longer present anything beyond a minimum programme, 'rightist' as it is called in Marxist terminology, relegating social demands to the background and

postponing the establishment of socialism to a distant future. They have renounced several points which were formerly considered essential, notably on the slogans of the class-struggle, and on anti-religious propaganda. Their tactics are to hold out a hand to Islam.

As with its political policy, so also the membership of the Eastern Communist parties differs greatly in its social composition from that of the 1920s and 1930s. Its members are recruited from all levels of society, but the Communist movement is pre-eminently that of the middle classes in revolt against the survivals of 'feudalism'. The majority of its leaders are intellectuals, often technicians of bourgeois origin. There are more students than workers or peasants among its militant members.

However, if consideration is confined to the internal organization and evolution of the Communist parties, the results obtained since the Second World War are somewhat deceptive. As happened after 1920, the Communist parties, in spite of a spectacular come-back, have encountered since 1950 in all the Muslim countries (outside the Soviet Union) increasing difficulties. On the other hand, in the dissemination of their ideology, the Communist parties have had some undeniable successes, with far-reaching and lasting consequences. Communism has found a place for itself, admittedly an unofficial one, in the national life. Today its doctrine is either opposed or accepted, but never unknown. The contacts between Islam and Communism, formerly difficult and infrequent, are now constant and can therefore be studied.

On the purely religious level, there is indeed an absolute incompatibility between Islam as a revealed religion and Communist ideology as a materialist doctrine, but this radical difference between them has never prevented individuals with a background of revealed religion from becoming Communists. On the contrary, on the socio-political field, the Muslim *Umma* and the Communist International are two associations of a comparable nature, both of them being totalitarian ideological movements with temporal programmes aiming at the establishment of a state under their control. They confront one another, and each may influence and sometimes penetrate the other. They are now in daily contact: Islam is prepared to take into account ideologies and values that have originated outside Islam, and is even willing to draw inspiration from them. It is thus possible to be both Communist and Muslim. On its side, Communism has since 1945 abandoned, in part at least, its intransigent totalitarian ideology, and also admits, in fact if not in theory, compatibility with other ideologies. Moreover, there are various points

COMMUNISM

of contact: some of them are temporary, such as the anti-Western themes and the anti-liberal, anti-colonialist and anti-racist reaction, others are permanent, such as the totalitarianism of both Communism and Islam, their dualist attitude towards the outside world, and finally their authoritarianism, imposing collective obligations on their adherents.

It is difficult to assess the influence exerted by Communist ideology on Muslim society. Its power and its depth should not be exaggerated. It still influences only a certain sector of the bourgeois intelligentsia, and the contacts of the masses with Communism are still only very superficial. In addition there is very often confusion between the attraction of Marxism and sympathy with the Soviet Union, with which the Muslim states are able to maintain excellent relations while at the same time persecuting their local Communists. Similarly Communism contains complex ideological strata—from Marx to Mao Tse-tung, via Lenin, and Stalin and his successors, not to mention the numerous ‘heretics’—which are all current and accessible. From them Muslims can draw at will various and sometimes contradictory ideas, values and doctrines. Nowadays the term ‘Communism’ implies to some Muslims a whole collection of ideas, including scientific rationalism or humanist liberalism, which do not belong to Marxism but which prepare the way for the reception of Communist ideology.

Since 1945, the ideological relations between Communism and Islam outside the frontiers of the Soviet Union have rarely been those of conflict, but fit broadly into the common desire for coexistence. This is, however, difficult to realize, since true peaceful coexistence is possible only if the two doctrines are placed on an equal footing, which is the case neither in Soviet Russia, where Islam is relegated to the fringe of society, nor in the Middle Eastern countries, where life is still dominated by Islam.

The solution of coexistence allows the two ideologies to remain intact, allied to each other only for the realization of similar and often negative objectives, as, for example, the struggle against the West. But contacts may also be closer. When the considerations of the international or domestic policy of their country demand it, Muslims are tempted to seek in Communism formulas or ideas which correspond with the demands of their own ideology, quite apart from any friendship for Communism. Some even go so far as to interpret traditional Islam in the light of Communism. On the Communist side, the same willingness to discover similarities or to develop points of contact is not

apparent. Thus, in the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union where the Muslims have lived for more than forty years under the Communist régime, Marxism has never taken Islamic forms, in spite of the dreams of the Muslim Communists of the 1920s. It would be impossible to discover there the slightest trace of an Islamo-Communist syncretism. Islam survives there only as a simple religious cult, the object of a very active anti-religious propaganda conducted by the authorities. Officially Islam may no longer influence in any way the life of the formerly Muslim populations, but it nevertheless retains a hold over customs and habits, and governs, in spite of prohibitions, a certain number of traditions affecting family life.

The real contacts between Communism and Islam outside the Soviet Union are of too recent a date and, for the moment, still too superficial for assessment, still less prediction, to be possible.

One may, however, ask whether the influence of Communism on Islam will in the final analysis be reduced simply to a contribution of new ideas and concepts which will finally become islamized and come to add some new techniques to the armoury of modernist reformism; or whether, as the oriental Communists of the 1920s and 1930s dreamed, Communism will finally triumph and succeed in building a new and completely de-islamized society. At present the survival of Islam in Soviet Russia does not permit of this conclusion.

Thus two essential questions remain open. The first is temporary and political. Is the Communist world or the West better equipped to gain the support of the Muslim world? The other is permanent and historical. What results may be expected from the contact between Islam and Communism, in the awareness of the social groups or of individual Muslims?

CHAPTER 6

THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE WEST

THE WORLD, THE WEST, AND ISLAM

The impact of the West on the rest of the world has been the most striking feature of human history in the last five hundred years. It acquired its dynamic force, ultimately, from a new attitude of mind—an avid dedication to the exploration of the unknown, an appreciation of continuity in change and of unity in variety, and a restless ambition to convert knowledge into power. This new mental outlook resulted in the progressive control of man's natural environment by means of an ever vaster and tighter division of human labour. The Western impact has been an impact of modern science, of modern technology, and of modern forms of social organization; its channels of transmission have been improved means of transport, more powerful weapons, and the desire of non-Western peoples to emulate the patterns of civilization whose effectiveness had thus been demonstrated.

This world-wide Western impact took three principal forms: overseas settlement, colonial rule and what has been called defensive modernization. The Americas were the first continent to succumb to colonial conquest; much of the indigenous population was replaced by European immigrants, whose descendants took the lead in establishing the first post-colonial states. Australia and New Zealand followed a similar course, although for them, as for Canada, independence came as the result of more gradual evolution. Today, the countries of North and South America may be considered cultural offshoots of the West, with a strong admixture of indigenous elements mainly in the Andean region from Mexico to Bolivia. Colonial rule without extensive European settlement was established in South and South-East Asia and in tropical Africa; here, the indigenous populations, having transformed their cultures to a greater or lesser extent on the Western model, at length emerged to self-government as a result of the weakening of the West in two World Wars. Russia and Japan remained strong enough to resist any attempt at conquest, but the price of their resistance turned out to be the systematic introduction, since the days of Peter I and of Meiji, of Western technology and organization. Today, Japan participates increasingly in the economic and intellectual development of the West,

whereas Russian government and society have been transformed by a dissident ideology of Western origin. China has followed a pattern intermediate between the second and the third: like Africa and South Asia, she was subjected to imperial penetration, but like Russia and Japan she never lost her independence, and like Russia she has embraced a version of Marxism as her dominant ideology.

With the liquidation of the Western colonial system (in part, at least by the imperial powers themselves) after the Second World War, a fourth pattern may be discerned. What started out as the dramatic impact of a particular Mediterranean-West European culture on the rest of mankind by now has become a world-wide intellectual and social transformation that is rapidly losing its parochial Western character. Competition among Europeans, their overseas descendants in America, their heretical or orthodox disciples in Russia, Japan and elsewhere is adding to the propulsive force of this revolution of world civilization.¹

Within this varied picture, the modern encounter of Westerners (including Russians) with Muslims has in many respects been a unique experience for both groups. It has been unique, first of all, because the Islamic Near East is particularly close to Europe in geography, history and cultural tradition. Unlike the Americas or Japan, the Near East to Europeans was always part of the 'known world': it did not have to be 'discovered' or 'opened up' by the dramatic arrival of ships at distant shores. Islam grew out of the same ancient Middle Eastern, Judaic and Hellenistic roots as did Christianity. The Arabs learned their science and philosophy from the ancient Greeks and taught them to the medieval Europeans. The Ottoman empire originated in Asia Minor, but expanded first into Europe, and only later into Asia and Africa; much of its administrative personnel throughout the centuries was recruited from Balkan Christians converted to Islam; and on that foundation it became for many centuries the most powerful, durable and extensive (hence in a sense most 'modern') realm to the west of the Himalayas. Yet, although there had been continuous contact between Islam and Christianity, a distinctive Western impact on the Muslim countries began only after Europe had attained a striking degree of military and technological superiority in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and

¹ For an elaboration of these views of modernization see R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, 1964), 3-13, and D. A. Rustow, *World of Nations* (Washington, 1967, 3-20).

even then the internal divisions and rivalries in Europe considerably delayed the full force of the impact. By the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman empire and Persia at one end of Asia, and China and Japan at the other, stood out as the two major regions never subjugated by Europe. Egypt and the Fertile Crescent were among the very last areas to be brought into the Western imperial system of hegemony. In the Arab countries and elsewhere in the Near East, therefore, the Western political impact reached its peak at a time when sections of the indigenous *élite* had already been converted to Western ideals of constitutionalism and nationalism, and when large sectors of European opinion had already turned against the colonial system. The régimes of military occupation, mandates and preferential treaties established in the Near East from the 1880s to the 1930s reflected this bad conscience of colonialism. The resistance of Arabs to these régimes reflected the ambivalent attitudes of Near Easterners to this belated impact.

For the Near Easterners, there was nothing new in receiving foreign cultural influences or submitting to foreign conquerors. Living at the crossroads of three continents and two oceans, they had throughout history been exposed to more intensive cultural interchange and more frequent invasion than the inhabitants of any other major region. But always in the past, superior culture had been balanced against superior military power. When Muslim bedouins in the seventh and eighth Christian centuries overran the Sasanian dominions and parts of the Byzantine empire, they quickly blended the Hellenistic and Iranian cultures of their new subjects with their own Muslim faith and their nomadic social organization. Later, these hellenized and iranized Muslims imparted their own faith and civilization to other nomadic conquerors such as Turks and Mongols. Now, in the Muslim experience of the Western impact, cultural and military superiority were both on the same side: for the first time in thousands of years Near Easterners were forced, slowly but inexorably, to receive and adapt the culture of outsiders who were conquering them.

After due allowance is made for these unique aspects of the Western impact upon Islam, the world-wide themes of defensive modernization, of colonial rule, of foreign settlement, and eventually of competitive coexistence, reappear. Defensive modernization began in Ottoman Turkey in the eighteenth century, in Egypt and Persia in the nineteenth, and in Afghanistan and on the Arabian peninsula in the twentieth. European colonial conquest moved concentrically from the periphery

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

of the Islamic region to its core: Mughal India and Indonesia in the seventeenth century, Central Asia and Islamic Africa in the nineteenth and the Arab Fertile Crescent in the twentieth. Russian Central Asia, Palestine and, for a time, Algeria, have been the only Muslim territories where Western rule entailed immigrant settlement—where colonialism implied colonization. The final, competitive-coexistent, phase of the Western impact began for Turkey in the 1920s and for most other countries in the years after the Second World War.

DEFENSIVE MODERNIZATION IN OTTOMAN TURKEY

Westernizing reforms in the Ottoman empire were stimulated by military decline, and that military decline became apparent with the lifting of the second Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1094/1683. But it would be a mistake to seek the beginnings of Ottoman reform in that period; for 1094/1683 became a turning point only from a lengthy perspective of hindsight. It is true that by 1110/1699 the empire in the treaty of Carlowitz had to yield all of Hungary, Transylvania and Podolia, that this was the first major Ottoman defeat in nearly three centuries, and that the Ottomans were never to recoup these losses. But this the Ottoman contemporaries had no way of knowing. What they did know was that their ancestors had won, lost and regained extensive territories before. Their state had survived in 804/1402 the loss of its Anatolian home base and the capture of its ruler on the battlefield. Clearly, the survival of the empire depended on the continuity of a dynasty and of certain forms of political organization rather than on any identity of territory. After 804/1402, following a period of civil war and chaos, the Ottomans had restored their rule in the Balkans and then in Anatolia, and in 857/1453 they crowned their earlier military exploits by the capture of Istanbul. But they had besieged Istanbul three times before, and they had laid siege to Vienna in 936/1529 as well as in 1094/1683. Who was to say that in another century and a half, or indeed sooner, they would not return to deliver the final, decisive blow? In contrast to the petty kingdoms and principalities of Europe, barely recovering from the ravages of the 'Thirty Years' War and forever disputing for supremacy, the Ottoman empire represented the full embodiment of co-ordinated Muslim power. Christian and Jewish subjects as well lived under the tolerant Ottoman régime and by their industry enhanced its welfare. Within a few years after the humiliation of

Carlowitz, the Ottomans gave refuge to Charles XII of Sweden (1121/1709) and very nearly captured Peter I of Russia (1123/1711). The year 1718 inaugurated a period of fifty years of peace entirely unprecedented in all Ottoman history, and interrupted only by a brief and victorious campaign (1148-52/1735-9) in which Serbia and western Wallachia were recaptured. During this era of peaceful prosperity, moreover, there was a lively cultural interchange with the West. As European audiences read Montesquieu's *Lettres Persanes* and (somewhat later) were to watch Mozart's *Entführung aus dem Serail*, so the pashas and beys of Istanbul delighted in the colourful varieties of tulips that their gardeners were importing from Holland, and the architects of the Nūru 'Osmāniye mosque, completed in 1168/1755, engrafted Italian baroque and rococo motifs on the Ottoman architectural style developed by the great Sinān (896-997/1490-1588). Unlike the cultural borrowings of a later period, these adaptations reflected a sense of strength and of confidence rather than of weakness and anxiety. Clearly, no event before the middle of the eighteenth century was likely to shake the Ottoman's sturdy reliance on the power of their sword, the justice of their rule or the righteousness of their faith.¹

The idyll of the Tulip Era at Istanbul was rudely shattered by the Ottoman-Russian War of 1182-8/1768-74. The generals of Catherine II overran Moldavia and Wallachia, her political agents tried to stir up an uprising in Greece, her admirals circumnavigated all of Europe to attack the Ottoman fleet on the very shores of the Aegean. In the peace treaty of Küçük Kaynarja, the sultan was forced to cede the Crimea—the first Muslimland yielded by Ottomans to Christians—and to allow the passage of Russian ships through the Turkish Straits into the Mediterranean. The privilege retained by the Crimean Tatars to pray publicly for the sultan in his rather dubious 'capacity of Grand Caliph of Mahometanism' was balanced by the privilege newly accorded to the tsar to make representations on behalf of certain of the sultan's Orthodox subjects. In 1197/1783, moreover, the Russians uncere- moniously annexed the Crimean buffer state.

Though the area yielded at Küçük Kaynarja was smaller than that surrendered at Carlowitz, the implications were far more serious. Defeat this time had been inflicted not by the Habsburg emperor, one

¹ For a divergent interpretation of the period from 1683 to 1774 see B. Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (London, 1964), 32 f, and 'Ottoman observers of Ottoman decline', in *Islamic Studies*. I 1 (March, 1962), 71-87.

of the most powerful European rulers, but by a remote and backward country that only two generations before had itself set out on the course of autocratic europeanizing reform. The Black Sea was no longer an Ottoman lake, and Russian ships could avoid the lengthy detour via the Skagerrak and Gibraltar to sail into the Mediterranean past the sultan's very palace in Istanbul. The clause relating to the Orthodox Church opened a dreary vista of foreign interference in the empire's relations with its Christian subjects. But the defeat of 1188/1774 involved something even more precious than territory or strategy: it posed a basic problem in statecraft and in theodicy and thereby threatened the Ottoman's traditional self-confidence. The surrender of Muslims to Christian rule put into question the rationale of a state founded on Muslim conquest of Christians, and of a religious revelation that promised to the true believer prosperity and power on earth as well as salvation hereafter. It made abundantly clear the need for reform to save the state and to reassert the true faith; and the only basis of reform could be a Muslim equivalent of Satan casting out Satan.

The response to that need was the so-called New Order (*Nizâm-i Jedîd*) proclaimed in 1793 by an energetic young ruler, Selim III (1203–22/1789–1807). The closer contacts with Europe in the Tulip Era had brought piecemeal innovations. In 1139/1727, Ibrâhîm Müteferriqa, a Hungarian Calvinist (or, more probably, Unitarian) captured during the Austrian wars and later converted to Islam, introduced the first printing press to Istanbul. A few years later, Comte de Bonneval, a French adventurer and renegade later called *Khumbarajî* (i.e. Bombardier) Ahmed Pasha, opened the first Ottoman school of artillery. In 1187/1773, a Hungarian-French aristocrat, Baron de Tott, resumed this project. But Selim's reforms were far more ambitious than any of these. A new army, trained and equipped in the European style, was to take the place of the Janissaries who had degenerated into a praetorian guard more inclined to cow the sultan in Istanbul and his subjects in the provinces than to fight his battles abroad. The commercial privileges long accorded to Europeans were to be cleansed of abuses. Taxation was to be tightened and extended. Diplomatic missions to major capitals were to report on events in Europe and to propose policies that might deserve emulation.

The sequel to Selim's reform decrees foreshadowed many of the problems that were to plague the Ottomans and other Near Eastern reformers throughout the next century. These difficulties may be illus-

trated by a brief review of four major crises of the Ottoman state in 1798–1808, 1826–40, 1875–8 and 1908–18.

The first crisis began in 1798 with Bonaparte's landing in Egypt. Here was a thrust not just at the periphery but into the very heartlands of Islam where no European soldier had effectively set foot since the Crusades. Luckily for the Ottomans, Nelson's fleet destroyed Bonaparte's ships and cut off his supplies, and after three years the last Frenchmen were evacuated. But the crisis continued in 1804 with a Serbian uprising against the oppressive Janissaries at Belgrade, and the Russians, who once again defeated the Ottomans in the war of 1806–12, deliberately encouraged this first stirring of Christian nationalism in the Balkans, following the precedent set by the French after Campo Formio. The climax came with two successive *coups d'état* in Istanbul in 1807 and 1808. In the first, Selīm was deposed by the Janissaries and conservative '*ulemā*'. In the second, his cousin Maḥmūd II (1808–39) was installed on the throne and subsequently signed the solemn *Sened-i Ittifāq* (Deed of Agreement) in which he promised to respect the vested rights of his powerful provincial vassals. Only fifteen years after the high hopes of the New Order, the sultanate had plunged into new depths of seemingly hopeless disorder.

In the dozen years before the next crisis, Maḥmūd II undauntedly resumed his predecessor's work of reform. In complete disregard of the Deed of Agreement, he laid the basis for a strongly centralized autocratic state. The Translation Chamber at the Sublime Porte became the nucleus of the new, westernized bureaucracy. But Maḥmūd perforce concentrated on fighting conservative opposition in Istanbul and the provinces while nationalist rebellion and foreign intervention went unchecked. In 1821 the Greeks revolted in the Morea. In 1822 Maḥmūd's soldiers subdued the formidable 'Ali Pasha of Jannina a hundred miles to the north. In 1826 his new troops destroyed the obstreperous Janissaries in a major bloodbath in Istanbul, leaving the fight against the Greeks to Muḥammad 'Ali of Egypt, most powerful of the provincial pashas. In 1828, the Egyptian forces evacuated the Morea, and in 1829 a Russian invasion of the Balkans forced the sultan virtually to recognize Greek independence in the treaty of Adrianople. In 1831 Muḥammad 'Ali, in open rebellion, started marching on Istanbul, where the frightened sultan in the treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi (1833) made his realm a virtual protectorate of the tsar. In 1839–40 renewed intervention by the great powers halted a second Egyptian attack. A few years later, in

1853, Tsar Nicholas I in contemplating the future of the sultanate uttered his famous condescending words: 'We have on our hands a sick man, a very sick man.'

The progress that the disease had made in half a century is reflected in the change of therapeutic nomenclature. Selīm III in 1793 had announced a New Order (*Nizām-i Jedid*) in the singular intransitive form; the reform era from 1839 to 1876 became known as the *Tanzīmāt-i khayriye*, or Beneficent Orderings, in the plural transitive. The architects of the *Tanzīmāt* were the leading members of Maḥmūd's new bureaucracy—Reshīd Pasha, 'Ālī Pasha and Fu'ād Pasha—who were eager to consolidate his work of reform and also, on occasion, to prove to the powers that the sultanate could solve its internal problems without leaving any justification for their interference. Reshīd drafted a comprehensive proclamation of reform, the *Khaṭṭ-i Sherif* of Gülkhāne of 1839, and 'Ālī and Fu'ād a second, the *Khaṭṭ-i Hümayun* of 1856, both read by Sultan 'Abd ül-Mejīd (1839–61). But beyond such solemn promises of civic equality, the *Tanzīmāt* statesmen effected important changes in administrative organization. They opened permanent military and administrative schools, supplemented them by a system of public secondary education, instituted the principles of recruitment by examination and of orderly promotion in the public service and introduced the first elements of representation into a new and more uniform system of provincial administration. Their hope was to create a common feeling of civic obligation that would weld together Ottoman subjects of Christian as well as Muslim faith. But the most immediate consequence of their work was the emergence of a critical spirit among the newly trained officers and civil servants, who fully accepted the principle of europeanizing reform, but resented the autocratic and bureaucratic manner in which reform had been imposed.

This new internal force interacted vigorously with the older secessionist and foreign pressures in the third Ottoman crisis. There were Christian revolts in the Balkans in 1875 and 1876; the great powers presented their customary protests and demands; Serbia and Montenegro attacked, and when the Ottomans defeated them Russia intervened on their side. A grand diplomatic Congress at Berlin (1878) ratified the most disastrous defeat since 1774: the Ottomans lost control of most of the Balkans, of the Caucasian border area and of Cyprus, and in the remaining areas of mixed Muslim-Christian population (Macedonia and Armenia) were forced to accept a system of international supervision.

Three years later, the bankruptcy of the empire led to the establishment of an international administration for its public debt with full control over customs and certain monopolies. In the midst of these foreign troubles, the empire underwent one of its most profound internal upheavals since 1808. It was precipitated by Midḥat Pasha, the last of the great Tanẓīmāt ministers, who had built up an admirable record of effective and magnanimous administration as provincial governor first of Bulgaria and then of 'Irāq, and who sought the empire's salvation in the adoption of a written representative constitution. To attain his end, Midḥat engineered the deposition of two sultans, the spendthrift 'Abd ūl-'Aziz (1861–76) and the demented Murād V. The next sultan, 'Abd ūl-Ḥamīd II (1876–1909), opened the first parliament only a month before the outbreak of the Russian War, but adjourned it *sine die* before acceding to the humiliating conditions of peace. Midḥat had already been forced to resign before the parliament convened and was subsequently banished and murdered at 'Abd ūl-Ḥamīd's behest. For thirty more years, Turkey reverted to autocratic reform—European-style military training, extension of telegraph and railroad networks, expansion of the school system—without the luxury of a representative constitution. Ideas of constitutionalism, however, continued to flourish among the younger members of the ruling class, particularly the military cadets, and 'Abd ūl-Ḥamīd's practice of exiling the malcontents to Europe only confirmed the radicalism of the opposition.

The empire's final crisis began with the so-called Young Turk Revolution of 1908, that is, the calling of new elections after a thirty-year interval, prompted by threats of rebellion on the part of army units in Macedonia. The Macedonian conspirators, known as the Committee of Union and Progress, had been encouraged by the writings of the exiles in Paris. But hopes for orderly constitutional development, for harmonious co-operation among the empire's nationalities and for a stronger position on the international scene quickly faded. The new government's attempt to extend elections into areas of only nominal Ottoman control led to the final loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Crete. A mutiny by conservative troops in Istanbul brought the Macedonian units to the capital and resulted in the deposition of 'Abd ūl-Ḥamīd in favour of Mehmed V Reshād (1909–18). A systematic policy of administrative centralization antagonized the hitherto loyal non-Turkish Muslim groups, notably the Albanians and later the Arabs. The Turkish-Italian and Balkan wars of 1911–13 resulted in the

loss of Libya and most of the empire's remaining European possessions. They also furnished the occasion for a bitter internal struggle among civilian and military factions resulting in the establishment of a military and party dictatorship of the CUP. When the leader of the Young Turk militarists, Enver Pasha, manoeuvred the Ottoman empire into the First World War on the German side, its fate was sealed. A political revival became possible only after a protracted struggle, and then only on a much reduced scale and in the novel form of a nationalist, secularist republic committed to the principle of integral westernization.

A number of broad themes may be traced throughout this history of Ottoman reform from 1774 to 1918: the continued pressure from abroad, the empire's precarious survival amidst European power rivalries, the interplay of internal and external pressures for change, the short-range weakening produced by the reforms, the spread of westernizing sentiment, the disputes about direction of the reform and its ever-broadening scope.

The foreign pressure that stimulated the original reforms never abated. In fact, European military strength, which the Ottomans could not match in the eighteenth century, steadily increased, so that the reformers were forever pursuing a rapidly receding target. Carnot's *levée en masse* almost overnight enlarged the man-power scale of warfare ten-fold; the spirit of nationalism, propagated by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, created a new sense of cohesion in the countries of Europe; and the industrial revolution added powerful weapons to their arsenals. The Ottoman empire—with its polyglot and multi-religious population, its dynastic and local loyalties and its more primitive agrarian economy—could neither effectively resist nor quickly reproduce any of these developments. In the eighteenth century, the Ottomans would have done well to hold their own against the Habsburg and tsarist empires. By the turn of the twentieth, Austria-Hungary had sunk to the rank of a secondary power, and both Habsburgs and Romanovs faced the twin threats of nationalism and revolution. All that the most strenuous efforts of the Ottoman reformers could achieve was to delay the downfall of their own empire to coincide with that of its two traditional rivals.

Meanwhile, the rivalries among European powers contributed now to prevent the empire's imminent collapse, and now its more complete salvation. The British cut off Bonaparte's line of supply in 1798; a grand European alliance fought Russian designs on the Balkans in the Crimean

War of 1854–56; and the Germans reorganized and helped to command the Ottoman armies in their contest with Russian and British forces in 1914–18. But the same European powers which prevented each other from taking over the empire's legacy also conspired to thwart any resurgence of Muslim power in the Near East. They intervened on behalf of the Greeks in 1828–30, against Muḥammad 'Alī in 1833–40, and on behalf of the Balkan states in 1877–8. Time and again the European balance of power was readjusted in its kaleidoscopic combinations so as to keep the Ottomans in their twilight status as the 'sick man of Europe'.

External and internal pressures came to interact ever more stringently. The readiness of Europeans to champion the cause of their co-religionists—British philhellenism, Russian solicitude for Greeks, southern Slavs, and Armenians, and French interest in Lebanese Maronites—did much to encourage nationalism and secession. For example, the bombing of the Banque Ottomane by Armenian terrorists in 1896, which set off the first major wave of anti-Armenian persecution, was deliberately planned so as to provoke the intervention of Russia and other powers. The Tanẓimāt statesmen, on their side, issued each of their major reform decrees at moments of external crisis so as to persuade the great powers to help those who helped themselves. Whereas the contents of the *Khatt* of 1839 and of the Constitution of 1876 reflected internal demands for reform, the *Khatt* of 1856 was largely inspired by the turcophile British ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Foreign crises also furnished the occasion, or at least the pretext, for Ottoman changes of government. The Russian War of 1877–8 prompted the dismissal first of Midḥat and then of the parliament; signs of a British-Russian *rapprochement* at Ottoman expense hastened the revolution of 1908; and the Libyan and Balkan wars led to several changes in factional control of the government at Istanbul. Somewhat later, the defeat of 1918 broke the power of the CUP, just as the Allied occupation of Istanbul, and Greek annexation of Izmir, threw the support of Turkish opinion behind the nationalist movement under Muṣṭafā Kemāl.

The early reforms provoked tenacious resistance from conservative forces in the state, such as Janissaries and 'ulemā'. Partly as a result, their immediate effect was much internal disarray and a weakening of the empire in its external contest. The new army lost more decisive battles than had the Janissaries; proclamations of civic equality did not dissuade the subject nationalities from secession; and the new body of tax collectors could not forestall public bankruptcy. In fact, the growing

'social mobilization'¹ of the population through such measures as improved transport, broader government recruitment and expanded schooling did much to accentuate the latent diversity among various ethnic groups. It is a singular tribute to the pragmatic spirit of the Ottoman ruling class that these setbacks did not deflect them from their course of progressive reform.

Support for modernization spread gradually through Ottoman-Turkish society, downwards from the top of the political hierarchy and inwards from the periphery of the empire. Reform started as the command of autocratic rulers such as Selim and Maḥmūd, was taken up in the Tanẓīmāt as the project of bureaucratic ministers, and by 1908 had become the ardent mission of organized political groups with growing support among the urban masses. In the mid-twentieth century, the transformation of society in Turkey and several other countries began to engulf the peasantry as well. The regions most accessible to Europe—the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean—were the natural channels of its influence. Following Bonaparte's invasion, Egypt became the centre of one of the most ambitious Near Eastern attempts at westernization. Secessionist nationalism spread first to Christians and later to Muslims, first to the Balkans and then to Anatolia and Arabia: Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, Albanians, Syrian and Lebanese Arabs, Arabs in the Hijāz and 'Irāq—in approximately that order. Being most closely identified with the imperial tradition, the Turks themselves did not turn to nationalism until the period from 1913 to 1923, when secession of the non-Turkish groups was in its final phase. Leading roles in this conversion were played by two groups of peripheral nationals, who were reacting to the upsurge of nationalism in Russia and in the Balkans. Muslim Turkish refugees from the tsarist empire provided much of the ideological rationale of early Turkish nationalism, whereas Ottoman Turks from Macedonia provided the major organizational impetus of the Young Turk and Kemalist movements.²

Although reform proceeded steadily, it did not proceed smoothly or without intense conflict. Even after the suppression of the provincial magnates and of the Janissaries, profound differences and bitter rivalries remained. Maḥmūd II, the early Tanẓīmāt ministers and 'Abd ül-

¹For that term, see Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953).

² Cf. D. A. Rustow, 'The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic', in *World Politics* xi (July 1959), 527 f.; and 'Atatürk as founder of a state', *Daedalus*, XCIII, 793-828 (1968).

Hamîd were concerned mainly about the strengthening of the central government's power. The New Ottomans of the 1860s, Midhat Pasha and the moderate wing of the Young Turk movement championed representation as a check on despotism and on irresponsible bureaucracy while hoping for 'harmony of the elements', that is, of ethnic groups imbued with a common spirit of Ottoman citizenship. The CUP, by contrast, came to equate Ottomanism with Turkish nationalism and representative government with party rule. From 1908 to 1918 there was an intense ideological debate, summed up rather than reconciled in Ziyâ Gökalp's triple slogan of 'Turkization, Islamization, Modernization'. The Kemalists opted for the first and third of these, whereas the partial religious restoration of the 1950s reintroduced the second theme in a minor key. During the one-party period (1923-45), the republic concentrated on modernizing the urban population, whereas competitive party politics since 1945 for the first time spread the impetus to the rural areas. In sum, the Turkish public debate since 1826 has concerned not so much the principle of modernizing reform itself as the priorities among various items of reform—that is, the specific combination of tradition and modernity to be attempted at any given time.

The Ottomans' first reaction to European military superiority had been to try to borrow only the 'cutting edge' of the new instrument.¹ But by a steady and inexorable logic, the impulse of reform spread through the political and social structure. The new army required new schools for the training of officers and new financing from heavier taxes; this created a need for new administrative machinery and at length for an entirely new legal system; all this in turn added to the demand for new teachers and new public servants—and hence for more schools and more financing. Of all the nineteenth-century reforms, the new educational system most consistently proved its worth in the long run. For, amidst defeat, rebellion and bankruptcy, it was the graduates of the schools founded during the *Tanzimât* and Hamidian periods who provided leadership in the transition from empire to republic, when reform was to be applied more intensively on a more manageable geographic scale. Yet, with the advent of the republic in 1923, reform had, in a sense, come full circle: the heirs of the new army that Selim had founded in 1793 had deposed his cousin's grandson and pronounced a coroner's verdict on the Ottoman empire. Reform, which had started out as a selective

¹ L. V. Thomas and R. N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), 51.

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

expedient for the defence of tradition against the Western onslaught, had become an instrument for the wholesale transformation and even the destruction of tradition itself.

VARIATION IN EGYPT AND PERSIA

The story of Ottoman westernization was repeated with significant variations in Egypt and Persia. In Egypt, the military pressure from Europe was felt earlier and more sharply than in the rest of the empire, in Persia it was felt later and in attenuated form: the speed and intensity of attempts at reform varied accordingly in each country. Neither country had as strong an administrative tradition as the Ottomans, and both countries—Egypt through its geographical location and Persia through its subsoil resources—offered far more attractive prizes to the builders of European empires: hence Egypt and Persia could not control their own modernization to the extent that Turkey could. Egypt for a generation became a colony in all but name, and Persia narrowly avoided the same fate on several occasions; as a result there accumulated in both countries a good deal more resentment against the West than was to be found in Turkey.

While the empire of Selim III was deprived of several outlying provinces, Egypt was itself occupied by foreign troops. General Bonaparte, moreover, landed not just with troops but also with a sizable retinue of historians, archaeologists, scientists, administrators, economists and propagandists. The French, as they had done to good effect in Belgium, Italy and elsewhere, proclaimed themselves as liberators of the common people from alien oppression; they also made much of their revolutionary anti-clericalism and its supposed affinity to Islam. On this last point, to be sure, their listeners displayed a healthy scepticism; nor did the French stay long enough to effect any lasting reorganization of administration, finances, education or agriculture. Nonetheless, three years of their presence had thoroughly shaken the rule of the Mamluk oligarchy and demonstrated what Western technology and organization might accomplish even in a Near Eastern setting. The lesson was well appreciated by Muḥammad ‘Alī, an Ottoman soldier of Albanian birth who had distinguished himself in the campaign against the French, and in 1805 rose to the position of viceroy of Egypt.

Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha consolidated his power by killing off his Mamluk opponents—much as Peter I had done with the Streltzi and as Maḥmūd II was to do with the Janissaries. Once in control, h

embarked on a programme of reform far more comprehensive than that of his Ottoman contemporaries. He introduced the cultivation of long-staple cotton, which found a ready market in Europe. He called in foreign military instructors, and built dockyards and ordnance factories. He sent young men to Europe to study technical subjects. And he used the proceeds of a growing export economy to finance the armies and the fleet that, in a number of brilliant campaigns, spread his power into Arabia, the Sudan, Palestine, Syria, Greece and Anatolia. In his clear appreciation of the economic base of military power, Muḥammad 'Alī differed sharply from all Turkish nineteenth-century reformers, with the sole exception of Midḥat.

European intervention in 1833 and 1840 halted his advance into Turkey, and thwarted any designs of claiming the legacy of the sultans. By the extension of European commercial privileges from the rest of the Ottoman empire to Egypt, it also withered the economic roots of Egypt's expansion. Muḥammad 'Alī's successors aggravated the plight by careless spending and by exorbitant taxes that often forced the peasants to sell their seed. The construction of the Suez Canal by the enterprising French engineer, de Lesseps, and the high demand for Egyptian cotton during the American Civil War brought a temporary reprieve. But the speculative fever of the double boom in exports and public works encouraged many sharp practices by European financiers; and, when the bubble burst, these found innumerable ways of recouping their losses and even their anticipated gains from the liberal treasury of the Khedive Ismā'il (1863–79). In 1875 Ismā'il was forced to sell his shares in the Suez Canal (they were bought by the Disraeli government), and in 1876 to accept foreign supervision of his finances. When a combined military-civilian opposition demanded that his successor should submit regular accounts to a parliamentary body, the European powers rallied to the protection of the foreign creditors. After lengthy deliberations, their intervention took the form of British military occupation—a *de facto* colonial régime that was to continue from 1882 until after the First World War.

Persia remained more sheltered from the main thrusts of European expansion. The Portuguese held a trading post at Hormuz in the Persian Gulf from 1507 to 1622, but the Indies offered far richer prizes to Portuguese, Dutch and British alike. Russia made contact with Persia fully a century after its first encounter with the Ottomans. In the years from 1800 to 1813 tsarist forces conquered the Persian border area

between the Caucasus and the Aras river; and, for a time, Persia was drawn into the diplomatic intrigues among France, Britain and Russia. By the middle of the century, Britain had consolidated her rule in India, and Russia proceeded to the conquest of Central Asia, so that both powers took a more active interest in the intervening Persian-Afghan area. Yet none of these developments had any marked effect on the rulers of Persia, except to afford them some practice in the precarious game of playing off one great power against the other and to give them an avid taste for foreign loans at exorbitant rates.

What westernizing influence was felt in Persia in the nineteenth century, therefore, was the result of activity not by the government but by enterprising foreigners. British subjects obtained concessions for the building of telegraph lines (1865), the construction of railways and exploration of minerals (1872), the opening of a bank (1889), and a monopoly on the purchase and sale of tobacco throughout the country (1890). Tsarist officers were called to organize a Cossack Brigade (1879), while other Russians obtained concessions for the lucrative caviare fisheries in the Caspian (1888), and for a second bank (1892). Meanwhile, however, a new force for change appeared on the scene—that of popular indignation at royal extravagance and foreign influence. The tobacco concession which affected not only the growers but also all smokers and chewers of tobacco, caused particularly strong resentment. When a general boycott of tobacco, organized by the Shī'ī '*ulamā*' in 1892, forced the shah to cancel the odious monopoly, the power of concerted popular action had been demonstrated. As in Turkey during the same period, newspapers written by political exiles and smuggled into the country helped keep alive the opposition spirit. By 1905 the movement had the support of the '*ulamā*', the bazaar merchants of Tehran, and large urban crowds; in 1906 these forced the shah to grant a parliamentary constitution.

Foreign influence, nevertheless, continued to play a crucial role—and that much more openly than earlier in the Ottoman empire. Britain and Russia completed their *rapprochement* against Germany by settling their outstanding issues in Asia; in a convention of 1907 they divided Persia into two spheres of influence, a Russian one in the north and a British one in the south. In 1908 the Cossack Brigade, under its Russian commander, assisted Muḥammad 'Alī Shāh in a military *coup* by shelling the building of the parliament and its members. A counter-*coup* in 1909, led by the southern Bakhtiārī tribe, restored the constitution and forced the shah

POLITICAL IMPACT OF WEST

into exile. Britain's interest had been heightened by the discovery of petroleum in the southern province of Khūzistān in 1908 and by the shift of the Royal Navy from coal to oil fuel in 1913. In 1914 the British government obtained a major financial interest in the petroleum concession first obtained by William Knox D'Arcy, an Australian, in 1901. The restored constitutional government tried to diversify its sources of foreign support by appointing Swedish officers to train a gendarmerie, and calling financial advisers from the United States. But other foreigners continued to arrive without any invitation. Between 1907 and 1921, Russian, British and German troops operated almost at will in various parts of Persia. In 1920 Soviet troops in pursuit of the routed Whites landed on the Caspian shore, and, in conjunction with local rebels, proclaimed the Soviet Republic of Gilān. A year earlier, the cabinet in Tehran had negotiated a treaty with Britain which if ratified would have made the country into a virtual protectorate.

The full independence of the country was restored only under Rizā Khān, who as the first Persian commander of the Cossack Brigade crushed the Gilān rebellion, seized power in Tehran (1921), had himself proclaimed shah in 1925 and in the next decade and a half inaugurated a programme that tried to match, in one rapid effort, the reforms of Maḥmūd II and Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha, of 'Abd ūl-Ḥamid and Atatürk. But the Second World War brought another period of foreign occupation by Russia and Britain, followed by further episodes of attempted secession under the Communist aegis, and of *coup* and counter-*coup* with the encouragement of Britain, Russia or the United States. From these difficulties Persia has only been extricating herself slowly since the 1950s.

Egyptians and Persians, in a variety of ways, were subject to stronger imperialist pressures than were the Turks, and their political and manpower resources for resistance were slimmer; hence among both peoples feelings toward the West were more markedly ambivalent. A characteristic early expression of this ambivalence may be found in Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839–97), perhaps the most colourful intellectual-political figure of the nineteenth-century Near East; and it is no accident that al-Afghānī, who spent many years of exile in Istanbul, should have exercised his most profound influence in Persia and in Egypt. Bernard Lewis has aptly described the tenor of al-Afghānī's thought:

For Jamāl al-Dīn [Islam] was a civilization, potentially a world power, and only incidentally a faith; its basic demand was for loyalty rather than for piety. The Muslims were to be united as the Germans and Italians were united, and

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

Jamāl al-Dīn passed his life in the search for a Muslim monarch to whom he could be a Bismarck or a Cavour. The enemy from which Islam needed to be saved was Europe, and especially Great Britain, the imperial power in India and Egypt.¹

It is true that in Islam, from its earliest times, religion and matters of state, ethics, law and politics were blended; but al-Afghānī's emphasis on the political aspects of Islam betrays a novel, European influence. His reinterpretation clearly was not only an antagonistic response to Western encroachments but also an adaptation of Western concepts. Much as Selim III had set out to fight the West with European-style artillery, al-Afghānī tried to fight the West with European-style ideology, with a revived Islam interpreted as a variant of modern nationalism. But whereas Selim and his successors down to Atatürk could use the power of the state for pragmatic steps of piecemeal reform, al-Afghānī and his Persian and Arab followers had to rely on the power of the word and the pen to express popular yearnings for a dramatic and rapid improvement in the helpless condition of the Muslim community. Al-Afghānī was a moving force behind the tobacco boycott of 1890–1 and seems to have played a role also in the assassination of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh in 1896. In Egypt he profoundly influenced Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), who did much to reorganize training at al-Azhar and to reconstruct Islamic theology in its two-front fight against rigid traditionalism and modern secularism.

THE TWILIGHT OF WESTERN IMPERIAL RULE

Just as Western influences such as nationalism spread inward from the periphery of the Ottoman empire, so the onslaught of European imperialism on the whole House of Islam, which Selim and Maḥmūd were fighting with military weapons, and men like al-Afghānī with weapons of the spirit, was moving concentrically inward from an even wider circle. That circle first was drawn when Vasco da Gama circumnavigated the Cape of Good Hope and Russian adventurers penetrated across the Volga and Urals into Siberia.

The Dutch established the first system of Christian colonial rule over a large Muslim population in Indonesia in the seventeenth century. The spread of Islam to the archipelago, however, which had begun around A.D. 1200 continued, and was at times even encouraged. In the eighteenth century, the British expanded their position in India, moving inland from coastal trading towns like Bombay and Calcutta, and playing off rival local rulers. In 1803 they took Delhi, seat of the once-powerful

Lewis, *The Middle East and the West*, 103.

POLITICAL IMPACT OF WEST

Mughal dynasty. Thus entrenched on the subcontinent, and warned by Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, they began to take a closer interest in the Near East, notably the Indian Ocean coast of the Arabian peninsula. They signed their first treaty with the pirate shaykhs of the Persian Gulf in 1820, and followed it up in 1853 with a permanent truce which was to give to the area the name Trucial 'Umān. They established a coaling station at Aden in 1839 to support a monthly steamer service from Egypt to India. Toward the end of the century they confirmed and rounded out their system of treaties, with the 'Umānī sultans at Masqaṭ and Zanzibar in 1890–1, with Baḥrayn in 1892, and with Kuwayt in 1899. Meanwhile, the French conquered Algeria after 1830, established a protectorate over Tunisia in 1881, and, together with Spain, another over Morocco in 1912. The British occupation of Egypt, French conquest of the Sahara, British rule over northern Nigeria and Italy's annexation of Libya in 1912 completed the European conquest of Islamic Africa. At the opposite end of the Islamic region, the Russians subdued the Mongol-descended khans of Kazan and Astrakhān as early as the mid-sixteenth century, annexed the Crimea in 1783, conquered Baku in 1806 and proceeded to expand into Central Asia, where they incorporated the khanates of Bukhārā, Khīva and Khokand between 1868 and 1876.

Nowhere in its five-hundred year history did European imperialism encounter such determined resistance as in these Muslim countries of Asia and Africa. Religious brotherhoods and nomadic tribes with their tight social organization often furnished the most effective leadership and inaccessible deserts and mountains the most favourable setting. 'Abd al-Qādir, a shaykh of the Qādirī order, fought the French in Algeria until 1847. Shaykh Shāmīl, a Naqshbandī in Dāghistān in the northern Caucasus, resisted the tsarist forces for nearly thirty years until his capture in 1859; the neighbouring Circassians, Chechens and Ossetians proved almost equally tenacious. The uprising of the Mahdi and his followers in the Sudan (1881–98) involved Britain in one of its most serious colonial wars, their initial success being symbolized by the death of General Gordon and capture of Khartoum. The Pathan tribesmen of the North-West Frontier kept the British Indian army in a perpetual alert for most of a century. In Cyrenaica, the Italians encountered tribesmen of the Sanūsī order, in Morocco the Spaniards fought the Berber tribes (Kabyles) under 'Abd al-Karīm. It also seems significant in this context that Muslim Algeria, along with Indochina and Cyprus, has been one of the few areas where colonial rule was terminated

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

as a result of guerrilla warfare; and that of the three, the Algerian war was the most protracted, and the only one fought against a large group of colonial settlers.

Despite such fierce opposition, all Muslim countries except for Albania, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and the Arabian peninsula had come under European domination by 1920. In some areas the colonial power acted through acquiescent local rulers, in others through its colonial officials alone. The Russians, carrying their conquests overland, generally annexed them outright, brought in settlers and assimilated some of the population. The French sponsored large-scale settlement only in North Africa and relied on direct rule except in Tunisia and Morocco. The British, with their love of precedent and of the exotic, took great pains to work out a variety of 'indirect' arrangements—with sultans in Malaya, Brunei and Zanzibar, with maharajas in the Indian princely states, with *amirs* in northern Nigeria and with shaykhs on the Arabian coast. To give one of the more curious examples, the Sudan after 1899 was governed under what its author aptly described as a 'hybrid form of government hitherto unknown to international jurisprudence'.¹ The fiction of an Anglo-Egyptian 'condominium' was symbolized mainly by an Egyptian flag flying next to the Union Jack over government buildings. In Cairo, a 'viceroy' ruled under the deceptively unassuming title of 'British agent and consul-general'; whereas the sultan in Istanbul, who was supposedly sovereign over Egypt and perhaps the Sudan as well, had to content himself with an annual payment of tribute. None of these legalistic niceties, however, made much difference to the realities of foreign control.

A fundamentally different pattern of imperial domination developed only in Egypt and in the Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent. In these countries, imperial hegemony was established at a time when many Europeans had already developed a sensitive conscience about Europe's earlier colonial expansion and when the Near Eastern political *élite* had already been converted to such Western political ideals as liberalism, constitutionalism and nationalism. The British government announced its occupation of Egypt in 1882 as a temporary measure to protect the interests of the foreign bondholders; in 1887 it signed an agreement with the Ottoman empire promising evacuation within three years or as soon as the war in the Sudan should be terminated. In the Fertile Crescent foreign rule was established after Britain, in its wartime nego-

¹ Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt* (London, 1916), ii, 115.

tiation with the *Sharīf* Ḥusayn, had encouraged aspirations for an independent and united Arab kingdom, and after Woodrow Wilson, in the twelfth of his Fourteen Points, had promised the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman empire 'an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development'. Syria-Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine (including what later became known as Transjordan) all were made into so-called class 'A' mandates, and with regard to the first two it was specifically provided that organic laws should be framed within three years and that the mandatory power should facilitate 'their progressive development . . . as independent states'.

The ideas of self-determination and representative government, which Wilsonian propaganda so emphatically reiterated had found wide acceptance among Near Eastern leaders. Constitutional charters were proclaimed in Tunis, Roumania and Egypt in the 1860s. Midḥat Pasha, 'Urābī and the Persian revolutionaries of 1905–6 all had championed time-tested Western devices of representative and responsible government in an effort to restrain the financial extravagance of rulers and their consequent subservience to foreign powers. In the early twentieth century, and especially after the Balkan Wars, nationalist ideas had taken root among Turks and Arabs. When Near Eastern spokesmen after the First World War rejected foreign domination, they rejected it with liberal arguments of universal currency in the West. Other Near Easterners, nevertheless, were inclined to take at face value the statements of early advocates of the mandate system who made it sound very much like what today we call economic and technical assistance. For example, the mayor, *qāḍī*, *muftī* and other notables of Damascus on 26 May 1919, informed an American commission of inquiry headed by Messrs King and Crane that they preferred 'complete independence' in principle but that 'for financial and economic reasons, a mandate was . . . desirable', and that they therefore 'urged that the United States take the mandate'. On that same day Damad Ferīd Pasha, the anglophile grand *vezīr*, upbraided a speaker in the sultan's Council in Istanbul for confusing the terms 'American mandate' and 'American protectorate', allowing only the first to be discussed as a way out of the defeated empire's predicament. And a few months later, Muṣṭafā Kemāl himself, at the Turkish nationalist congress of Sivas, had to tax his ingenuity to forestall any pronouncement in favour of an American mandate.¹

¹ Harry N. Howard, *The King-Crane Commission* (Beirut, 1963), 108; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Millî mücadele başlarken*, i (Istanbul, 1959), 107; [Kemal Atatürk,] *A Speech Delivered by Ghażī Mustapha Kemal* (Leipzig, 1929), 100.

In practice the mandates were imposed by traditional techniques of military conquest, just as the 'temporary' British occupation of Egypt lasted four decades, and in parts of the country until early 1956. The Turco-Russian War of 1877–8 and the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, coming as they did in the wake of the Ottoman and Persian constitutions, indicated that the mere adoption of Western institutions was unlikely to ward off foreign interference and military defeat. In Egypt and in Syria that same lesson was reinforced by actual occupation. In Syria, the confrontation of nationalism and colonialism was particularly dramatic: French troops occupied the hills around Damascus, and even before the expiry of a perfunctory ultimatum began shelling the city, where a nationalist assembly had proclaimed the *Sharif* Husayn's son, Fayṣal, king of Syria. In the following years, the French aggravated Arab resentment by a cynical divide-and-rule policy designed to play the Lebanese Christians, the coastal 'Alawis and the Druzes in the mountains against the Sunnī Arab majority. In Palestine, the British outraged Arab sensibilities by including in the terms of the mandate Balfour's promise of support for 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people'. In contrast to most other colonial areas, foreign rule in Palestine was to be accompanied by foreign colonization.

In view of these realities, Western pronouncements on self-determination and democracy, on temporary occupation and on the educational theory of the mandate inevitably came to have a hollow, insincere ring in Near Eastern ears. Western liberalism and constitutionalism clearly were not intended for export. 'Temporary' occupation in Egypt and mandates in the Fertile Crescent turned out to be colonial rule under another name—nothing, in fact, but colonialism with a bad conscience. For several decades after 1882 and 1920, Arab resentment and European bad conscience reinforced each other. The admittedly temporary nature of the foreign régime prevented both rulers and subjects from fully and frankly adjusting to it; hence both sides came to rely on force in dealings with each other. A perceptive observer has suggested that the British might more quickly have terminated an Egyptian occupation intended as permanent than one that was proclaimed as 'temporary' from the start.¹ In India, in more than two centuries of British rule, an indigenous class of civil servants and military officers had grown up, who effectively supported the

¹ John Marlowe, *Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800–1953* (London, 1954), 253.

imperial system. In the Arab countries it proved far more difficult for the British and French to enlist local co-operation.

Just as Western rule had been imposed by force on Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, so it was attenuated, and at length withdrawn, in response to the threat or application of superior force. When Ottoman Turkey entered the First World War, the British were fearful of the response that pan-Islamic propaganda and the Turkish call for a *jihād* might find in Egypt. To sever Egypt's legal connexion with an enemy ruler, they converted their 'temporary occupation' into a 'protectorate', but coupled this change with a promise of full independence after the war. The Egyptian nationalist uprising of 1919 brought to the scene the Milner commission, which recommended direct dealings with Sa'd Zaghlūl (who had previously been exiled) and his Wafd party. Because of continuing disagreements over future relations between the two countries, Britain in 1922 issued a unilateral statement in which she declared Egypt independent in name, but reserved such far-reaching powers in foreign and military affairs as to deny the substance of independence. Only when Italian expansion confronted British and Egyptians with a common threat was a mutually agreed formula worked out in the treaty of 1936. In 1921 when the Hashimites assembled troops to invade Syria, the British diverted their ambitions by making Fayṣal king of Iraq, and 'Abd Allāh *amir* of Transjordan—i.e., the eastern part of Palestine which they henceforth exempted from the provisions of the Balfour Declaration. A widespread Arab uprising in Palestine in 1937 prompted them to impose sharp limitations on Jewish immigration. Needless to say, each such concession tended to whet Arab nationalist appetites even further.

Allied policy in the Fertile Crescent in the Second World War repeated the political tactics that Britain had applied in Egypt in the First. Each tightening of control was accompanied by promises of more generous post-war treatment. Thus, the British in 1941 with some difficulty suppressed a pro-Axis *coup* in Iraq, and, together with the Free French, occupied the Levant states; at the same time, however, they issued a solemn promise of post-war independence for Syria and Lebanon and publicly offered 'support to any scheme [of Arab unity] that commands general approval'.¹ Britain's withdrawals from Palestine in 1948, and

¹ The statements were contained in the De Gaulle-Lyttleton Agreement of 7 August 1941, and Anthony Eden's speech at Mansion House the preceding 29 May; see J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, 1956), ii, 231, 236.

from Suez in 1954, were prompted not only by the changed strategic situation after the loss of India and by American and other foreign pressures, but also by prolonged guerrilla warfare in both countries. Only in Iraq and in Jordan did the British succeed in establishing a friendlier pattern of co-operation with local political forces; hence by a series of treaties (with Iraq in 1930 and 1955, and with Jordan in 1946) the mandate status was converted into a more bilateral relationship. The price of such co-operation, however, was the increasing discredit of the anglophile ruling groups among the vocally nationalist segments of their own population. In Jordan, King Ḥusayn has since 1955 been able to ride out the storm. In Iraq the old order was restored through British intervention in 1941, but in the 1958 revolution it totally collapsed.

Since the end of the Second World War, the Muslim countries have fully participated in the world-wide transition from colonialism to sovereignty. At the end of the First World War, there were only six independent Muslim states (Albania, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Yemen and Sa'udi Arabia—the latter formed in 1925 through the annexation of the Ḥijāz to Najd). In the inter-war period, Egypt (1922) and Iraq (1932) were recognized as independent, although their sovereignty remained in fact rather restricted until the 1950s. In the last two decades, as many as twenty states with an exclusively or largely Muslim population have been formed in formerly colonial or dependent territories. The only durable legacy of European colonialism in the Muslim region, on the other hand, is Russian rule over Āzarbāyjān and Central Asia.

Two centuries or more have passed since the modern Western impact on the peoples of Islam first reverberated through the battle-fields of Hungary, of the Crimea and of Bengal. In that time, both Muslims and Westerners have undergone a profound transformation. Among Muslims, some were able to resist Western aggression by borrowing from the West's arsenal of artillery, of administration, of political concepts and of social ideals. Others succumbed, and had many of the same Western devices and principles more directly imposed upon them. But the distinction between defensive modernizers and colonial subjects has now disappeared: the heirs of both are engaged in propelling the modern revolution into the remote recesses of the House of Islam. Just as Muslims have won national independence, so the Westerners have lost their monopoly of power. Modern technology and modern organization which were first developed in Europe, now are shared with its descendants and disciples in North America, Russia, Japan and China,

POLITICAL IMPACT OF WEST

and they are ardently desired and emulated by its former subjects in Asia and Africa. Perhaps for the first time since the seventh century A.D. the historical ground thus has been cleared for a new relationship between the West and Islam—one based not on hostility or domination but on equality and co-operation. But the resentments of the past are slow to abate and emulation of Western technology and organization easily leads to new frustrations. Whether and when such a more equal relationship will grow up and what forms it will take is in the hands of future generations.

CHAPTER 7

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE

In the second and third quarters of the twentieth century the Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa began the process of breaking up an economic and social pattern that had been established, in most of them, a century earlier by a combination of European influences and native responses. The continuous display of European power from the end of the eighteenth century aroused the Muslim world to an appreciation of modern science, technology, and social and political organization. It aroused it also to self-defence through emulation of European society in order to acquire the means to overcome foreign control, or through regeneration of the traditional system of life and thought in order to withstand the intrusions. In the course of these varied responses, sometimes alternating and sometimes simultaneous, new leaders of Muslim peoples have sprung up since the early nineteenth century, changing the basis of political power and introducing reforms in the conduct of government and then in economic and social affairs. Further unplanned changes have taken place in consequence of these imposed ones.

During the nineteenth century, Europe penetrated the Muslim countries in several ways. A combination of military and political power led to varying degrees of European influence in North Africa, Egypt and the eastern portion of the Ottoman empire, ranging from outright occupation to certain preferential arrangements. Indigenous political leaders, however, still retained some power both to resist militarily and to introduce social, economic and political measures to reform their domains. They sent hundreds of students to be educated in Europe. They tried to modernize their armed forces. Meanwhile, European governments supported their nationals in economically penetrating the Muslim countries through banking, public utilities, transport and manufacturing. In several regions of the Ottoman empire the old pattern of the state's or rulers' monopoly of land ownership was ended by the creation of a landed class (with large holdings) of private individuals and families closely connected with those in political power.

It is this socio-economic and political pattern which the twentieth century has broken. European political influence in Turkey, for

example, was receding in the early twentieth century, even while Europe was still to gain influence in the Fertile Crescent under the League of Nations mandates after the First World War. But in the second quarter of this century this influence too began to wane until, in the fifteen years following the Second World War, the Muslim countries achieved political independence. At first they retained the Western political structure of parliaments, parties and elections; a few years later these were abandoned in several countries. By the 1960s the Muslim world of western Asia and North Africa was largely divided between military republics and traditional monarchies, each striving to modernize in economic and social life. Such efforts have included the expansion of education at all levels and the sending of thousands of students to Europe and North America, the adoption of measures to industrialize at a faster pace, the enactment of welfare legislation, and land reform.

The state has played a leading role in these efforts, varying from encouragement of private enterprise in Turkey and Morocco, for example, to expropriation of private industry in Egypt and Algeria. Two processes have broken the economic basis of the power of foreign governments and individuals as well as of the native landed class. First, nationalization of two sorts has taken place: the transfer of capital from European governments and private individuals to native persons, and the transfer of private local capital (first that of the minorities, then of native Muslims as well) to the state. Second, in some countries more than others, large agricultural estates have been expropriated by government and sold, on easy terms, in small plots, to peasants who previously owned little or no land. Thus the pattern of economic and social power, created in the nineteenth century in both the cities and the countryside, has been broken—completely in Egypt and Algeria, considerably in Turkey, Tunisia, Iraq, Syria and Persia, and only incipiently in Morocco, Jordan, Afghanistan, Sa‘udi Arabia and Libya.

The political power thus lost by foreign governments and individuals and by the native upper classes has gone to the state. At the same time, social changes have occurred which bring into question many traditional authorities, including the state. The development of secular education and the growth in the media of communication have loosened but not eliminated the control of the individual formerly exerted by religion, family and locale. Thus far, however, in most of the Muslim countries the state has been able to retain its control through force and indoctrination. All rulers face the problem of how to release the energies of the

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

people for social and economic advance without weakening all authority. The military and civilian autocracies face the additional problem of how to release such energies without creating demands for democracy; that is, how to free individuals from 'reactionary' authority without freeing them also from the state itself.

ECONOMIC CHANGE

Even before Europe began to penetrate the Muslim world directly in the modern period, the products of Europe's developing manufactures had already, by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, begun to appear in the Middle East, and by the nineteenth century had become a major economic issue. Cheap textiles, especially, adversely affected native industry and crafts. Penetration became more direct when Europeans later made loans to Middle Eastern rulers and governments. In the latter part of the century European capital gained concessions for the provision of public utility services, the establishment of transport and communications systems and then some mining and manufacturing. Most of these undertakings enjoyed monopolistic privileges and hence dependable yields on capital. A half-century or more later this sequence was approximately repeated in much of North Africa.

The reaction to Europe's power and example was not long in coming, first in the centre of the Ottoman empire, and then in its outpost in Egypt. In the late eighteenth century, Selim III introduced reforms to strengthen the empire against European incursions. Sultan Maḥmūd II ruled the Ottomans from 1808 to 1839, while in Egypt Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha won autonomy for that Ottoman territory and ruled from 1805 to 1848. Both autocrats destroyed old institutions, customs and safeguards as they forced reforms in military organization, education and administration. Muḥammad 'Alī, though nominally a subject of the sultan, was the innovator in these fields as well as in economic and social change. He established large monopolistic industrial enterprises of which he made himself the sole owner. He further weakened the guilds of masters and journeymen, as he did all independent agencies standing between himself and the masses of his subjects. In commerce he either held monopolies himself, or he gave foreign merchants certain privileges in return for their favours. His agrarian policy was to expropriate the land held by the former rulers, the Mamluks, to make it state land, and to redistribute it to the members of his own family, high officials whom he controlled, and later to peasants. He developed cotton

as a commodity for export and made Egypt a one-crop economy dependent upon the world market. With the help of foreign technicians, he also developed irrigation and transport.

After the deaths of Maḥmūd II and Muḥammad 'Alī, this impulse to modernization continued in Istanbul but flagged in Cairo. Ottoman involvement with Europe led to considerable indebtedness (especially in the effort to finance the Ottoman part in the Crimean War), and then to European financial control in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1875 the Ottoman government defaulted on its foreign debt of 200 million pounds sterling. An Administration of the Public Debt was created in 1881 to safeguard the investments of thousands of European bondholders. Nominally part of the Ottoman government, the Administration was largely independent of the Finance Ministry, many of whose functions it pre-empted. It collected revenues, which it used to redeem the debt. Controlling the country's finances, the Administration was able to encourage even more European investment in Turkey. Meanwhile, Egypt was going through a similar process. In 1876 the ruler could no longer meet payments on the rising debt, then nearly 100 million pounds sterling. A *Caisse de la Dette publique* was immediately created to represent the European creditors; soon after, an Englishman was appointed to supervise the collection of revenue and a Frenchman to supervise expenditure. A European Commission of Inquiry into the country's financial condition, appointed in 1878, prepared the next year's budget. In the same year the Europeans found the 'dual control' inadequate and placed two Europeans in the Egyptian cabinet, an Englishman as minister of Finance and a Frenchman as minister of Public Works. Thus Europeans controlled revenue and expenditure while the Commission arranged for the payments to Egypt's creditors; the Commission's consent was required for new loans. In Persia, British-Russian rivalry became intense in the early nineteenth century as Britain sought to promote its commercial interests there and to protect its route to India while Russia sought territorial and financial advantage over this weak neighbour. In the last quarter of the century the familiar process of concessions and loans gave the two European powers considerable influence, which increased down to the Second World War.

Further penetration of the Middle East by European capital followed during a period of relative stability. Egyptians, Syrians and Turks gained some familiarity with Western industry, commerce and finance,

although throughout the region Europeans and native Christians dominated the modern urban economy, while the land was tilled and owned mostly by native Muslims. This pattern prevailed in Turkey (and in Persia to some extent) until just after the First World War, in the Arab East until the Second World War, and in North Africa until the late 1950s, when these countries were able to control their own political and economic policy and organization.

Acting upon a century of reform recently accelerated under the régime of the Young Turks, Turkey used the First World War as an opportunity to advance its economic independence of the European powers and to promote the interests of Turks as against those of non-Muslim Levantines—Greeks, Armenians and Jews. The government ended the privileges of foreigners, and required companies enjoying concessions to keep their records in the Turkish language. Such policies opened employment opportunities to Muslim Turks. At the same time, the government called in many foreign high-level advisers, whose functions did not reduce opportunities for Turks, but were intended to increase them by increasing economic activity and efficiency. These foreign technicians now came from Germany and Austria, for Turkey was fighting against Britain and France. Finally, the government in 1915 widened a law of 1909 for the encouragement of industry, offering to native capital free land, tax-exemption for a time and freedom from certain import and export duties. It also required factories to employ only Turkish citizens, except in technical posts requiring skills that could be found only abroad. These measures were designed rapidly to change the character of both capital and labour, and hence of political and social power as well. In 1915, for example, an official inquiry revealed that Greeks and Armenians supplied seventy per cent of the capital and seventy-five per cent of the labour in the nearly three hundred factories (half in Istanbul) then accounting for most of the modern manufacturing sector.

The wartime measures were followed by the defeat of Turkey and the humiliating treaty of Sèvres in 1920. The Kemalist revolution began around the same time, sweeping away first the discredited Ottoman rulers and then the foreigners, and giving Turks, with the treaty of Lausanne in 1923, almost full control over their land. This political mastery was the basis of a resurgence of economic and social change, under Atatürk, designed to make Turkey a modern, secular, industrial country.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE

A similar but less extensive process of political reorganization took place a few years later in Persia under Rīzā Khān, a military officer who overthrew the government in 1921 and four years later became shah. He, too, strengthened the army and tried to unify the country, stabilize its finances, introduce modern industry and social patterns, and reduce the economic influence of foreigners. The Second World War, however, brought back foreign control, as the British and Russians invaded the country to prevent the spread of German power under Hitler and to supply Russia from the south. It was not until the evacuation of all foreign troops after the war, and the government's assumption of control over oil resources, that Persia regained that full sovereignty in political and economic affairs which has enabled it to proceed with a policy of economic and social modernization.

In the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire—Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine—French and British influence was firmly established after the First World War, and continued by means of the League of Nations mandates and then preferential treaties and military occupation down to the Second World War. During that war they, along with Egypt, lacked the autonomy that had enabled Turkey to reduce foreign influence. Indeed, foreign control in the Arab lands (as in Persia) increased because of the Allied strategic interest in denying the area to the Germans. There was much ideological hostility to Britain and France, as well as doubt that Germany could be stopped; there was consequently considerable sentiment, especially in Egypt, for using the Allied troubles as an occasion to push for greater independence. In order to keep the area supplied and to reduce civilian hardship, which might create a favourable atmosphere for resistance if not outright rebellion, the British in 1941 established the Middle East Supply Centre. The Americans joined this economic-military venture the following year.

Each government in the area regularly sent to Centre headquarters in Cairo a list of its civilian needs. These were supplied on a much lower scale than in peacetime, and rationed according to shipping space available. Attempts were also made to increase agricultural productivity in the area, but little was done to develop local industry. The main purpose of the Allies was to keep the area supplied with the greatest economy of resources and effort; hence the authorities relied mainly upon private traders, with the result that the Middle Eastern governments and merchants made very large profits. These gains were not appropriately taxed because governments hesitated to use force to collect taxes from

profiteers on a trade that was so vital to stability, and the governmental machinery in the area was incapable of that task anyway. The long-range economic effects were thus not beneficial and even the experience of regional planning was limited in value because it was tied so closely to war needs ultimately determined and executed from abroad; in any case, the co-operation did not long survive the war which had fostered it in the first place. The Centre's policy of restricting imports of finished products did, however, lead to some expansion of domestic industry.

We have just reviewed the growth of national independence in economic policy in different parts of the Middle East. Another very important process was going on during roughly the same period between the mid-nineteenth century and the two World Wars. This was the introduction of modern transport and communications, which are so necessary to modern agriculture and industry and which have also had important effects upon social life.

Modern transport and communications were often developed in the Middle East as a result of military and political considerations, and the needs of foreign powers, rather than out of purely local commercial requirements. Ports and fleets were constructed in the nineteenth century with foreign capital to accommodate increasing trade, and were gradually expanded and then nationalized following the two World Wars. The most important and fateful project was the building of the Suez Canal mainly with French and British capital. Opened in 1869, the Canal was the culmination of one era of European commercial expansion and heralded another in Africa and the Far East. Very soon it became highly profitable for its European owners as well as for the Egyptian government; even ordinary Egyptians received some benefit in the form of wages and through the money spent by European employees of the Canal. Egyptians regarded the Canal, nevertheless, as a political liability to themselves. In the midst of a political crisis the Egyptian government nationalized the Canal in 1956 and assumed full ownership, control and operation.

The first railways were constructed in the 1850s in Turkey and Egypt. In other countries the lines came only much later and after the introduction of motor and air transport, which reduced the need for rail facilities. Iraq's state railway system developed during the First World War. A railway across Persia was completed only in 1938. Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have few lines, though the one between Beirut and Damascus was constructed in the early 1890s. Egyptian railways steadily

expanded in the nineteenth century and then around the Second World War, after which they were nationalized. In Turkey railways have been more highly developed than in Egypt and were also nationalized earlier, largely in the 1930s. Roads for motor transport are inadequate throughout the Middle East. Egypt and Turkey have the greatest mileage; Turkey's mileage exceeds Egypt's, but the latter's system has more first-class roads. Most countries in the region have extensive plans for building highways, but these have not been carried out rapidly enough to meet the needs of the more easily increased numbers of cars, trucks and buses. Foreign needs and activity have been especially important in road building: French in Syria and Lebanon, American in Turkey, and British, American and Russian in Persia.

Air transport was introduced in the Middle East just after the First World War, not long after its development in the West. A French-Roumanian concession established a short-lived service in Turkey in 1922, and four years later a state-supported line was inaugurated. Egypt's main airline was begun in 1933. Both these lines, as well as those of other Middle Eastern countries, have had close financial and operational ties with various Western lines. Gradually the Middle Eastern governments have fully nationalized and extended their airlines, but some still retain their connexions with Western companies.

Turkey was the first Middle Eastern country to have a telegraph service; it was introduced by the British and French in 1855, at the time of the Crimean War. In two decades or so the service reached virtually the whole of the Ottoman empire, and there were links to Europe as well. Egypt was quick to follow, and had an extensive system well before the end of the nineteenth century. A few years before the First World War a telephone service was introduced into Turkey, at first for government use only and then for private subscribers; even today, despite a great increase in use, service throughout the area is not widespread or efficient. The Turks were the first to nationalize the telegraph, by making it a state enterprise, and by making communication in Turkish possible.

Though there were a few official gazettes that functioned as newspapers in the early nineteenth century, it was only in the period 1860–80, after the introduction of telegraphic communication, that modern independent newspapers came into existence in the Middle East. The Crimean War had occasioned a desire for news both in Europe and the Middle East; telegraphy made it possible to satisfy this desire more rapidly. As newspapers became more than official gazettes, new problems

arose. The unofficial press being an innovation, Ottoman rulers did not look with favour upon it in the Arab provinces. Egypt, not subject to control from Istanbul, became the refuge for enterprising, talented Arab publishers and journalists from Syria and Lebanon. In recent years the number of readers has greatly increased, but the proliferation of papers has kept the circulation of most rather low. After having gone through a long period of relative freedom of the press since the turn of the century or since the First World War, newspapers have again become, in many countries of the Middle East, little more than the government organs they were in the early nineteenth century. The difference is that the press was then largely an organ of official information, while it has now tended to become largely an organ of official propaganda.

Radio and cinema are communications media usually associated primarily with entertainment, but in the Middle East they have been operated and closely supervised by government. Introduced in the 1930s, radio has reached very large audiences only since the Second World War. Television was introduced in Egypt in 1960, and then in other countries. The importance of radio is obvious in a region with very high rates of illiteracy. It was used extensively in the propaganda war between the Allies and the Axis powers before and during the Second World War. With the cheap production of transistor sets since then, radio coverage is growing rapidly and may soon approach, at least in some countries, that of Europe. Radio transmission is extensive, and several governments take full political advantage of its appeal to the masses. As nationalism and political disputes have grown, régimes have increasingly resorted to radio as means of consolidating public opinion in their own domains and of turning it against the rulers elsewhere. The cinema has been devoted primarily to entertainment, but governments have exercised close control over it out of moral and political considerations. Most films shown to the increasing audiences are American and European. Only Egypt produces films locally in any volume.

In recent years the time-lapse between a technological innovation in the West and its introduction in the Middle East has declined. Sa'udi Arabia, for example, just being carried into the modern age by its oil economy, has telescoped the development of its media of transport and communication into a very brief space of time. When in 1945 King 'Abd al-'Aziz accepted President Roosevelt's gift of an aeroplane, he had to persuade the jurists that it was not prohibited by Muslim law. In

a few years, several airports and dozens of planes were serving a number of inland and port cities. Meanwhile, in 1948, work began on the first railroad (not counting the defunct Hijāz Railway from Medina to the north, constructed by the Ottomans before the First World War); in 1951 the 300-odd-mile line between Dammām and Riyāḍ was opened. Around the same time modern roads were constructed between the leading cities. In 1952 a Ministry of Communications was created, which improved postal service and expanded telegraphic and telephone service. Television followed soon afterward. These projects were financed through royalties from the activity of the Arabian American Oil Company and with the company's technological aid.

On the basis of this modernization of transport and communications, achieved with varying degrees of foreign participation, the more or less independent countries of the Middle East tried to build up modern industry after the First World War. They regarded industrialization as the key to a rising standard of living and to national power, and so one country after another enacted laws for the encouragement of industry which offered tax exemptions and other advantages to native capital. Such measures were necessary precisely because conditions were not conducive to the growth of industry. Entrepreneurship, private or public, was not geared to manufacturing. Raw materials, as well as engineering and administrative skills, were lacking. Literacy was limited. Political life did not induce confidence in the future. The prevailing atmosphere thus combined with tradition to perpetuate the investment of capital in land, trade, and in substantial manufacturing ventures that were highly protected.

With the laws to encourage industry went, in some cases, the creation of special financial instruments. As early as 1917 Turkey founded the National Credit Bank, in which both administration and stock-holding were limited to Turkish nationals, in order to finance private and public enterprises. Though much was made of the few companies established with its aid, this effort was not successful. During the Atatürk revolution and as part of its policy of etatism, Turkey established the Sümerbank to help to finance industry, and the Etibank to help in mining and energy projects. In 1920 a private Egyptian bank was formed, the Misr Bank, which played a very important role in the growth of industry. By the time it was nationalized in 1960, the Misr group, already quasi-public in character, included large and flourishing enterprises in textiles, chemicals, mining, transport and insurance.

Under these influences, foreign and domestic, modern industry has advanced, as has modern agriculture to a lesser degree. In the 1920s, Turkey's contribution to world industrial production rose. In the half-decade after the Second World War its rate of economic growth was considerable, and it then declined towards the late 1950s. Industrial output increased greatly in Egypt in the 1930s, partly as a result of the application of the first protective tariff. Previously, international agreements had prohibited Egypt from imposing such tariffs. Output was expanded during and after the Second World War, mainly in already familiar lines such as textiles, cement, foods, leather and certain chemicals. Some new products were added, and an additional impetus to output came with the new régime's great emphasis upon modern industry after 1952. In most other countries, however, modern industry began on a very small scale only around the Second World War. It must be remembered, moreover, that large percentage increases are misleading because the base is so small that even a little growth yields large relative gains.

A significant and persistent feature of industry (as of all economic activity) in the Middle East is the intimate role of the state. Recent accelerated movements toward state ownership are thus not contrary to local tradition, though the extent of such trends in Egypt in the early 1960s is rather extreme even for the Middle East. State monopolies of the manufacture of tobacco, matches and alcohol, for example, are found in many countries, while in others the state owns additional enterprises not regarded in other regions as especially connected with the public interest. Private enterprise, however, did play an important role. In Egypt, for example, the first modern entrepreneurs were foreigners, foreign residents, or members of minority groups, who invested in public utilities, transport and factories to process raw materials. Before the end of the nineteenth century, native Egyptians were participating in such ventures and in banking and trade. Just before and after the First World War, the number of Egyptian entrepreneurs and investors increased considerably, turning to industry from land-ownership, politics and government service. Through all these periods, these private interests enjoyed government protection in the form of monopoly rights, tariff walls, a free hand regarding labour, and those myriad benefits of doubtful legality that accrue from the close connexion between wealth and political power. The joint-stock company in such circumstances was a more widespread and influential form of

enterprise than Egypt's level of economic development would have suggested.

During the 1930s, under the impact of the world-wide depression and following the example of the U.S.S.R., Turkey adopted the policy of etatism, state direction of the economy, in order to achieve prosperity in a short time. Economists severely criticized Turkish governmental economic planning and activity, yet some impetus was given to industry by this deliberate effort. By the 1950s the share of the public sector in capital formation had fallen to, and was stabilized at, about a quarter of the total. In Egypt, meanwhile, a similar non-doctrinaire approach to economic development was adopted. The share of the public sector in capital formation rose from about a fifth to two-fifths between 1950 and 1952, even before the military revolution. After it, the public sector's share continued to grow, reaching a half in 1954 and three-fifths in 1956.

In the early 1960s, Egypt went further in the direction of state ownership and control, aiming not only to alter its own economy and society, but expecting to influence other Arab régimes to move in the same direction. As Egypt's rulers turned toward the U.S.S.R. for military and economic aid, they adopted a policy of non-alignment in international relations and socialism in domestic economy. The Suez War of 1956 and the Congo crisis of 1960 were the occasions for the sequestration of considerable assets owned by foreigners and members of certain minority groups. In 1961 came measures which affected Egyptian Muslim owners of wealth too, placing most of the economy, including trade, in the hands of the government. Private enterprise was, nevertheless, given a nominal place in the new scheme of things. Under the influence of moves towards increasing economic competition in Marxist Yugoslavia, the Egyptian theoreticians of Arab Socialism spoke of the opportunities and responsibilities of 'non-exploiting national capital' to contribute to total production and to provide healthy competition for the public sector. Little scope, however, was left to 'national capital', except in small-scale agriculture. Turkey, meanwhile, having already gone through such a period of distrust of private capital, national or foreign, was in the 1950s reverting to the encouragement of the private sector through state action.

Suspicion of the role of private capital in the Middle East has been the result of its privileged position in domestic life, and of its traditional close connexion with foreign governments, foreigners, resident foreigners and minorities. Middle Eastern governments under native

Muslim control have feared that encouragement of private enterprise would only mean the perpetuation of the economic power of foreigners and non-Muslims, who traditionally controlled banking, trade and manufacture. The new régimes, beginning with Atatürk in the 1920s in Turkey, and continuing with Nasser (Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir) in the 1950s in Egypt and with new leaders in Algeria, Syria, and Iraq in the 1960s, have stressed state control and ownership. Turkey has emerged from this position as foreign economic influences have receded, and it may be that other Middle Eastern states will follow a similar path. Etatism in Turkey helped produce not only managers of public enterprises but also private entrepreneurs and managers, who, when politics became freer in the late 1940s, joined other classes in opposing the continuation of state action on the same scale. Arab Socialism, however, does not seem to be moving in this direction.

Beginning with Turkey in the 1930s, almost all Middle Eastern countries have been attracted to economic and social planning. Turkey, Egypt and Persia have had the best-trained staffs in the region, but even their planning mechanisms have revealed serious weaknesses. In Turkey and Persia, to begin with, the planning goals and apparatus have become matters of political dispute, and this has reduced their effectiveness; in Egypt, the scope for political manoeuvring has been so narrow that the planners have not been able to exert enough independent influence to become a political issue. Elsewhere, political instability has deprived planning of even a minimum of continuity. In varying degrees throughout the area, moreover, planning has lacked three important features. First, the data on which plans must be based have been far from adequate in amount and reliability. Secondly, instruments for prediction of economic and social trends have not been developed. Thirdly, there has not been enough persistence and ingenuity in the execution of plans; too often the plan itself has satisfied the desire for planning. Some lessons have nevertheless been learned. It is increasingly understood that planners must be given enough freedom to be imaginative and creative (though this degree of freedom is not yet granted), that planning calls not for the haphazard erection of factories unrelated to needs, but for the establishment of a firm basis for industrial growth in a more efficient agriculture, a healthy and educated population, and adequate transport, communication and energy sources.

The general goal of planning has been to create and direct the flow of capital necessary for economic growth. Lack of capital thus remains

one of the greatest limitations upon the economic ambitions of the Muslim countries. At the same time, the continuing need for foreign capital remains a limitation upon their chief political goal, that is, complete independence. The import of foreign capital, in whatever form and from whatever source, has meant the exercise of foreign influence as well. While most Middle Eastern countries fear this influence, they still want the capital. In its National Charter of 1962 Egypt, for example, expressed the view that former colonialist powers have a sort of duty to assist the countries from which they formerly withdrew wealth. Such assistance, it was added, could take three forms, in order of decreasing desirability from the receiving country's point of view: unconditional grants, unconditional loans on easy terms, and investments where unavoidable. During the 1950s the Middle East sought all three forms of aid, including foreign investments permitting the withdrawal of profits; indeed, Afghanistan, Egypt, Persia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the Sudan, Syria and Turkey all enacted laws to encourage the investment of foreign capital, though other actions such as nationalization had the opposite effect.

Since the Second World War several billions of dollars of grants and loans have gone to the region from a variety of sources, but largely from the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The former gave aid mainly to Persia and Turkey and then to Egypt, while the latter, starting later, gave aid chiefly to Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf, meanwhile, received large amounts of Western private and public capital to develop their resources, which have yielded billions of dollars in profits to the investors, in tax revenues to their governments and in royalties to the local governments.

The extent of foreign aid to Turkey and Egypt is impressive. In the period 1948–62 Turkey received over eleven thousand million dollars of foreign exchange, which it used mainly to finance imports but also to repay debts. Though most of this amount came from the export of Turkish goods and sources, more than a third of it, over four thousand million dollars, came from various forms of bilateral and international grants and loans. In turn, nine-tenths of this amount came from the U.S.A. in the form of economic and military aid. From 1952 to 1962, Egypt received about one and three-quarter thousand million dollars of aid, virtually all of it from individual countries in the Western and Eastern blocs. The two largest donors were the U.S.A., which extended 700 million dollars, or forty per cent of the total, mostly in commodities

since 1959, and the U.S.S.R., which since 1958 extended credits amounting to 500 million dollars, or twenty-eight per cent of the total. This aid enabled Egypt since 1956 to finance its imports of capital and consumer goods.

The emergence and expansion of the oil industry, through foreign capital and expertise, is probably the most significant economic process of this century in the Muslim world, though until now its effect upon economic development there has been limited. Not only has it tied more of the Middle East to the world economy, but it has also put the Middle East in the midst of high international politics, sometimes to the region's disadvantage. Western interest in Middle East oil began at the end of the nineteenth century, and the first rapid development of this resource took place in Persia around the First World War. An extraordinary expansion took place after the Second World War, especially in the Persian Gulf. The region's estimated reserves were a fifth of the world's total in the middle 1930s, while actual production was only about six per cent. By the early 1960s, reserves were estimated at three-fifths, while production had risen to a quarter of the world's total. Thus, owing to successful exploration, the vast increase in production has been accompanied by a vast increase in reserves. At the same time, Middle East oil has constituted a growing proportion of world trade in this commodity, reaching three-fifths by 1960. Most of this movement has been to Europe, which has relied upon the Middle East for about three-quarters of its oil. In the 1960s, North African oil became important in the world market and to that region. European and American companies have found large reserves in Algeria and Libya.

The first leading investors in and developers of this huge industry were European private interests and governments, and they were soon followed by American corporations. Gross investment reached a thousand million dollars just after the Second World War, and rapidly rose to over four thousand million dollars by 1960. Middle East oil has been profitable to foreign investors and local governments alike. The yield per well has been one to five hundred times that in the Americas, and cost per barrel has been only a tenth to a quarter of the cost in the West; prices to the buyers, however, have tended to be established more in accordance with the costs of the more dearly produced oil. The result has been that shareholders have received dividends constituting a much larger proportion of gross receipts of the companies than in other kinds of investment. To the countries in which oil has been discovered in

great quantities by foreign explorers, the gains have been no less phenomenal. The leading producers (Baḥrayn, Persia, Iraq, Kuwayt, Qaṭar and Sa'udi Arabia) received over nine thousand million dollars from the oil companies in direct payments from 1948 to 1960. Thereafter these annual payments increased steadily, approaching two thousand million dollars by the mid-1960s. Several countries, moreover, themselves without substantial oil resources, receive large payments in return for the movement of oil through their waters or over their territory. For the producing countries, oil revenue makes up two-fifths to nine-tenths of their annual budgets, and provides over two-thirds of their foreign exchange. In the 1950s, a new relationship between the companies and the governments began, resulting from new sources of supply, changing demand, and a trend toward nationalization. The governments have come together in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to strengthen their position in seeking a larger proportion of the profits.

The oil-producing countries are a perfect case of a dual economy: a small highly modern sector in a broad hinterland of economic backwardness. Though the oil industry has created and transferred vast amounts of wealth, it has not had the penetrating economic impact that might be expected from enterprises of such magnitude. The industry has employed only about 100,000 persons, and this number has not been growing. In the smaller economies like Baḥrayn and Kuwayt, oil workers have made up a fifth or more of the total employed population and a very much larger proportion of those employed in industry. In Iraq and Persia, more populous, advanced and diversified, oil workers have been only one per cent of the total labour force and somewhat more or less than a tenth of all industrial workers. In recent years, native Middle Easterners have constituted an increasing proportion of the persons employed in the industry, reaching two-thirds by the early 1960s. Formerly confined to the low-paying posts requiring little skill, they have, with increasing education and training, occupied a small but growing proportion of the managerial and technical posts. Wages and other conditions of labour are in general superior to those in other industries, for the Western operating companies introduced their more favourable personnel policies, and the local governments found it easier to require or persuade foreign firms to maintain high standards than to impose enlightened policies upon native employers.

The small labour force relative to the economic importance of the oil

industry indicates how difficult it has been for the Middle East to industrialize. All of the countries have found it possible to increase industrial production with varying amounts of foreign capital and technical aid, yet they have found it difficult to expand industry rapidly enough to absorb more than merely a proportionate amount of the annual increase in the labour force. Thus, for example, the index of industrial production in Egypt rose five per cent from 1952 to 1954, while the number of workers in industry rose not quite one per cent. This pattern of increasing industrial production with a stationary proportion of the labour force employed in industry has prevailed for a substantial period in the two most industrialized countries in the region. In Egypt this proportion was 8.2 per cent in 1927, varied little in the next two decades, and stood at 8.6 per cent in 1957. In Turkey the proportion was 9.2 per cent in 1935 and 9.5 per cent twenty years later. Meanwhile the number of industrial workers in each country nearly tripled during roughly the same period.

This enormous increase in the number of industrial workers has brought on the familiar three-cornered relation among labour, government and industry. Labour organization of a primitive sort appeared in the nascent modern industry of Egypt and Turkey just before and after the beginning of the twentieth century. Governments very early regarded trade unions as subversive or, what amounted to the same thing, bent upon sharing the power to determine conditions of life. It was therefore several decades before legislation was enacted to permit the formation of unions, or to require employers to improve working conditions. Such legislation came in most countries in the 1930s and 1940s, but it characteristically gave governments increasing power, which they have fully used to control the trade unions but not so fully to enforce factory laws and minimum wages.

By the 1960s there were perhaps a million organized workers in the Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Such protection as the workers have had, nevertheless, has come largely from legislation. The unions suffer from lack of professional leadership, official suspicion or solicitude, and mass indifference or ignorance. Low wages, poor health and a steadily rising cost of living have kept down initiative and energy. Low productivity has in turn been a factor in keeping wages low. Labour unrest, in these circumstances, has not been manifested in strikes, for they are prohibited almost everywhere and in any case presuppose a higher form of labour organization than exists. Instead, unrest takes the

form of an individual response to dissatisfaction: inefficiency, absenteeism, rapid turnover and habitual complaining to conciliation boards where they exist. Personnel policies of management hardly recognize the benefits and incentives known in more industrial societies, such as bonuses, pensions, rest periods, sanitation and congenial working conditions. Increasingly, these are required by law, and are found in the larger factories, yet most managers in both public and private enterprises seem to assume that such non-monetary considerations are not important to workers. They may indeed be right; to workers not yet inured to industrial life and labour such benefits are remote and uncertain compared with the immediate advantage of wages in cash. Only the worker committed to this new mode of life through familiarity and the lack of alternatives is likely to regard fringe benefits as important.

As Middle Eastern governments assume increasing control over industry, their relation to labour changes. When large factories were owned by foreign capital, governments were willing to enact laws to protect native labour. Some countries, moreover, deliberately shifted to industry the responsibilities elsewhere assumed by public agencies. Thus Egypt has required large employers to provide various welfare services for their workers, including at one time even elementary education. Having satisfied (and created) such expectations, governments that have taken over much of private industry must retain an expensive welfare system. Their willingness to do so reflects their growing determination that industrialization shall be accomplished with the least possible social cost to the urban class least able to protect itself against exploitation.

This concern becomes all the more important in those countries where the massive effort to industrialize has called for attempts to prevent wages and consumption from rising too quickly. Throughout the area, then, labour is becoming more and more the object of official attention, and hence less and less able to develop independent strength in either economic or political affairs.

Another submerged class to which governments have given increasing attention is the peasantry. The exploitation and submergence of this class are proverbial. Changes in régime, new ideologies, westernization, and even alterations in land tenure, had left the peasants in their misery for centuries. In a society and economy which prized land highly, those without political influence or wealth could acquire very little of it. During the nineteenth century, the extent and value of cultivated land

increased as several crops were in greater demand to supply food and raw material for both Middle Eastern and European factories. In the early part of the century, powerful rulers in Egypt and the Ottoman empire took title over vast amounts of land from private interests. Beginning around the middle of the century, rulers assigned the state lands to notables and officials. In some places these favoured classes were only agents for the collection of taxes, but they extended their rights until they were practically full and unrestricted owners. In other places, state land was given in virtual freehold to small and large holders who paid taxes directly to the state. In the late nineteenth century wealthy people in cities—merchants, bankers, manufacturers—began to acquire land, too, on a large scale. In Egypt this group included local and foreign Christians to a greater extent than elsewhere.

By the twentieth century this arrangement of large holdings in the hands of a few private owners (with vast economic power in the countryside and political power in the capital) was accepted as natural and eternal in most of the region. Changes in crops, seeds, fertilizers, tools and marketing were made as agriculture, too, responded to technological and economic change the world over. The expansion of the cultivated land and the increased use of machinery have considerably increased agricultural production. In the 1950s, for example, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq and Persia, which already employed thousands of tractors on the land, resorted to this source of power more than ever. Meanwhile, in Jordan, the Sudan and Syria, where tractors had been numbered only in hundreds, there were thousands by the early 1960s.

Social arrangements in the countryside have been more resistant to change. In the early 1950s, in country after country, two or three per cent of the landholders owned twenty to fifty per cent of the cultivated land. Meanwhile, at the other end of the scale, a large mass of smallholders owned a few acres each or, as in Persia, nearly everyone who worked the land was not even a smallholder but a tenant. In Egypt and Iraq, two-fifths of the owners held less than ten or twelve acres each; in Turkey the proportion was three-fifths, and in Lebanon nearly every owner held such small plots. In Syria there has been a more even distribution of land.

Turkey, the first Muslim country to establish its complete independence of foreign control after the First World War, was also the first to attempt land reform through redistribution in a manner that became widespread in the 1950s. Under Atatürk nearly two million acres were

distributed to landless peasants. A law was passed in 1945 to speed up the process, and, after a slow start, nearly four million acres were distributed in a decade. Land reform was introduced in Iraq and Egypt in the 1940s, but it had little effect. It was not until the revolutionary régime took over in Egypt in 1952 that the Arab countries had a model of serious land reform, which has had considerable effect in Egypt, but less in Iraq and Syria. In 1951 in Persia the shah began the distribution of his private estates, and under the Land Reform Law of 1962 the government began to buy the lands of private owners above a certain maximum and to sell them to the occupying peasants. The limit set (which was later reduced) was one village.

Recent land reforms have three features. First, the government expropriates with compensation all land above a certain maximum holding, and sells small plots, on easy terms, to farmers with little or no land. Secondly, the government organizes the new owners, or encourages them to organize themselves, into co-operatives for loans, purchase of materials and implements, and for the marketing of their products. Finally, the government sometimes establishes safeguards for farm workers and landless tenants. Land reform in Egypt has had a greater impact than elsewhere. After a decade, nearly half a million acres had been transferred to about 163,000 families. Though this acreage was only eight per cent of the total amount cultivated and the number of families not quite eight per cent of all farm families, the land reform has had a political effect out of proportion to this apparently limited economic effect. It has destroyed the economic base of the old class of large landholders, whose political power over the peasants was therefore ended. At the same time, the power this class exercised in the capital was ended with the elimination of political parties and nationalization of urban enterprises. The elimination of this class has not, however, meant the commensurate growth in political and economic influence of the peasants. They have benefited somewhat economically, but the political power lost by the old landlord class has been appropriated by the government, thus reproducing the traditional alliance of soldiers and bureaucrats which prevailed before the creation of a class of powerful freeholders in the nineteenth century.

One serious problem that land reform has failed to solve is that of fragmentation, from which Egypt has suffered most. During the present century the number of farms under one acre in size and the total amount of land they have included have both doubled. Egypt and Turkey have

taken hesitating steps to prevent fragmentation through inheritance, but thus far social custom and religious law have been strong enough to foil these efforts. The encouragement or enforcement of co-operatives is intended to prevent the evils of fragmentation; their success has likewise been limited in this respect.

What has been the result of a hundred years or more of economic change? The Middle East, taken as a whole and ignoring vast internal differences, has (with foreign aid) built up a modern system of communications and transport, achieved a modest beginning in industry, and has only begun to develop modern technology in agricultural production. The region has become part of the modern world economy but has thus far, in strictly economic terms, probably suffered from this relationship as much as it has benefited from it.

SOCIAL CHANGE

In selecting the social changes to emphasize in this section we shall be guided by the same principle which governed the choice of economic changes in the preceding one: to select the changes which both stemmed from and produced events and trends having a serious impact upon the lives of the peoples of the Middle East, and upon their relations with other peoples. We should mention, though we cannot discuss, the question of the relation between the economic and social changes. On this broad and complicated issue we can say here only that these two types of change are intertwined. An economic change like the growth of a transport system certainly affects a social change like the increase in migration. But the development of transport itself requires a certain social attitude and policy, and so is not purely an economic affair. Certain apparently social changes, moreover, like the position of minority groups, have a considerable effect upon the economy.

Another general question we can only touch upon is that of the relation between changes introduced by Western society and those that are more indigenous to the Middle East. Perhaps the greatest change of all has been acceptance by Muslims of the idea that change itself might be necessary or even good. This new idea has been the result of the Muslim world's realization that overwhelming Western scientific, technological and military power could be excluded, resisted or emulated only by societies somewhat similarly organized, and that, apart from matters of

power, Western economic and political institutions offered the hope and means of progress along humanitarian lines as well.

The Western impact has not been uniform in its nature or effect throughout the Middle East. Some sections the West controlled directly, others it influenced from outside. Generally speaking, the direct impact of the West occurred through the introduction of, first, new economic institutions; manufacturing, trade, banking and agricultural methods; and, secondly, new means of public administration broadly conceived; civil and military service, police, public health and finance. Education was one of the few Western innovations which touched social life very directly. In response to these changes, native rulers and *élites* have, especially after achieving complete independence from Europe, introduced even more radical changes in economic and political life, and have gone further to affect social life directly by changing even religious and legal institutions. No foreign invader ever went so far as Atatürk or Nasser in seeking to impose direct and profound change. The shock and example of Bonaparte have been carried on by more determined and more effective native revolutionaries for over a century and a half. In this period the Muslim world has been transformed. It was a traditionalist, static, agricultural-pastoral society governed by an urban class of religious leaders, soldiers and bureaucrats. It is now a dynamic, nascent industrial-urban society still governed mainly by soldiers and bureaucrats, but one in which religious law no longer guides economic and political institutions.

The social changes which stimulate economic changes and are in turn stimulated by them have become familiar in recent centuries in Europe and then in other continents penetrated by Europeans. A new technology, based upon scientific thought, permits further division of labour determined by mechanical and other new forms of energy. The differentiation of occupations, for which increasing training and education are required, stimulates ambition, for new goals can be pursued with a reasonable hope of realizing them. People burst the old boundaries of birth and locale, moving to new employments, new kinds of social status, new places near or far from their origins. Formal education, awareness of the variety of human talents and social forms, and the production or importation of many new and attractive goods stimulate new tastes and desires. Family life changes, as parents no longer want their sons and daughters to follow the traditional ways, and as other institutions—schools, churches, governments—begin to share

the family's task of rearing and training the young. The growth and distribution of population change with increased migration to cities and smaller families. As science and technology affect social values and people's outlook, religion becomes more an ethical imperative and a kind of social identity, less an explanation of the physical and social world. With increasing education, communication, and economic interdependence, political institutions become the concern of more social classes, whose positions and viewpoints must be considered by both despotic and democratic rulers. In varying degrees, these broad changes have begun to occur in the Muslim world too, and we shall now inquire into them in greater detail.

Muslim countries are in that stage of social change characterized by rapid population growth owing to a high and stationary birth rate coupled with a high but declining death rate. For a century or so, advances in public sanitation, and in both agricultural and industrial production, have made growth possible. In the Middle East and North Africa alone the population has probably doubled in this century, to stand in the mid-1960s at about 170 million persons. Since 1800, the population of what is now Turkey has increased about six times, and that of Egypt about nine times. The geographical distribution of this growing population has been changing. At present, density of settlement varies from less than one person per square kilometre in Libya to more than 140 in Lebanon. In Egypt, the average density is only twenty-four persons per square kilometre, but in the inhabited and cultivated areas there are nearly 700 persons per square kilometre. The cities have been absorbing more and more of the growing population. In North Africa, for example, Algiers increased its population nearly ten times in little more than a century, while since 1900 Casablanca increased its population nearly twenty times. The influence of political events is seen in further changes in Algiers. When the struggle for independence from France began in 1954, there were 300,000 Muslims and 300,000 Europeans. Ten years later the total population had increased by a third, and the balance had shifted widely; there were then an estimated 700,000 Muslims and 100,000 Europeans. Tehran, in a half century, has grown from about 200,000 to two million people, now constituting about a tenth of the entire population of Persia. In Egypt, the proportion of the urban population has steadily increased from a fifth in 1917 to nearly two-fifths in 1960.

The historical urban pattern in the Muslim world, the predominance

of a few large towns over a vast hinterland, has survived modern developments. In almost every country, one or two cities tower over all others, and grow at a rate surpassing that of the lesser cities. Cairo and Alexandria, with five million people, are hardly approached in any important respect by Egypt's other cities. Baghdad stands alone as a great metropolis in Iraq. Tehran dominates Persia except for the oil industry. Beirut has a third of Lebanon's total population. These huge metropolitan areas have begun to experience problems familiar to those in other regions: insufficient housing, excessive traffic and inadequate services. Social problems of poverty, delinquency and decline of human relations also abound, though often their newness and intensity are exaggerated. On the outskirts of several large cities, migrants from the countryside have built temporary shacks that tend to become permanent settlements. City planning on a small scale was introduced in Istanbul in 1854, partly under the influence of Ottoman participation in the Crimean War. The large number of European interests and the increase in street traffic emphasized the need for improved services, leading to the establishment of a municipal commission. City planning was introduced elsewhere by Western rulers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and has been somewhat developed in recent years by Middle Easterners educated in European and American institutes of architecture and planning. Political leaders, however, have been too absorbed in national economic planning to see the importance of city planning, and its relevance to the national economy.

Demographic changes affect the material standard of living because they are an important element in the relationship between needs and resources. As regions of rapid increase of population, the Middle East and North Africa have a high proportion of young people who, though they enter the labour market early, are yet a burden on the economy. The Muslim countries as a group are not in danger of population growth outstripping the increase in resources, but some of them will face this problem if present rates of growth are maintained. Egypt is of course already in this difficult position of having to achieve a high rate of economic growth merely to maintain the existing low standard of living. In the present century, the population has doubled, while the cultivated area has increased by only a sixth and the cropped area by a third, giving Egypt the low ratio of a quarter of an acre of cultivated land per person.

Deliberate reduction of births has thus become an issue in some

Muslim countries, especially Egypt. The persistence of a high birth rate has been due not so much to a clear religious prohibition against birth control, but to traditional practice which simply has not encouraged it. In an agricultural society, men and women usually assume that they will have the number of children their natural relationship will bring. In such a society, children are not expensive to rear, and soon become economically productive, so birth control is a remote matter. A large family, it is widely felt moreover, brings social and divine approval.

The intention to keep down the size of the family comes in the cities, and among the people with higher income and formal education. In cities, children are usually not economically productive, and are expensive to rear because they attend school. Parents' aspirations for their children make each child an economic burden for a long time. Under these conditions, where status is determined chiefly by occupation, income, and education, and by one's ability to provide children with the opportunity to reach the proper level of each, ideas of voluntary birth control take hold. The few studies of fertility (the number of children under five years of age per one thousand women in the reproductive age-group fifteen to forty-nine) show that urban ratios are much lower than rural ones. An interesting difference emerges in some places between Muslim and Christian women. Among the Muslim women, urban-rural differences in fertility are negligible, but among urban women those of higher socio-economic status have a lower fertility ratio. Among Christian Arab women, however, the chief concomitant of low fertility is not higher socio-economic status, but living in urban areas. Thus urban life is associated with low fertility in both cases, but among the Muslim women the decline in fertility comes only when urban life brings with it higher income and education.

Such evidence suggests the kind of changes the Muslim family is undergoing with the changes in economic life and with urbanization. The rigid sexual code is relaxing somewhat. Young people in the cities enjoy a moderate but increasing degree of freedom both to meet and to mate. Even in the rural areas, it is more difficult to maintain the patriarchal family as young men find opportunities for employment and education in cities, and thereby escape the supervision of parents and other adult members of the family. In the cities, especially, which absorb most of the population growth, the traditional 'extended' family of several generations in one household is being replaced by the 'conjugal' family including only husband and wife and their children. Throughout

Muslim societies, the secular school, the government and the new media of communication have an increasingly important role in the rearing of the young.

The status of women, which deeply affects the nature of family life, has been changing as opportunities for their education and employment have grown. The result of uneven change is that until recently in some places women were still given as compensation to victims of major crimes, while in the cities many educated women have been pursuing independent careers in education, law, medicine and government. Polygamy has declined, though it persists in some rural and steppe areas. It was abolished in Turkey in 1926 and in Tunisia in 1956. Easy divorce by husbands has been curbed in Morocco, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Singapore and Persia. Elsewhere, these practices have been discouraged by official pronouncements, public opinion and economic reality. Even before Turkey outlawed polygamy (which did not end the practice in rural areas), the manpower shortages of the First World War had forced the country to employ thousands of women in factories making military clothing, and in government offices, shops and other private businesses. Following the new Civil Code of 1926 came legislation, in 1930, giving women the right to vote in municipal elections, and then, in 1934, to vote in national elections, and even to become candidates.

Surveys of opinion, attitudes and practices in the 1950s show that women strongly aspire to greater freedom. Women students do not look forward exclusively to marriage. The younger generation of women have a higher proportion than the older who are educated, employed outside the home, have shed the veil, participate in community life and were consulted by their parents in the selection of a husband. A wide gulf remains, however, between what educated women want, and what the men want for them. Women seem to want and expect fewer children than men do, are more in favour of working wives and do not express so great a need for religion as men do. Men, indeed, are ambivalent on the subject of greater freedom for women. Many men appear to resent the subjection and seclusion of their mothers, an attitude which predisposes them to favour more freedom for women. Yet the values implanted by family life and a male-dominated society predispose men to favour the old ways. It is also a question of relationships. Men may want their own wives and unmarried sisters to abide by the strict traditional code, but they may also want their sisters and daughters to have a good education, and to marry men who will be more modern. That is to say, men may be

more favourable to emancipation for their women (sisters and daughters) who will one day become the responsibility of other men. The main force for emancipation is education, which has been steadily extended to girls. In the 1950s there were over a million girls attending public schools in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, compared to only about 160,000 a quarter-century earlier. By 1961 even Sa'udi Arabia had 12,000 girls enrolled in schools. Education imparts a wider outlook which traditional subordination and seclusion cannot satisfy.

Modern secular education, which is spreading to all the Muslim world, has a broadening effect upon boys and young men too, of course. Western educational methods and subjects were introduced by French Catholic missionaries in the early eighteenth century, and American and British Protestants followed suit in the early nineteenth. Native rulers, especially Sultan Maḥmūd II and Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha, established secular institutions of higher education and sent many students to Europe in an effort to build up military power. Out of these foreign missionary schools and native technological institutes grew the native school system which ended the monopoly over learning long held by the religious leaders. By combining various institutes dating back, in some cases, to the mid-nineteenth century or earlier, the independent countries of the Muslim world have established national universities. Turkey created one before the First World War. The Egyptian University, founded by private enterprise in 1908, was taken over by the state in 1924. Other universities have been founded in Egypt subsequently. Syria established one in 1924, and Persia in 1934. The other countries consolidated various units into full-fledged universities only in the 1950s.

Students have sometimes played important political roles in some Muslim countries, notably Egypt, Persia and Turkey. Educated and articulate, they have taken a great interest in politics and government because of both nationalist feeling and career interests. Revolutionary leaders have often sought student support, and, indeed, have often expressed their struggle not so much in terms of social classes as in those of generations: youth against age, the modern against the traditional. As revolutionaries have assumed power, however, they have stressed the need of students to stay at their desks rather than to demonstrate in the streets. They also have tried to divert students from law and journalism, professions which had played a leading role in the nationalist revolts, to engineering and science, which are needed for the growth of modern industry.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Industrialization, changes in the family and in the distribution of population, and the advance of secular education have produced, and have been accompanied by, changes in occupations and in social classes. Before these changes, Muslim societies run by Muslims had a relatively clear class-structure. Foreigners and non-Muslims had low status and were indeed a separate group of communities. Muslims had the highest status, and among them the highest prestige and power lay with the political-religious leaders controlling the government. With the distribution of land to private owners, the growth of trade, and the introduction of modern transport, communication and some manufacturing, all of which began at various times in the nineteenth century, new classes rose. The large Muslim landowner, and the Christian and Jewish merchants and bankers, acquired more power, though only the Muslim landowner acquired higher status in a society in which people still divided themselves chiefly according to religion. A new element entered with the growing influence of the European powers, and the attendant rise in importance of the resident foreigners (the Levantines) and native Christians and Jews long familiar in the Muslim world. As Muslim countries reduced and finally eliminated such foreign and minority influences during the present century, while adopting Western economic and political institutions, another shift in social class occurred, bringing up the nationalist political leaders and the professions, such as law, journalism and the armed forces, closely identified with the nationalist struggles. The most recent changes have taken place in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Syria (to a certain extent), where the influence of the state, controlled through the army, has ended the power of certain classes which had thriven earlier, notably the large landowners, the independent professionals, and both Arab Christian and Muslim industrialists, bankers and merchants. In these countries the army and the higher civil service have advanced in power and prestige; the new leaders have spoken much of the dignity and importance of the mass of labourers and peasants, but thus far their position has not changed much. The new emphasis upon technology and science is intended to raise the status of occupations needed for modern industry and military power; with this emphasis goes an effort to overcome the traditional disdain of the educated class for manual pursuits, even when they are associated, as in science and technology, with higher learning.

Such changes have not been felt so deeply outside the urban areas which have been the locus of most sources of power. In the rural area,

social class-differences are not so refined, and still depend mainly on the ownership of land. In the declining tribal societies of desert and steppe, any settled rural or urban pursuit is still regarded as demeaning, despite the increasing sedentarization of the bedouin resulting from economic necessity and official policy.

As in other societies, so too in the Muslim world, wealth, prestige and power do not always go together. Making the Pilgrimage to Mecca confers prestige with no difference in wealth or power. Often holy men are poor, but they still have high prestige and much influence. Businessmen have wealth and some power by virtue of it, but in many parts of the Muslim world they have little prestige, unless they associate themselves with religion by supporting it.

The basis of human association in the Muslim world has been changing and widening. Traditionally, kinship and religion exclusively fixed relations among men, covering the social-geographical area from the local community to the whole universe itself. Occupational and class affinities assumed importance from time to time in traditional Muslim society, but always in conjunction with family and religious community. In modern times associations sprang up with various unifying principles, for example, literary, benevolent, scientific, moral, and then political. More recently, occupation has been growing in importance both as a determinant of social class, and as a principle of association (where freedom to associate is still permitted). Approaching Western forms of social stratification, the modern urban Middle East has begun to reveal the coalescence, though still hardly across religious boundaries, of education, income, status and power in one's occupational position.

Vestiges of previous bases of social class, and the approach of new ones, make Muslim countries socially unstable in two senses. First, the coexistence of various systems of stratification makes it difficult to describe the Muslim world in terms of any one of them. Secondly, the changing classes themselves are unstable, because the whole economy and society are undergoing change at different rates. Within each new social class, there is thus instability too, and this applies to native capitalists, to the growing, inexperienced and poorly led working class, and to the volatile intellectuals, not firmly anchored economically or socially.

Social instability has resulted, also, from changes in the position of religion. Secularism has meant the relegation of religion to a defined place in a society in which religious ideas and obligations once pervaded

all aspects of private, social and public life. Religion, nevertheless, continues to be strong among the mass of the population, persists as a very important basis of identity among Muslims, and is still a factor in political affairs.

Nationalism has been proclaimed by the leaders of most Muslim lands as the chief bond among men. This principle is a recent one for Muslims, and they have not yet fully adjusted themselves to it. Under the Ottoman *millet* system, religion defined one's relation to others in the social realm beyond kinship. It worked through the principle of tolerance of differences by avoidance of contacts except under well-defined conditions. Nationalism and the national state sought homogeneity and loyalty on less familiar grounds, but the new principle has thus far not succeeded in ordering, in a manner acceptable to all groups, the interests and relations of many communities based on a criss-crossing of religion, language, nationality and territorial origin. A vast population exchange in this century, in which about two million Turkish and other Muslims left the Balkans for Turkey while about the same number of Christian Arabs, Europeans and Jews left the Near East for Europe and America, did not remove the problem of the minority in a nationalist era.

Though the secular nationalists governing much of the Middle East and North Africa have reduced the public influence of religious leaders, some of them appeal to religious loyalty too. This has been especially true of the revolutionary leaders of Egypt, who regularly obtain the endorsement of their secular goals by the '*ulamā*'. This recognition of the religious feeling of the mass of the people has come even in Turkey, which had gone furthest in a secular direction; in the 1950s the government found it expedient not to interfere with a revival of religion among the peasants, artisans and shopkeepers.

Modernism has stimulated a certain rebirth of religious fundamentalism in both traditional and new religious brotherhoods. To many religious Muslims, to be 'modern' is to be wanton, bound by no religious or moral obligation, disrespectful of elders—in a word, libertine. The solemn authoritarian régimes bent upon industrialization have proclaimed their own secular form of austerity. They call upon the masses, in the name of national progress rather than religion, to avoid self-indulgence, and they often condemn the pursuit of pleasure as a vice of westernization and capitalism.

Many of the changes we have been discussing are registered not only in official policy, private attitudes and public conduct, but have also been

codified in new legal instruments. For half a century the civil code of the Ottoman empire was the *Mejelle*, issued between 1869 and 1876, which was based on the *Shari'a*. Turkey replaced it in 1926 with a revolutionary adaptation of the Swiss Civil Code; the *Mejelle* continued for a time as the basic law in several former Arab provinces, but now survives only in Jordan and Israel. Egypt adopted a new civil code in the late nineteenth century, based on the *Code Napoléon*, but adopted a more indigenous code in 1948 based on both Western and Islamic concepts. This code, developed by the Egyptian jurist 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī, was the basis also for those adopted after the Second World War by several newly independent Arab states. The most far-reaching transformation in the legal structure, as in so many other matters, came in the Turkey of Atatürk, which in 1926 introduced a new Penal Code based on an Italian model, and a new Commercial Code based on Italian and German models. Several other Muslim countries have modernized older penal and commercial codes, or adopted new ones since the Second World War. Changes have been made in the judiciary too. First, foreign influences stemming from extra-territorial rights were eliminated, and then the central secular judicial systems were consolidated in some countries. Thus in 1955 Egypt abolished the special courts administering religious law and transferred this function to the regular courts. A few years later Syria gave the regular courts jurisdiction over the tribes, which had until then had their own law. The importance of these changes is that they express in the legal structure the vast economic and social transformation of the Muslim world in the last century, and the determination of its leaders to continue moving the entire society in the same direction.

AN ASSESSMENT OF CHANGE

Perhaps the most significant change in the Muslim world since the eighteenth century is the growth of a favourable attitude toward change itself. The leaders of Muslim society today embrace what their predecessors abjured. Even generations after the Ottomans realized that they would have to transform their institutions to preserve them, they still could not give up the comforting idea, expressed in the *Khatt-i Sherif* of 1839, that their troubles could be traced to their abandonment of the precepts of the Holy Qur'ān and the great empire built upon them. Reformers of today seldom pay the past such tribute. One of the most recent recruits to modernization is Sa'udi Arabia, which early in 1964

proclaimed (in a newspaper advertisement) its determination 'to develop into a modern progressive state'. Reminiscent in tone of Ottoman pronouncements a century ago, the document spoke rather of science, industry, education and oil, than of morality, religion and God.

Apart from the effects it produces in various domains of life, change itself becomes a matter of concern—its source, rate, mode and means. It raises questions of personal and group identity which had long remained settled. It also produces its own rationale and its own subterfuge. When accused of seeking to overthrow hallowed traditions, the advocates of change often point to earlier traditions to which they say they seek to return. Thus some Muslim nineteenth-century thinkers called for a return to interest in the sciences, in which Muslim society had excelled before Europe took the lead. Similarly, the need to borrow from Europe is explained by pointing out that Muslims thereby reclaim what Europeans once borrowed from them. Or a presumed national or religious tradition is shown to be itself a foreign importation, as when Atatürk, advocating European dress, argued that the fez was Greek, and the long gown Byzantine or Hebrew. In Turkey, too, reforms that offended tradition were carried out under the banner of the need for unification; this cover protected the adoption of the Gregorian calendar and the metric system of weights and measures.

Change itself acquires a tradition. The traditional source of change for the Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa has been the West: Europe and then North America. Now the Muslim world distinguishes between Western Europe and North America on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the other. Some Arab leaders now take their inspiration from the latter, and from Communist China.

A review of social and economic change inevitably exaggerates it, and (perhaps also inevitably) suggests that it has been for the better, if not in every respect then at least 'on the whole'. Change, of course, often leaves things essentially the same. Thus the recent increase in state power in many Muslim countries may only increase their resemblance today to their condition several centuries ago, though their leaders may speak the language of Marx, Lenin and Mao rather than that of the Qur'ān, the Prophet and the '*ulamā*'. Air transport is fast becoming the most frequently used means by which pilgrims go to Mecca, but the modern jets carry them there to perform a traditional rite. Change is more dramatic to us than continuity, so we tend to overlook the

CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS: RECENT TIMES

persistent conservatism, especially in social life, of the great mass of Muslims who still live in the countryside, or who live in urban enclaves where they pursue a traditional mode of life.

We often tend, also, to exaggerate the novelty of change, overlooking its long history. Atatürk's reforms were rooted in the Young Turk movement before the First World War, which in turn owed much to nineteenth-century Ottoman reform efforts. Much of the programme of Egypt's 'revolutionary' leadership after 1952 (except for the radical crypto-Marxism beginning in 1961) was anticipated in the previous two decades under the despised 'reactionaries'. This includes legislation and financing to encourage industry, labour and social welfare legislation, land reform, land reclamation and state participation in capital formation. Finally, we tend to exaggerate the extent of the transformation, for the Muslim world is still one in which the mass of the people are bound to religious and social tradition, government is still oppressive and not representative, agriculture predominant and modern industry still rudimentary.

DYNASTIC LISTS

TABLE I. THE Umayyads, 'Alids and 'Abbasids




TABLE II. THE Umayyad Caliphs






TABLE III. THE 'ABBASID CALIPHS



DYNASTIC LISTS


TABLE IV. THE TWELVER *IMĀMS* AND FATIMID CALIPHS



Notes: I–XII. Twelver *Imāms*. 2–14. Fatimid caliphs. The first Fatimid caliph, 'Ubayd Allāh al-Mahdī, is said to have been an *imām mustawḍā'* (trustee *imām*), not in the Fatimid line of descent.


DYNASTIC LISTS

TABLE V. THE OTTOMANS



DYNASTIC LISTS

TABLE VI. THE SAFAVIDS



DYNASTIC LISTS

TABLE VII. THE DYNASTY OF MUḤAMMAD ‘ALĪ IN EGYPT





TABLE VIII. THE Umayyads of Spain



BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following book-lists are intended as a guide to further reading, and consist almost entirely of secondary sources in the principal European languages. Articles in learned journals, *Festschriften* and other collective works of the kind are not normally included; a comprehensive and systematic guide to such materials is provided by:

Pearson, J. D. *Index Islamicus 1906-55*, with its two *Supplements* for 1956-60 and 1961-5 respectively. Cambridge, 1958, 1962, 1966.

An indispensable work of reference on the bibliography of Islamic studies is: Sauvaget, J. *Introduction à l'histoire de l'orient musulman*. 2nd edn. revised by Cahen, Cl. Paris, 1961.

An English version of this, incorporating some revision and expansion, has appeared as:

Jean Sauvaget's Introduction to the History of the Muslim East. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965.

A general introduction to Islamic studies is offered by:

Pareja, F. M. *Islamologia*. Rome, 1951. French edn., *Islamologie*. Beirut, 1957-63.

Numerous articles on Islamic history will be found in:

The Encyclopaedia of Islam. 1st edn. Leiden, 1913-42. 2nd edn. Leiden and London, 1960- (in progress).

There are also relevant chapters in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, *The Cambridge Medieval History*, *The Cambridge History of India*, and *The Cambridge History of Iran*.

A survey of the historiography of the Muslim Middle East is provided by:

Lewis, B. and Holt, P. M. *Historians of the Middle East*. London, 1962.

The historiography of Islam in other areas is dealt with in chapters in:

Philips, C. H. (ed.). *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*. London, 1961.

Hall, D. G. E. (ed.). *Historians of South East Asia*. London, 1962.

Amongst aids to the student, the following atlases will be found useful:

Hazard, H. W. *Atlas of Islamic History*. 3rd edn. Princeton, 1954.

Roolvink, R. *Historical Atlas of the Muslim Peoples*. Amsterdam, 1957.

Atlas of the Arab World and the Middle East. Macmillan; London, 1960.

Oxford Regional Economic Atlas: The Middle East and North Africa. Oxford University Press; London, 1960.

Genealogical and dynastic lists and tables are given by:

Lane-Poole, S. *The Mohammedan Dynasties*. Paris, 1925.

Zambaur, E. de. *Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam*. Hanover, 1927.

The following works are of basic importance to the student of Islamic history, society and institutions. They have in different ways contributed to the corpus of knowledge about Islam, to its interpretation and understanding, and to the development of methods of research and investigation.

Becker, C. H. *Islamstudien*. Leipzig, 1924-32.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Gibb, H. A. R. *Modern Trends in Islam*. Chicago, 1947.
 — *Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey*. London, 1949.
 — *Studies in the Civilization of Islam*. Ed. Shaw, S. J. and Polk, W. R. Chicago, 1962.
 Goitein, S. D. *A Mediterranean Society*. Vol. I. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967.
 Goldziher, I. *Muhammedanische Studien*. Halle, 1889-90; Hildesheim, 1961.
 Eng. tr. of Vol. I, ed. S. M. Stern, *Muslim Studies*. London, 1967.
 — *Vorlesungen über den Islam*. 1st edn. Heidelberg, 1910. (French tr. by Arin, F. *Le dogme et la loi de l'Islam*. Paris, 1920.)
 Grunebaum, G. E. von. *Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation*. 2nd. edn. Chicago, 1953.
 — *Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition*. London, 1955.
 Hurgonje, C. S. *Verspreide geschriften*. Bonn, Leipzig, Leiden, 1923-7.
 — *Selected Works*. Ed. Bousquet, G.-H. and Schacht, J. Leiden, 1957.
 Macdonald, D. B. *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*. New York 1903; Beirut, 1964.
 — *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*. Chicago, 1906; Beirut, 1965.
 Schacht, J. *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*. Oxford, 1950.
 Wellhausen, J. *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten*. 2nd edn. Berlin, 1897.

Pre-Islamic Arabia

- Aigrain, R. 'Arabie', in *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique*. Vol. III. Paris, 1924.
 Altheim, F. and Stiehl, R. *Die Araber in der alte Welt*. Berlin, 1964-8.
 Caskel, W. *Das altarabische Königreich Lihyan*. Krefeld, 1950.
 — *Die Bedeutung der Beduinen in der Geschichte der Araber*. Cologne, 1953.
 — *Entdeckungen in Arabien*. Cologne, 1954.
 — *Lihyan und Lihyanisch*. Cologne, 1954.
 Février, J. G. *Essai sur l'histoire politique et économique de Palmyre*. 1931.
 Gabrieli, F. (ed.). *L'antica società beduina*. Rome, 1959.
 Grohmann, A. 'Arabien', in *Kulturgeschichte des alten Orients*. Munich, 1963.
 Guidi, M. *Storia e cultura degli Arabi fino alla morte di Maometto*. Florence, 1951.
 Hourani, G. F. *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times*. Princeton, 1951.
 Lammens, H. *Le berceau de l'Islam*. Rome, 1914.
 — *L'Arabie occidentale avant l'Hégire*. Beirut, 1928.
 Levi Della Vida, G. 'Pre-Islamic Arabia', in Faris, N. A. (ed.). *The Arab Heritage*. Princeton, 1944.
 Moscati, S. *The Semites in Ancient History*. Cardiff, 1959.
 Nielsen, D. *Handbuch der altarabischen Altertumskunde*. Copenhagen, 1927.
 Nöldeke, Th. *Die ghassânischen Fürsten aus dem Hause Gafna's*. Berlin, 1887.
 Olinder, G. *The Kings of Kinda of the Family of Ākil al-Murār*. Lund, 1927.
 Rothstein, G. *Die Dynastie der Lahmidin in al-Hira*. Berlin, 1899.
 Ryckmans, G. 'Les religions préislamiques', in *L'histoire générale des religions* Paris, 1960.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ryckmans, J. *L'institution monarchique en Arabie méridionale avant l'Islam*. Louvain, 1951.
- 'Le Christianisme en Arabie du Sud préislamique', in *Atti del Convegno Internazionale sul tema: L'Oriente cristiano nella storia della civiltà*. Rome, 1964.
- Starcky, J. *Palmyre*. 1952.
- Wellhausen, J. *Reste arabischen Heidentums*. 2nd edn. Berlin, 1897. 3rd. edn. Berlin, 1961.
- Wissmann, H. von and Höfner, M. *Beiträge zur historischen Geographie des vor-islamischen Südarabien*. Wiesbaden, 1953.
- Muhammad
- Ahrens, K. *Muhammed als Religionsstifter*. Leipzig, 1935.
- Andrae, T. J. E. *Mohammed, the man and his faith*. London, 1936 (tr. from Swedish).
- *Die Person Muhammeds in Lehre und Glauben seiner Gemeinde*. Stockholm, 1918.
- *Les origines de l'Islam et le Christianisme*. Paris, 1955 (tr. from German).
- Arberry, A. J. *The Koran Interpreted*. London, 1955.
- Archer, J. C. *Mystical Elements in Mohammed*. New Haven, 1924.
- Bell, R. *The Origin of Islam in its Christian Environment*. London, 1926.
- Blachère, R. *Le problème de Mahomet*. Paris, 1952.
- Buhl, F. *Das Leben Muhammads*. Leipzig, 1930 (tr. from Danish).
- Caetani, L. *Annali dell'Islam*. Vols. I, II. Milan, 1905.
- *Studi di storia orientale*. Milan, 1911–14.
- Hamidullah, M. *Le prophète de l'Islam*. Paris, 1959.
- Katsh, A. I. *Judaism in Islām*. New York, 1954. (New edn. *Judaism and the Koran*. New York, 1962).
- Muir, W. *The Life of Muhammad*. Revised edn. Edinburgh, 1923.
- Nöldeke, Th. *Geschichte des Qorāns*. 2nd edn. Leipzig, 1909–38.
- Paret, R. *Mohammed und der Koran*. Stuttgart, 1957.
- Rodinson, M. *Mahomet*. 2nd edn. Paris, 1968.
- Watt, W. M. *Muhammad at Mecca*. London, 1953.
- *Muhammad at Medina*. Oxford, 1956.
- *Muhammad, Prophet and Statesman*. London, 1961.
- Wellhausen, J. *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten IV*. Berlin, 1897.

The Patriarchal and Umayyad Caliphates

- Becker, C. H. *Islamstudien*. Vol. I. Leipzig, 1924.
- Butler, A. J. *The Arab Conquest of Egypt*. Oxford, 1902.
- Caetani, L. *Annali dell'Islam*. Milan, 1905–26.
- *Chronographia Islamica*. Paris, Rome, 1912–23.
- Dennett, D. C. *Conversion and the Poll-tax in Early Islam*. Cambridge, Mass., 1950.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Eickhoff, E. *Seekrieg und Seepolitik zwischen Islam und Abendland*. Berlin, 1966.
- Gabrieli, F. *Mubammad and the Conquests of Islam*. London, 1968.
- *Il Califato di Hishâm. Studi di storia omayyade*. Alexandria, 1935.
- Gibb, H. A. R. *The Arab Conquests in Central Asia*. London, 1923.
- 'Arab-Byzantine relations under the Umayyad caliphate', in Shaw, S. J. and Polk, W. R. (ed.). *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*. Boston, Mass., 1962.
- Goeje, M. J. de. *Mémoire sur la conquête de la Syrie*. 2nd edn. Leiden, 1900.
- Honigmann, E. *Die Ostgrenze des byzantinischen Reiches von 363 bis 1071*. Brussels, 1935.
- Lammens, H. *Études sur le règne du calife omayyade Mo'awiya Ier*. Paris, 1908.
- *Le califat de Yazîd Ier*. Beirut, 1910–21.
- *Études sur le siècle des Omayyades*. Beirut, 1930.
- Løkkegaard, F. *Islamic Taxation in the Classical Period*. Copenhagen, 1950.
- Petersen, E. L. 'Ali and Mu'awiya in early Arabic tradition. Copenhagen, 1964.
- Vloten, G. van. *Recherches sur la domination arabe, le Chiitisme et les croyances messianiques sous le khalifat des Omayyades*. Amsterdam, 1894.
- Wellhausen, J. *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten VI: Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte des Islams*. Berlin, 1899.
- *The Arab Kingdom and its Fall*. Calcutta, 1927 (tr. from German).

The 'Abbasid Caliphate

- Abbott, N. *Two Queens of Baghdad*. Chicago, 1946.
- Arendonk, C. van. *Les débuts de l'imamat zaidite au Yemen*. Leiden, 1960.
- Barthold, W. *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*. 3rd edn. London, 1968.
- *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie centrale*. Paris, 1945.
- Bosworth, C. E. *The Ghaznavids*. Edinburgh, 1963.
- Bowen, H. *The Life and Times of 'Ali ibn 'Isâ*. Cambridge, 1928.
- Busse, H. *Die Buyiden im Irak*. Beirut, 1968.
- Gabrieli, F. *Al-Ma'mûn e gli 'Alidî*. Leipzig, 1929.
- Goeje, M. J. de. *Mémoire sur les Carmathes du Bahraïn et les Fatimides*. 2nd. edn. Leiden, 1886.
- Herzfeld, E. E. *Geschichte der Stadt Samarra*. Hamburg, 1948.
- Hodgson, M. G. S. *The Order of Assassins*. The Hague, 1955.
- Kabir, M. *The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad, 334/946–447/1055*. Calcutta, 1964.
- Laoust, H. *Les schismes dans l'Islam*. Paris, 1965.
- Le Strange, G. *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*. 2nd. edn. Cambridge, 1930.
- *Baghdad During the Abbasid Caliphate*. Oxford, 1924.
- *Palestine under the Moslems*. London, 1890.
- Lewis, B. *The Origins of Ismā'ilism*. Cambridge, 1940.
- *The Assassins*. London, 1967.
- Minorsky, V. F. *La domination des Dailamites*. Paris, 1932.
- Muir, W. *The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline and Fall*. Revised edn. by Weir, T. H. Edinburgh, 1924.
- Nazim, M. *The Life and Times of Sulṭan Maḥmūd of Ghazna*. Cambridge, 1931.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Nöldeke, Th. *Sketches from Eastern History*. London, 1892 (tr. from German).
- Pellat, C. *Le milieu baṣrien et la formation de Ḡāḥiṣ*. Paris, 1953.
- Sadighi, G. H. *Les mouvements religieux iraniens au IIe et au IIIe siècle de l'Hégire*. Paris, 1938.
- Schwarz, P. *Iran im Mittelalter nach den arabischen Geographen*. Leipzig, 1910.
- Sourdel, D. *Le vizirat 'abbāside de 749 à 936*. Damascus, 1959–60.
- Spuler, B. *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*. Wiesbaden, 1952.
- *The Muslim World, A Historical Survey I: The Age of the Caliphs*. Leiden, 1960 (tr. from German).
- Vasiliev, A. A. *Byzance et les Arabes*. Brussels, 1935–68.
- Weil, G. *Geschichte der Chalifen*. Mannheim, Stuttgart, 1846–62.
- Egypt and Syria from the Arab to the Ottoman Conquest
- Atiya, A. S. *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*. London, 1938.
- Ayalon, D. *L'esclavage du mamelouk*. Jerusalem, 1951.
- *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom*. London, 1956.
- Becker, C. H. *Beiträge zur Geschichte Ägyptens unter dem Islam*. Strassburg, 1902–3.
- Cahen, Cl. *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des croisades*. Paris, 1940.
- Canard, M. *Histoire de la dynastie des H'amdānides de Jazīra et de Syrie*. Paris, 1953.
- Darrag, A. *L'Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay 825–841/1422–1438*. Damascus, 1961.
- Elisséeff, N. *Nūr al-Dīn, un grand prince musulman de Syrie au temps des Croisades (511–69/1118–74)*. Damascus, 1967.
- Gaudefroy-Demombynes, M. *La Syrie à l'époque des mamelouks*. Paris, 1923.
- Gottschalk, H. L. *Al-Malik al-Kāmil von Egypten und seine Zeit*. Wiesbaden, 1958.
- Hassan, Z. M. *Les Tulunides: étude de l'Égypte musulmane à la fin du IXe siècle. 868–905*. Paris, 1933.
- Kraemer, J. *Der Sturz des Königreichs Jerusalem*. Wiesbaden, 1952.
- Lammens, H. *La Syrie, précis historique*. Beirut, 1921.
- Lane-Poole, S. *History of Egypt in the Middle Ages*. 2nd edn. London, 1914.
- Lapidus, I. M. *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages*. Cambridge, Mass., 1967.
- Munier, H. and Wiet, G. *L'Égypte byzantine et musulmane*. Cairo, 1932. (Vol. II of *Précis de l'histoire d'Égypte*.)
- Runciman, S. *A History of the Crusades*. Cambridge, 1951–4.
- Saunders, J. J. *Aspects of the Crusades*. Christchurch, N.Z., 1962.
- Setton, K. M. and others (ed.). *A History of the Crusades*. Vols. I, II. Philadelphia, 1955, 1962.
- Stevenson, W. B. *The Crusaders in the East*. Cambridge, 1907.
- Wiet, G. *L'Égypte arabe* (Vol. IV of Hanotaux, G. (ed.), *Histoire de la nation égyptienne*). Paris, 1937.
- *Les marchands d'épices sous les sultans mamelouks*. Cairo, 1955.
- Ziadeh, N. A. *Urban Life in Syria under the Early Mamlūks*. Beirut, 1953.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Turks in Anatolia and the Ottoman State to Selim I

- Atiya, A. S. *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*. London, 1938.
- Babinger, F. *Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit*. Munich, 1953.
- Bratianu, G. I. *Le commerce génois dans la Mer Noire au XIII^e siècle*. Paris, 1929.
- Cahen, Cl. *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*. London, 1968 (tr. from French).
- Chalandon, F. *Alexis I Comnène*. Paris, 1910.
- *Jean II Comnène et Manuel I Comnène*. Paris, 1912.
- Fisher, S. N. *The Foreign Relations of Turkey, 1481–1512*. Urbana, Ill., 1948.
- Flemming, B. *Landschaftsgeschichte von Pamphylien, Pisidien und Lykien in Spätmittelalter*. Wiesbaden, 1964.
- Gabriel, A. *Monuments turcs d'Anatolie*. Paris, 1931–2.
- *Voyages archéologiques dans la Turquie orientale*. Paris, 1936.
- Halecki, O. *Un empereur de Byzance à Rome*. Warsaw, 1930.
- Hammer-Purgstall, J. von. *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*. Pest, 1827–35; 2nd edn. 1834–6. French tr. *Histoire de l'empire ottoman*. Paris, 1835–43.
- Heyd, W. *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge*. Paris, 1936.
- Iorga, N. *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*. Gotha, 1908–13.
- *Histoire des Roumains et de la Romanité orientale*. Bucharest, 1937–45.
- Jireček, K. *Geschichte der Serben*. Gotha, 1911, 1918.
- Köprülü, M. F. *Les origines de l'empire ottoman*. Paris, 1935.
- Laurent, J. *Byzance et les Turcs seldjoucides jusqu'en 1081*. Nancy, 1913.
- Lemerle, P. *L'émirat d'Aydın, Byzance, et l'Occident*. Paris, 1957.
- Mas Latrie, L. de. *Relations de l'île de Chypre avec l'Asie Mineure au moyen-âge*. Paris, 1879.
- Melikoff, L. *Le geste de Melik Danismend I*. Paris, 1960.
- Miller, B. *The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror*. Cambridge, Mass., 1941.
- Minorsky, V. F. *La Perse au XV^e siècle entre la Turquie et la Venise*. Paris, 1933.
- Runciman, S. *A History of the Crusades*. Cambridge, 1951–4.
- *The Fall of Constantinople 1453*. Cambridge, 1965.
- Setton, K. M. and others (ed.). *A History of the Crusades*. Vols. I, II. Philadelphia, 1955, 1962.
- Vaughan, D. M. *Europe and the Turk. A Pattern of Alliances, 1350–1700*. Liverpool, 1954.
- Wittek, P. *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*. Istanbul, 1934.
- *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*. London, 1938.
- Zinkeisen, J. W. *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*. Hamburg, Gotha, 1840–63; reprinted, 1962.

The Ottoman Empire from Selim I

- Anderson, M. S. *The Eastern Question*. London, 1966.
- Baer, G. *A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, 1800–1950*. London, 1962.
- Bailey, F. E. *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement*. Cambridge, Mass., 1942.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Blaisdell, D. C. *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire*. New York, 1929.
- Bodman, H. L. *Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760–1826*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1963.
- Braudel, F. *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*. Paris, 1949.
- Combe, E., Bainville, J. and Driault, É. *L'Égypte ottomane, l'expédition française et le règne de Mohammed Aly (1517–1849)*. Cairo, 1933. (Vol. III of *Précis de l'histoire d'Égypte*.)
- Davison, R. H. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876*. Princeton, 1963.
- Devereux, R. *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period*. Baltimore, 1963.
- Dodwell, H. *The Founder of Modern Egypt*. Cambridge, 1931.
- Douin, G. *Histoire du règne du khédivé Ismail*. Cairo, 1933–41.
- Emin, A. *Turkey in the World War*. New Haven, Conn., 1930.
- Engelhardt, E. *La Turquie et le Tanzimat*. Paris, 1882–4.
- Gibb, H. A. R. and Bowen, H. *Islamic Society and the West I: Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*, Parts I and II. London, 1950, 1957.
- Hammer-Purgstall, J. von. *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*. Pest, 1827–35; 2nd edn., 1834–6. (French tr. *Histoire de l'empire ottoman*. Paris, 1835–43.)
- *Die osmanischen Reichs Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung*. Vienna, 1815.
- Herrold, J. C. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. London, 1963.
- Heyd, U. *Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552–1615*. Oxford, 1960.
- 'The Ottoman 'ulemā and westernization in the time of Selim III and Mahmūd II', in Heyd, U. (ed.). *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization*. Jerusalem, 1961.
- Holt, P. M. *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516–1922*. London, 1966.
- (ed.). *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt*. London, 1968.
- Hourani, A. H. 'The Fertile Crescent in the eighteenth century', in *A Vision of History*. Beirut, 1961.
- Hurewitz, J. C. *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East; a Documentary Record; 1535–1914, 1914–1956*. Princeton, 1956.
- Iorga, N. *Geschichte des osmanischen Reichs*. Gotha, 1908–13.
- Ismail, A. *Histoire du Liban*. Vols. I, IV (all so far published). Paris, 1955; Beirut, 1958.
- Kedourie, E. *England and the Middle East*. Cambridge, 1956.
- Kerr, M. H. *Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840–1868*. Beirut, 1959.
- Lammens, H. *La Syrie, précis historique*. Beirut, 1921.
- Landau, J. M. *Parliaments and Parties in Egypt*. Tel Aviv, 1953.
- Landes, D. S. *Bankers and Pashas*. London, 1958.
- Lewis, B. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. 2nd edn. London, 1968.
- *Istanbul and the Civilization of the Ottoman Empire*. Norman, Oklahoma, 1963.
- Longrigg, S. H. *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*. Oxford, 1925.
- 'Iraq, 1900 to 1950'. London, 1953.
- Lybyer, A. H. *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent*. Cambridge, Mass., 1913.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Mantran, R. *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVII^e siècle*. Paris, 1962.
- Ma'oz, M. *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861*. Oxford, 1968.
- Marlowe, J. *Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953*. London, 1954.
- *The Making of the Suez Canal*. London, 1964.
- Masson, P. *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVII^e siècle*. Paris, 1896.
- *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIII^e siècle*. Paris, 1911.
- Philby, H. St J. *Sa'udi Arabia*. London, 1955.
- Polk, W. R. *The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840*. Cambridge, Mass., 1963.
- Rafeq, A-K. *The Province of Damascus, 1723-1783*. Beirut, 1966.
- Ramsaur, E. E. *The Young Turks*. Princeton, 1957.
- Rivlin, H. A. B. *The Agricultural Policy of Muḥammad 'Alī in Egypt*. Cambridge, Mass., 1961.
- Salibi, K. S. *The Modern History of Lebanon*. London, 1965.
- Sammarco, A. *Les règnes de 'Abbas, de Sa'id et d'Isma'il*. Rome, 1935. (Vol. IV of *Précis de l'histoire d'Égypte*.)
- Serjeant, R. B. *The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast*. Oxford, 1963.
- Shaw, S. J. *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798*. Princeton, N.J., 1958.
- Stripling, G. W. F. *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511-1574*. Urbana, Ill., 1942.
- Temperley, H. W. V. *England and the Near East, the Crimea*. London, 1936.
- Tibawi, A. L. *British Interests in Palestine 1800-1901*. London, 1961.
- *American Interests in Syria 1800-1901*. Oxford, 1966.
- Tignor, R. L. *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914*. Princeton, 1966.
- Ubicini, A. *Lettres sur la Turquie*. Paris, 1853-4.
- Ursu, J. *La politique orientale de François I^{er}*. Paris, 1908.
- Wilson, A. T. *The Persian Gulf*. London, 1928.
- Wood, A. C. *A History of the Levant Company*. London, 1935.
- Zeine, Z. N. *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*. Beirut, 1966.
- Zinkeisen, J. W. *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*. Hamburg, 1840-63; reprinted 1962.

The Modern Arab States and Arab Nationalism

- Ahmed, J. M. *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism*. London, 1960.
- Antoniou, G. *The Arab Awakening*. London, 1938.
- Atiyah, E. *The Arabs*. London, 1955.
- Brown, L. C. *The Surest Path*. Cambridge, Mass., 1967.
- Edmonds, C. J. *Kurds, Turks and Arabs*. London, 1957.
- Gendzier, I. L. *The Practical Visions of Ya'qub Sanu'*. Cambridge, Mass., 1966.
- Haim, S. *Arab Nationalism, An Anthology*. Berkeley, Cal., 1962.
- Holt, P. M. (ed.). *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt*. London, 1968.
- Hourani, A. H. *Syria and Lebanon*. London, 1946.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'Race, religion and nation state in the Near East', in *A Vision of History*. Beirut, 1961.
- *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*. London, 1962.
- Ireland, P. W. *Iraq, A Study in Political Development*. London, 1937.
- Karpat, K. H. *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*. London, 1968.
- Keddourie, E. *The Chatham House Version*. London, 1970.
- Khadduri, M. *Independent Iraq 1932–1958*. 2nd edn. London, 1960.
- Kirk, G. E. *The Middle East in the War*. London, 1953.
- *The Middle East, 1945–1950*. London, 1954.
- Laqueur, W. Z. (ed.). *The Middle East in Transition*. London, 1958.
- Longrigg, S. H. *Iraq, 1900–1950*. London, 1953.
- *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate*. London, 1958.
- Monroe, E. *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956*. London, 1963.
- Nuseibeh, H. Z. *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism*. Cornell, 1956.
- Safran, N. *Egypt in Search of Political Community*. Cambridge, Mass., 1961.
- Salibi, K. S. *The Modern History of Lebanon*. London, 1965.
- Toynbee, A. J. *Survey of International Affairs 1925 I: The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement*. London, 1927.
- Vatikiotis, P. J. *Politics and the Military in Jordan*. London, 1967.
- *The Modern History of Egypt*. London, 1969.
- Warriner, Doreen. *Land Reform and Development in the Middle East*. 2nd edn. London, 1962.
- *Land Reform in Principle and Practice*. Oxford, 1969.
- Zeine, Z. N. *The Struggle for Arab Independence*. Beirut, 1960.

Persia from the Safavids: Persian Nationalism

- Alavi, B. *Kämpfendes Iran*. Berlin, 1955.
- Arasteh, R. *Education and Social Awakening in Iran*. Leiden, 1962.
- Avery, P. W. *Modern Iran*. London, 1965.
- Banani, A. *The Modernization of Iran, 1921–41*. Stanford, 1961.
- Bellan, L. L. *Chah 'Abbas I*. Paris, 1932.
- Binder, L. *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962.
- Browne, E. G. *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*. Cambridge, 1910.
- *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia*. Cambridge, 1914.
- *Materials for the Study of the Bābī Religion*. Cambridge, 1918.
- Cottam, R. W. *Nationalism in Iran*. Pittsburgh, 1964.
- Curzon, G. N. *Persia and the Persian Question*. London, 1892.
- Ellis, C. H. *The Transcasian Episode, 1918–1919*. London, 1963.
- Entner, M. L. *Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, 1828–1914*. Gainesville, Fla., 1965.
- Geyer, D. *Die Sowjetunion und Iran*. Tübingen, 1955.
- Greaves, R. L. *Persia and the Defence of India, 1884–1892*. London, 1959.
- Hamzavi, A. H. *Persia and the Powers*. London, 1946.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Hinz, W. *Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im fünfzehnten Jahrhundert*. Berlin and Leipzig, 1936.
- Horst, H. *Timūr und Hoḡā 'Alī*. Wiesbaden, 1958.
- Kazemzadeh, F. *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914*. New Haven and London, 1968.
- Kelly, J. B. *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880*. Oxford, 1968.
- Lambton, A. K. S. *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*. London, 1953.
- Lenczowski, G. *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1949*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1949.
- Lockhart, L. *Nadir Shah*. London, 1938.
- *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*. Cambridge, 1958.
- Millspaugh, A. C. *The American Task in Persia*. New York, 1925.
- *Americans in Persia*. Washington, D.C., 1946.
- Minorsky, V. F. (ed. and tr.). *Tadhkirat al-mulūk*. London, 1943.
- Motter, T. H. V. *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*. Washington, D.C., 1952.
- Ramazani, R. K. *The Foreign Policy of Iran . . . 1500-1941*. Charlottesville, Va., 1966.
- Roemer, H. R. *Der Niedergang Irans nach dem Tode Isma'il's des Grausamen 1577-1581*. Würzburg-Aumühle, 1939.
- Sarwar, Gh. *The History of Shāh Ismā'il Safawī*. Aligarh, 1939.
- Sheil, Lady. *Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia*. London, 1856.
- Shuster, W. M. *The Strangling of Persia*. New York, 1912.
- Sykes, C. *Wassmuss, 'the German Lawrence'*. London, 1936.
- Sykes, P. M. *A History of Persia*. 3rd edn. London, 1930.
- Thomas, L. V. and Frye, R. N. *The United States and Turkey and Iran*. Cambridge, Mass., 1951.
- Upton, J. M. *The History of Modern Iran*. Cambridge, Mass., 1960.
- Watson, R. G. *A History of Persia*. London, 1866.
- Wilber, D. N. *Contemporary Iran*. London, 1963.
- Wilson, A. T. *The Persian Gulf*. London, 1928.
- Zabih, S. *The Communist Movement in Iran*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966.

Westernization, Social and Economic Change

- Anderson, J. N. D. *Islamic Law in the Modern World*. New York, 1959.
- Ayroun, H. H. *The Egyptian Peasant*. Boston, Mass., 1963.
- Baer, G. *Population and Society in the Middle East*. London, 1964.
- Berger, M. *The Arab World Today*. London, 1962.
- Binder, L. *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*. New York, 1964.
- Bonné, A. *State and Economics in the Middle East*. 2nd edn. London, 1955.
- Bullard, R. W. (ed.). *The Middle East. A political and economic survey*. 3rd edn. London, 1958.
- Campbell, J. C. *Defense of the Middle East*. 2nd edn. New York, 1960.
- Daghestani, K. *Étude sociologique sur la famille musulmane contemporaine en Syrie*. Paris, 1932.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- El-Gritly, A. A. I. *The Structure of Modern Industry in Egypt*. Cairo, 1948.
- Fisher, S. N. *The Military in the Middle East*. Columbus, Ohio, 1963.
- Frye, R. N. (ed.). *Islam and the West*. The Hague, 1957.
- Gardet, L. *La cité musulmane. Vie sociale et politique*. Paris, 1934.
- Grunebaum, G. E. von. *Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962.
- Halpern, M. *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*. Princeton, 1963.
- Hershlag, Z. Y. *Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East*. Leiden, 1964.
- Holt, P. M. (ed.). *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt*. London, 1968.
- Hourani, A. H. *Minorities in the Arab World*. London, 1947.
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. *The Economic Development of Iraq*. Baltimore, 1952.
- *The Economic Development of Syria*. Baltimore, 1955.
- Issawi, C. *Egypt in Revolution. An Economic Analysis*. London, 1963.
- *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800–1914*. Chicago, 1966.
- and Yeganeh, M. *The Economics of Middle Eastern oil*. London, 1962.
- Keddie, N. R. *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968.
- Kedourie, E. *Afghani and 'Abdub*. London, 1966.
- Laqueur, W. Z. (ed.). *The Middle East in Transition*. London, 1958.
- Lerner, D. *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Glencoe, Ill., 1958.
- Le Tourneau, R. *Évolution politique de l'Afrique du Nord musulmane, 1920–1961*. Paris, 1962.
- Lewis, B. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. 2nd edn. London, 1961.
- *The Middle East and the West*. London, 1964.
- Longrigg, S. H. *Oil in the Middle East*. London, 1964.
- Nolte, R. H. *The Modern Middle East*. New York, 1963.
- Patai, R. *Golden River to Golden Road*. Philadelphia, 1962.
- Proctor, J. H. (ed.). *Islam and International Relations*. London, 1965.
- Rustow, D. A. *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*. Princeton, 1956.
- 'The politics of the Near East', in Almond, G. A. and Coleman, J. S. (ed.). *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Princeton, 1960.
- Smith, W. C. *Islam in Modern History*. Princeton, 1957.
- Toynbee, A. J. *The World and the West*. London, 1953.
- Yaukey, D. *Fertility Differences in a Modernizing Country*. Princeton, 1961.

Central Asia, the Golden Horde and the Tsarist Empire

- Allworth, E. (ed.). *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*. New York, 1967.
- Barthold, V. V. *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*. 3rd edn. London, 1968 (tr. from Russian).
- *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie centrale*. Paris, 1945 (tr.).
- *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*. Leiden, 1956–63 (tr. from Russian).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barthold, V. V. *La découverte de l'Asie*. Paris, 1947 (tr. from Russian).
- Bouvet, L. *L'empire mongol. 2me. phase*. Paris, 1927.
- Bratianu, G. I. *Recherches sur le commerce génois dans la Mer Noire au XIIIe siècle*. Paris, 1929.
- Carrère d'Encausse, H. *Réforme et révolution chez les Musulmans de l'Empire russe: Bukhara, 1867-1927*. Paris, 1966.
- Czaplicka, M. A. *The Turks of Central Asia*. London, 1918.
- Elias, N. and Ross, E. D. *History of the Moghuls of Central Asia*. London, 1895.
- Grekov, B. D. and Yakubovsky, A. Y. *La Horde d'Or*. Paris, 1939.
- Grousset, R. *L'empire mongol. Ière. phase*. Paris, 1941.
- *L'empire des steppes*. 4th edn. Paris, 1960.
- *Conqueror of the World*. London, 1967 (tr. from French).
- Hambly, G. (ed.). *Zentralasien*. Frankfurt, 1966.
- Hammer-Purgstall, J. von. *Geschichte der goldenen Horde in Kiptschak*. Pest, 1840.
- *Geschichte der Chane der Krim*. Vienna, 1856.
- Holdsworth, M. *Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century*. London, 1959.
- Hookham, H. *Tamburlaine the Conqueror*. London, 1962.
- Howarth, H. H. *History of the Mongols*. London, 1876-88.
- Kirimal, E. M. *Der nationale Kampf der Krimtürken*. Emsdetten, 1952.
- Mouradja d'Ohsson, A. C. *Histoire des Mongols*. 2nd edn. Amsterdam, 1852.
- Nolde, B. E. *La formation de l'empire russe*. Paris, 1952-53.
- Pelliot, P. *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or*. Paris, 1949.
- Pierce, R. A. *Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917. A Study in Colonial Rule*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960.
- Prawdin, M. *The Mongol Empire*. London, 1940.
- Schuyler, E. *Turkistan*. London, 1876. (Abridged edn. London, 1966.)
- Skrine, F. H. B. and Ross, E. D. *The Heart of Asia*. London, 1899.
- Spuler, B. *Die goldene Horde*. Leipzig, 1943.
- *The Muslim World, a Historical Survey II: The Mongol Period*. Leiden, 1960 (tr. from German).
- *Die Mongolen in Iran*. 3rd edn. Berlin, 1968.
- Vámbéry, A. *History of Bokhara*. London, 1873.
- Velyaminov-Zernov, V. *Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire du khanat de Crimée*. St Petersburg, 1864.
- Vernadsky, G. *The Mongols and Russia*. New Haven, 1953.

Islam, the Soviet Union and Communism

- Batatu, J. 'Some preliminary observations on the beginnings of Communism in the Arab East', in *Islam and Communism*. Munich, 1960.
- Bennigsen A. and Quelquejay, C. L. *Les mouvements nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie I: Le Sultangalievisme au Tatarstan*. Paris, 1960.
- *The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR and Their Linguistic Problems*. London, 1961 (tr. from French).
- *Islam in the Soviet Union*. London, 1967 (tr. from French).
- Blumberger, J. T. P. *Le communisme aux Indes néerlandaises*. Paris, 1929.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brackman, A. C. *Indonesian Communism: A History*. New York, 1963.
- Ellis, C. H. *The Transcaspian Episode, 1918-1919*. London, 1963.
- Eudin, X. J., and North, R. C. *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927*. Stanford, 1957.
- Glazer, S. *Communism in the Near East*. Washington, D.C., 1949.
- Hayit, B. *Turkestan im XX Jahrhundert*. Darmstadt, 1956.
- Hostler, C. W. *Turkism and the Soviets*. London, 1957.
- Kahin, G. M. *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia*. Melbourne, 1956.
- Kolarz, W. *Religion in the Soviet Union*. London, 1962.
- Laqueur, W. Z. *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*. London, 1956.
- (ed.). *The Middle East in Transition*. London, 1958.
- Lenczowski, G. *Russia and the West in Iran 1918-1949*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1949.
- McVey, R. T. *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1965.
- Monteil, V. *Les musulmans soviétiques*. Paris, 1957.
- Park, A. G. *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927*. New York, 1957.
- Pipes, R. *The Formation of the Soviet Union—Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*. Cambridge, Mass., 1954.
- Rodinson, M. 'Problématique de l'étude des rapports entre Islam et communisme'. *Colloque sur la sociologie musulmane*, 1961.
- Romainville, F. de. *L'Islam et l'URSS*. Paris, 1947.
- Spector, I. *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958*. Seattle, 1959.
- *The First Russian Revolution, its Impact on Asia*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962.
- Wheeler, G. *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*. London, 1964.
- Zabih, S. *The Communist Movement in Iran*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966.
- Zenkovsky, S. A. *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*. Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

Modern Turkey and Turkish Nationalism

- Başgil, A. F. and others. *La Turquie*. Paris, 1939. (Vol. VII in Lévy-Ullmann, H. and Mirkiné-Guetzévitch, B. (ed.). *La vie juridique des peuples*.)
- Başgöz, I. and Wilson, H. E. *Educational Problems in Turkey, 1920-1940*. Bloomington, 1968.
- Berkes, N. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal, 1964.
- Edib, H. [Adivar]. *The Turkish Ordeal*. London, 1928.
- Frey, F. W. *The Turkish Political Elite*. Cambridge, Mass., 1965.
- Gökalp, Z. (tr. and ed. Berkes, N.). *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*. London, 1959.
- Hershlag, Z. Y. *Turkey, the Challenge of Growth*. Leiden, 1968.
- Heyd, U. *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*. London, 1950.
- *Language Reform in Modern Turkey*. Jerusalem, 1954.
- Howard, H. N. *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923*. Norman, Oklahoma, 1931.
- Jäschke, G. *Die Türkei in den Jahren, 1935-1941*. Leipzig, 1943.
- *Der Islam in der neuen Türkei*. Leiden, 1951.
- *Die Türkei in den Jahren, 1942-1951*. Wiesbaden, 1955.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Karpat, K. H. *Turkey's Politics. The Transition to a Multi-party System.* Princeton, 1959.
- Kazamias, A. M. *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey.* London, 1966.
- Kinross, Lord. *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation.* London, 1964.
- Lewis, B. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey.* 2nd edn. London, 1968.
- Lewis, G. L. *Turkey.* 3rd edn. London, 1965.
- Makal, M. *A Village in Anatolia.* London, 1954.
- Mardin, Ş. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought.* Princeton, 1962.
- Orga, I. *Phoenix Ascendant.* London, 1958.
- Robinson, R. D. *The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development.* Cambridge, Mass., 1963.
- Roux, J. P. *Turquie.* Paris, 1968.
- Smith, E. D. *Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly, 1919-1923.* Washington, D.C., 1959.
- Société pour l'Étude de l'Histoire turque. *Histoire de la république turque.* Istanbul, 1935.
- Stirling, P. *Turkish Village.* London, 1965.
- Thomas, L. V. and Frye, R. N. *The United States and Turkey and Iran.* Cambridge, Mass., 1951.
- Thornburg, M. W., Spry, G. and Soule, G. *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal.* New York, 1949.
- Toynbee, A. J. and Kirkwood, K. P. *Turkey.* London, 1926.
- Turhan, M. *Where are we in Westernization?* Istanbul, 1965.
- Ward, R. E. and Rustow, D. A. (eds.). *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey.* Princeton, 1964.
- Yalman, A. E. *Turkey In My Time.* Norman, Oklahoma, 1956.

GLOSSARY

‘ĀLIM (pl., ‘*ulamā*’). A scholar in the Islamic sciences relating to the Qur’ān, theology and jurisprudence.

BID‘A. An innovation in Muslim belief or practice; the converse of *sunna*, the alleged practice of the Prophet. *Bid‘a* thus tends to be regarded as blameworthy by Muslims.

DĀR AL-ḤARB. ‘The abode of war’, i.e. territory not under Muslim sovereignty, against which warfare for the propagation of the faith is licit; cf. *Jihād*. It is the converse of *Dār al-Islām*, ‘the abode of Islam’.

DHIMMĪ. An adherent of a revealed religion (especially Judaism or Christianity) living under Muslim sovereignty, under the protection of the *Shari‘a* (q.v.).

DĪHQĀN (Persian). A member of the lesser feudal nobility in the Sasanian empire. The *dīhqāns* largely retained their positions after the Arab conquest, but declined in status from the fifth/eleventh century.

FATWĀ. A formal statement of authoritative opinion on a point of *Shari‘a* (q.v.) by a jurisconsult known as a *muftī*.

FERMĀN (Turkish, from Persian, *farmān*). An order or edict emanating from an Ottoman sultan.

GHĀZĪ. A frontier-warrior, taking part in raids (sing. *ghazā*) in the Holy War (*Jihād*, q.v.) against the infidel. The term was used as a title of honour, e.g. by Ottoman rulers.

ḤADĪTH (pl., *aḥādīth*). A Tradition of an alleged saying or practice of the Prophet. A *Ḥadīth* consists of a chain of oral transmitters (*isnād*) and the text transmitted (*matn*).

ḤAJJ. The Pilgrimage to the Holy Places of Mecca, which is a legal obligation upon individual Muslims. The rites of the *Ḥajj* take place between 8 and 12 Dhu’l-Ḥijja, the last month of the Muslim year. The ‘Lesser Pilgrimage’ (*‘Umra*) may be performed at any time.

‘ĪD AL-ADḤĀ. ‘The Feast of Sacrifices’, or *al-‘Īd al-Kabīr* (the Great Feast), held on 10 Dhu’l-Ḥijja, to coincide with the sacrifice which is one of the rites of the *Hajj* (q.v.).

‘ĪD AL-FITR. ‘The Feast of the Breaking of the Fast’ or *al-‘Īd al-Ṣaghīr* (the Small Feast), held after the end of Ramaḍān, the month of fasting.

ILTIZĀM. A farm of taxes of state-lands. The tax-farmer was known as a *multazim*.

IMĀM. The leader of a group of Muslims in ritual prayer (*ṣalāt*); more specifically, the head of the Islamic community (*Umma*). The title was particularly used by the Shī‘ī claimants to the headship of the community.

GLOSSARY

IQṬĀʿ. A grant of state-lands or revenues by a Muslim ruler to an individual usually in recompense for service.

JIHĀD. The Holy War against infidels, which is in certain circumstances an obligation under the *Shariʿa* for Muslims. See also *Ghazī*.

JIZYA. Poll-tax paid to a Muslim government by male members of the protected non-Muslim communities (see *Dhimmi*).

KHUṬBA. The sermon delivered at the Friday congregational prayer in the mosque. Since it includes a prayer for the ruler, mention in the *khutba* is a mark of sovereignty in Islam.

MADHHAB. Sometimes translated 'rite' or 'school', a *madhhab* is one of the four legal systems recognized as orthodox by Sunnī (q.v.) Muslims. They are named after their founders—the Ḥanafī, Ḥanbalī, Mālikī and Shāfiʿī *madhhab*.

MADRASA. A school for teaching the Islamic sciences, frequently connected with a mosque.

MAMLŪK. A slave (especially of Turkish, Circassian or Georgian origin) trained as a soldier.

MAWLĀ (pl., *mawālī*). A client of an Arab tribe; more especially a non-Arab convert during the first century of Islam, who acquired status by attachment to an Arab tribal group.

MIḤRĀB. A recess in the wall of a mosque to indicate the *qibla*, i.e. the direction of Mecca, for the correct orientation of ritual prayer.

MILLET (Turkish, from Arabic *milla*). A religious community in the Ottoman empire, usually used of the non-Muslim (*dhimmi*, q.v.) communities, which had some measure of internal autonomy.

MINBAR. The pulpit in a mosque, from which the *khutba* (q.v.) is delivered.

MUJTAHID. A Shiʿi *ʿālim* (q.v.), exercising the functions of a jurisconsult.

MULLĀ (modern Turkish, *molla*, from Arabic, *mawlā*). A member of the *ʿulamāʾ*.

MURĪD. A disciple of a Ṣūfi (q.v.) teacher.

PĪR (Persian). The Persian equivalent of the Arabic term *shaykh*, in the sense of a Ṣūfi (q.v.) teacher.

QĀḌĪ. A judge in a *Shariʿa* (q.v.) court.

QĀNŪN. A statement of administrative regulations in the Ottoman empire.

SAYYID. Literally, 'lord'. Used to signify a descendant of the Prophet, more specifically through al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī. See also *Sharīf*.

SHARĪʿA. The revealed Holy Law of Islam, derived in theory from the Qurʾān, *Ḥadīth* (q.v.), the consensus (*ijmāʿ*) of the *ʿulamāʾ*, and analogical reasoning (*qiyās*).

GLOSSARY

SHARĪF. Literally 'noble'. Used to signify a descendant of the Prophet, more specifically through al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī. See also *Sayyid*.

SHĪ'A. Literally 'party'. Originally the supporters of 'Alī's claims to the caliphate, the Shī'a evolved into the principal minority religious group of Muslims, with numerous branches including the Twelver Shī'a and the Ismā'ilīs.

SHĪ'I. A member of the Shī'a (q.v.).

SIPAHI (Turkish, from Persian). In Persia a soldier. In the Ottoman state, a cavalryman, maintained by the grant of a *timar* (q.v.). From this term in Indian and North African usage are derived the English 'sepoy' and the French 'spahi'.

ŞŪFĪ. A Muslim mystic, more especially a member of a religious order (*ṭarīqa*), which has special liturgical and other practices as a means to mystical ecstasy.

SUNNĪ. A member of the majority group of Muslims (in contradistinction to the Shī'a), belonging to one of the four *madhhabs* (q.v.), which claim the authority of the *sunna* of the Prophet as transmitted in the *Ḥadīths* (q.v.).

TIMAR. The Turkish equivalent to *iqṭā'* (q.v.): in particular, the smallest type of Ottoman land-grant. See also *Sipahi*.

VILAYET. A province of the Ottoman empire.

WAQF (pl., *awqāf*). An endowment (usually of landed property) established for pious purposes (*waqf khayrī*), or for the benefit of the donor's family (*waqf ahli*). In North Africa the equivalent term is *hubbūs*.

ZĀWIYA. A Šūfī convent.

